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The Value of Humanity
Lisa Nandi Theunissen
My dissertation is on foundational questions about the value of human beings. This is
a Kantian topic but I develop a proposal in a non-Kantian framework. I argue that to
be a Kantian in ethics is to be committed to rationalism, but that the foundations of
ethics should take account of the nature of human beings and our circumstances in the
world. I develop a non-Kantian theory in which the value of human beings is no different,
metaphysically speaking, from the value of other valuable things. Human beings have value,
just as anything of value has value: because we are capable of being good-for something or
someone. Most fundamentally, I argue that we are capable of being good-for ourselves. I
propose that human beings have value in virtue of a capacity for having final ends, and that
the capacity for having final ends makes us valuable because it makes us capable of living a
good life, a life that is valuable because it is good-for the person who leads it. I show how
the value of human beings gives everyone reason to treat human beings in certain ways. In
particular, I show how everyone has reason not to destroy the capacity of human beings to
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Katja in more indirect ways, too. I have attended nearly all her seminars at Columbia, and
been a TA for several of her undergraduate courses. Without Katja, if I can put it this way,
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to my irritation. Our partnership over the eight years that followed meant that I engaged
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My dissertation begins with the question of why human beings are to be viewed, treated, and
generally related to in very special ways. It asks: what kind of value grounds this distinctive
status? Accordingly, the starting-point of my project is the central ethical question of what
we owe to others. I am concerned with our ethical relations with human beings, whose value
I take to be distinctive, while allowing that there could be an analogous (if less ambitious)
picture about what we owe to non-human animals.
From what we owe to human beings it is a short step to the value of human beings. We
take that step when we ask what it is about human beings that makes us subjects of ethical
concern. That we ‘have an elbow’, or ‘a vestigial appendage’, that we ‘walk upright’, are
so many joking candidates. But they make a serious point. If human beings are such as
to merit being treated in certain ways, it is because something about us is valuable. The
question of my dissertation is: what makes human beings valuable, and accordingly, such as
to be treated in certain ways and not in others?
Much of the literature on the value of human beings begins with Kant. Recent emphasis
on the so-called ‘Formula of Humanity’ version of the Categorical Imperative has made
Kant the central interlocutor in accounts of human value generally. Now there are various
ways of appealing to Kant on this topic, and of working out whether to construct a positive
account of the value of human beings in a Kantian framework. A common approach is
to engage closely with Kant and Kantian views on the value of humanity. It is not the
approach taken in the present work. My approach is rather to ask, more basically, what is
it to be a Kantian in ethics? What commitments make it the case that one is or is not a
Kantian? With that in view, the thought is, we have grounds for determining whether to
They are joking candidates of Robert Nozick.

construct an account of human value in a Kantian framework.
In Chapter , ‘Kant’s Commitment to Metaphysics of Morals’, I argue that a definitive
feature of Kant’s moral philosophy is its rationalism. Kant insists that moral theory, at
least at its foundation, cannot take account of empirical facts about human beings and
their circumstances in the world. This is the core of Kant’s commitment to ‘metaphysics
of morals’, and it is what he sees as his greatest contribution to moral philosophy. The
paper clarifies what it means to be committed to metaphysics of morals, why Kant is
committed to it, and where he thinks empirical considerations may enter moral theory. The
paper examines recent work of contemporary Kantians (Barbara Herman, Allen Wood and
Christine Korsgaard) who argue that there is a central role for empirical considerations in
Kant’s moral theory. Either these theorists interpret Kant himself as permitting empirical
considerations to enter moral theory, or they propose to extend Kant’s theory so as to allow
them to enter. I argue that these interpretive trends are not supported by the texts, and that
the proposed extensions are not plausibly Kantian. Kant’s insistence on the exclusion of
empirical considerations from the foundations of moral theory is not an incidental feature
of his thought which might be modified while the rest remains unchanged. Rather, it is the
very center of his endeavors in moral philosophy. If we disagree with it, I argue, we have
grounds for moving to a distinctly different theoretical framework.
In Chapter , ‘Responsibility and the Value of Intelligible Beings’, I show why Kant’s
rationalism may be thought to raise deep concerns. Kant has long been thought committed
to a dilemma about responsibility: either we are never responsible for morally bad actions,
or we are always responsible for morally bad actions. We are never responsible for bad
actions because, for Kant, we are only fully agents when we act as we morally should, not
when we fail to do so. We are always responsible for bad actions, for Kant, because we are
always capable of moral agency, and therefore always responsible for failing to live up to

it. I consider whether either horn of the dilemma may be seized by appealing to lines of
argument in David Velleman and Christine Korsgaard. Ultimately, I conclude that these
arguments fail. The dilemma is generated by Kant’s non-empirical conception of agency,
and we should reject this conception. While it is true that we are rational agents, I argue
that our empirical nature is also taken, and is right to be taken, as practically relevant. We
relate to one another as rational beings, but also as beings with failings and vulnerabilities.
In sum, the first two chapters of my dissertation make the case that Kant is a rationalist
in ethics, and that rationalism is a position we have reason to reject. Taken together, these
chapters give my grounds for developing an account of the value of human beings in a
non-Kantian framework.
But, of course, it is important to have Kant’s account of the value of humanity in view.
In many ways, Kant has set the terms—human beings as ‘ends-in-themselves’, human beings
as ‘absolutely’ valuable—for subsequent discussions. By way of introduction, then, allow me
to say a word about Kant’s views, as I read him, on the value of humanity. It will become
clear that Kant’s treatment sets the terms for my own in several respects.
. Kant on Ends-In-Themselves
Kant’s claim that human beings are ‘ends-in-themselves’ is widely invoked, and it has
achieved something of the status of a platitude. But it is worth pausing to ask whether it
is a notion we fully understand. For despite the familiarity it has achieved, the idea that
human beings are ends might strike us as rather puzzling.
As it emerges in Kant, the notion of an end-in-itself figures in what we might think of as
a theory of action. Kant’s is less a theory of action in general than a theory of those actions
we should be doing. Given Kant’s peculiar conception of normativity, his is an account
of action in accordance with laws of practical reason. There are broadly two kinds of law

of practical reason, the moral law and the law (or more weakly, the rule) of instrumental
reason. The talk of ends comes as Kant is outlining what is involved in the capacity to
act in accordance with the representation of laws (:). Like Aristotle, Kant thinks that
action is for the sake of ends. This is a moral-psychological point about that in view of
which we determine ourselves to act. There are the ends which vary among us, and there
is happiness as the end common to us all. Unlike Aristotle, however, Kant thinks there is
something distinctly moral in view of which we determine ourselves to act. Kant calls this
an end-in-itself. The end-in-itself is that for the sake of which we act when we act morally.
For Kant, human beings, as rational beings, meet the criteria for being ends-in-
themselves. On the face of it, human beings ought to strike us as surprising candidates for
being ends of any kind. What is puzzling about thinking of human beings as ends is that
an end is to be brought about; it is an object of choice. And it is not clear what it would
mean to say that human beings are to be brought about. Kant handles this infelicity by
having ends-in-themselves be different kinds of end : independently- or self-existent ends
(:). The thought is that human beings are ends, not in the sense that they are to be
brought about as effects of our action, but in the sense that they are constraints or limits on
action. We might say that while Kant takes over Aristotle’s teleological conception of action
in taking action to be for the sake of ends, the notion of an end-in-itself is robbed of its
teleological import.
Still, I take it human beings may yet be said to qualify as ‘ends’ in at least two ways.
First, an end may be parsed as that for the sake of which we act, and human beings may
intelligibly be said to be that for whose sake we act. So we can intelligibly say things like:
“I brought the meeting to a close for her sake” or, “You did not give back the money for
his sake, but for your own”. Second, I take it the talk of ends is meant to exploit a contrast
with means, so as to make a normative point. The notion of an end-in-itself picks out that

in a theory of action which cannot figure merely as a means to something else, and in that
sense figures always as an end. While activities like making tea or fetching children are
ends from one point of view—ends from the point of view of boiling water or getting in
the car—from another point of view they are means to further ends—to refreshment and
having the children home. By contrast, the end-in-itself in Kant cannot lose its status as an
end to become a mere means to something else. The qualification ‘mere’ here is important.
For Kant, there are other ends with respect to which an end-in-itself may be taken as a
means. So we might pay a taxi driver to take us home. Kant’s point is not that we cannot
treat human beings as means to other ends we have. It is just that we should not treat them
merely as means. It is in this sense that they cannot lose their status as ‘ends’. In these two
respects, then, I take it that there is at least a diminished sense in which human beings may
be thought of as ‘ends’.
Note that Kant also puts the difference between ordinary ends and ends-in-themselves
in terms of a difference in our motivational orientation. Our motivation to pursue ordinary
ends is a function of desire, while our motivation to pursue ends-in-themselves is a function
of a rational motive. In this way, Kant’s account of what is involved in acting in accordance
with the representation of practical laws has two components. There must be an end and
there must be a source of motivation. There are, then, two kinds of ends and two kinds of
motivation, corresponding to the two kinds of practical law.
. A Normative Doctrine
An end-in-itself, then, is that for the sake of which we act, when we act morally. It is an end
we are to have irrespective of desire. And it is a distinctive kind of end in being such that
Or so Kant lists the components when he outlines ‘the matter’ of practical laws, where he had hitherto
outlined their ‘form’ (:-).

it is to be acknowledged as a constraint on action rather than as something to be brought
about. The account of human beings as ends-in-themselves is ultimately an account of what
that acknowledgement comes to. It is an account of how we should behave with respect to
human beings. Put colloquially, the doctrine says that we are to engage with human beings
always in such a way that we recognise that they are capable of making up their own minds
about things. So Kant says we must treat human beings as limits on choice, and as objects
of respect (:). Later he will add that we are to treat human beings in such a way that
we consider their concerns, projects and interests—their ends—as things we must work to
further (:). So what it means for human beings to be ends-in-themselves is for human
beings to be treated in these particular ways.
This being so, the doctrine of human beings as ends-in-themselves does not by itself tell
us why human beings are to be valued as they are. The doctrine does not settle the question
of whether human beings are to be treated as ends-in-themselves because they possess some
special property, or some distinctive kind of value, or because ideally rational agents would
so treat them; it does not tell us whether human beings are to be treated as ends because I
would have others treat me that way, and on pain of inconsistency, must so treat others. To
that extent, the doctrine may be thought to push our question back, our question being:
what makes it the case that human beings are valuable, and accordingly, to be treated in
certain favourable ways.
As we might put it, then, being an end-in-itself is a second-order property. To be an
end-in-itself is to be the kind of thing that is to be treated in certain ways—as a limit
While we might gloss this by saying that we should treat human beings as autonomous, really autonomy
should be understood as meaning, more strictly, capable of legislating, and governing oneself with a view to,




on choice, an object of respect, and something whose ends are to be furthered. Now the
expression ‘ends-in-themselves’ is sometimes used to denote that in virtue of which human
beings are to be treated in certain ways. That is, the expression is sometimes used to denote
a first-order property, a property which features in an explanation of the special treatment
of human beings. So it is said that human beings must be treated with respect because they
are ends-in-themselves. If what I have said is right, however, that would be to say no more
than that human beings must be treated with respect because human beings must be treated
with respect. I would add that this purported explanatory use of the phrase stretches the
notion of an ‘end’ quite beyond the extended sense granted above, the sense granted for
‘independent-’ or ‘self-existent’ end. For what does it mean to say that an object has the
property of being an end (or a means for that matter)? It is agents who take objects as ends
or means; objects by themselves cannot bear these relations. The notion of an end must be
relativised to an (possible) agent, or valuer.
. Kant on the Absolute Value of Humanity
Why does Kant think human beings must be treated as ends-in-themselves? As I read him,
Kant’s explanation is that human beings have ‘absolute value’. Absolute value is said to be
something the existence of which in itself has value (:), or inner worth (:). The
bearer of absolute value, as Kant puts it figuratively, is like a jewel that shines by itself,
having its full worth in itself (:). While it involves other notions besides, the notion of
absolute value involves at least the idea of value that does not derive from its relationship to
anything else.
That is, presuming we do not hold a teleological world view. For Aristotle it makes sense to say that ends
are goods and goods are ends. But we no longer take this kind of equation to be plausible—we don’t think of
things as themselves end-like.

The notion of absolute value is contrasted with relative value (:). What has relative
value may be priced and admits of comparison, replacement and equivalents (:). The
explanation of the value of relatively valuable things—of everything that is not absolutely
valuable, for these categories are taken to be exhaustive—is that we are inclined towards
them. Kant does not have a sophisticated theory of relative value, and he seems to take
inclination to be a basic explanatory concept, so that the concepts of interest, need and
benefit are reducible to it. This is questionable since we may well have no inclination
towards what may be of benefit to us, as in, a trip to the dentist. But the category of relative
value is seemingly meant to include what has worth because we want it, because it makes
our lives go well, meets our needs, or is of benefit. About all values of this kind Kant is a
kind of projectivist, so that our wanting (or needing, or being benefited by) something is
not a response to a seeming good-making property in it, but is conferred by desire. Again,
while it is characterised in other terms besides, the notion of relative value involves at least
the idea of value that derives from its relationship to something else, as in Kant’s account,
to the inclinations of human valuers.
Kant’s argument for the existence of absolute value, and for human beings as bearers
of absolute value, proceeds in two stages. There must be something of absolute value for
without it there could be no moral law (stage ); human beings meet the criteria for having
absolute value (stage ). We have already met stage  of the argument, but we can restate it
intuitively as follows. The moral law is categorically binding on human beings—it holds
He writes, for example, of “inclinations and the needs based on them” (:). Later (at :), Kant
draws a distinction between value that is relative to inclination, and value that is relative to a certain taste, or
delight. So there are in fact two basic concepts at work here, inclination and taste. They correspond to what
has market price and fancy price, respectively (:-).
Kant sometimes puts the relative value idea in terms of what has conditional value (:), where that
means value conditional on our inclinations and taste, but also, if we turn back to the opening of the
Groundwork, value conditional on circumstance. Relative values are such that they may be good in some
circumstances, and bad in others. They are not, as Kant also puts it here, good without limitation (:-).

irrespective of inclination. Action in accordance with the representation of the moral law
requires an end, or good. Since the law is categorically binding, this end or good cannot
be relative to inclination—it cannot be good because we want it, and not otherwise. It
must be an end or good that simply has value—has absolute value. If there is a moral law,
there is absolute value. The second stage of Kant’s argument, such as it is, is that, unlike
the other candidates he considers—the objects of our inclinations, inclinations themselves,
non-rational beings—the nature of human beings, as rational beings, marks them out as
absolutely valuable (:). Human beings are absolutely valuable on account of their
nature as rational beings.
So stated, what are we to make of Kant’s explanation of the distinctive value of human
beings? We can take hold of Kant’s argument at both stages  and . Of stage , we might
deny that moral requirements must be grounded in values. Or we might agree that
moral requirements must be grounded in values, but deny that moral requirements are of
a sort (such as to be categorically binding) that they must be grounded in values that are
likewise absolute. I am sympathetic to this second line. To look ahead, my scepticism about
Note that Kant’s argument is hypothetical. He is not here arguing that there is a moral law, he is so far
only outlining what the law would need to be, and what the capacity to act in accordance with it would need
to involve. As Kant puts the argument: there is something of absolute value because “without it nothing of
absolute worth would be found anywhere; but if all worth were conditional and therefore contingent, then no
supreme principle for reason could be found anywhere” (:). The task of showing that there is a moral law
is the burden of Section III of the Groundwork.
In stating the two stages of the argument this way, I agree with the interpretations given in Timmermann
() and Vogt (). I disagree with the interpretations given in Korsgaard (a) and Wood (), and
with the general line of interpretation to which they have given rise. Among recent defenders of the Korsgaard
line, see Martin () and Sussman (). Among recent detractors of Kant read along Korsgaardian lines,
see Regan ().
Important interpretive questions come up here about, as it is sometimes put, deontological versus
teleological readings of Kant. See for example the lines taken in Herman (a), and Johnson (). See
also Timmermann (). My own view is that the moral law is grounded in a value, for Kant, but in such a
way that the value turns out to be a postulate. For that reason, Kant is not what we would think of as a value
realist.

absolute value, or in my terms, value simpliciter, is related to a scepticism about categorical
bindingness.
Of stage , consider that, as Kant goes on to tell us what it is about rational nature that
makes it so valuable, the emphasis comes to be laid on our capacity to be moral. As the
famous passage has it: “Hence morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality,
is that which alone has dignity”, where to have dignity is to have absolute value (:). I
admit I find this to be an overly narrow, or overly moralised, conception of what makes
human beings valuable. What is more, at times Kant writes as if it is not the capacity to
be moral that makes human beings valuable, but the state of having a good will. As Kant
puts it in one of a number of similar passages, it is the person who wills to act from basic
principles that has dignity, and is the object of respect (:). So while Kant has long been
held to be the Enlightenment proponent of the view that all human beings have distinctive
value just in virtue of being a certain kind of being, when we look closely at the texts, he
seems to say that more—that merit—is needed. That is, it looks as if Kant is saying that
only morally good human beings have the relevant kind of value.
Finally, there is the possibility not only that not all human beings have absolute value
for Kant, but that no human beings do. This is a possibility not just for the reason that
likely no one has a good will. For there are passages which suggest that the proper object
of respect, the mode of valuation proper to objects of absolute value, is not human beings
in the first place, but the moral law. Kant says that “Any respect for a person is properly
Darwall () considers the challenge posed by these passages to the orthodox, non-merit, reading
of Kant on the value of humanity, though he ultimately concludes in favour of the orthodox view. Dean
() takes a different position. He defends the view that only human beings with a good will have absolute
value for Kant, mainly for the reason that the Groundwork opens with the claim that only the good will has
absolute value. Vogt () suggests we think of Kant as going back and forth on this question. She argues
that while Kant never gives up the idea that human beings simply have absolute value, he shifts emphasis in
the Metaphysics of Morals. There the emphasis is less on treating human beings as objects of value, and more
on treating the values (the ends) of human beings as the objects of concern, and the locus of action.

only respect for the law [. . . ] of which he gives us an example” (: n). In these moments,
it looks as if the value of human beings is relational after all: the value of human beings
depends on their standing in an appropriate relationship to the moral law. Now we might
say that Kant thinks that it is in the nature of human beings to be moral, or to be capable of
being moral, so that the relationship of human beings to the moral law is not a contingent
one. But even if it is constitutive of human beings that they be related in some way to
the moral law, it is still the moral law that has non-relational value, human beings only
derivatively so.
. A Non-Kantian Account of the Value of Human Beings
My own account of the value of human beings in a way begins by asking Kant’s question: are
human beings absolutely valuable? The notion of absolute value, as it has been explicated
above, is a notion of non-relational value, of something’s being valuable independently of
its relationship to anything or anyone. In fact, my interest is slightly more focussed. My
interest is in whether human beings are valuable simpliciter, that is, valuable independently
of being good-for anything or anyone—independently of being useful for something, or
beneficial in some broader way. This is an aspect of the notion of absolute value which
interests Kant, as when he characterises the good will as being such that usefulness would
add nothing to its worth, and fruitlessness take nothing away (:).
The distinction between good simpliciter and good-for is an instance of the distinction
between non-relational and relational value. But unlike this second distinction, which is
broad enough to encompass meta-ethical questions, the distinction between good simpliciter
and good-for is a distinction in the metaphysics of value. As we might put it, it pertains
to the structure of value. It is possible to have a range of meta-ethical theories of good
simpliciter and of good-for, and the distinction cross cuts questions about, for example,

realism and anti-realism. In this work, I leave these meta-ethical questions to one side, while
recognising that they would be part of a full account of the nature of the value of human
beings.
It is something of a background hypothesis to my dissertation that there is no such
thing as value simpliciter. My background hypothesis is that all value is value-for something
or someone, and that the value of human beings is no exception. Now there are different
ways to try to defend this hypothesis. One could construct a historical genealogy of the
notion of value simpliciter, and show it to depend on assumptions we need not accept. For
example, it may be shown to rest on theological assumptions. Alternatively, one could
argue that good means good-for. Or one could argue that good simpliciter has no practical
relevance for ethical life. My own approach is to argue that the notion of value simpliciter
is theoretically superfluous—that we can do without it. As a corollary of that, my focus is in
large part on showing what an account which appeals only to the notion of value-for might
look like, and how it can capture core desiderata for an account of the value of human
beings. Chapters  and  of my dissertation are companion papers. They carry different
burdens of this task, but the lines of argument are mutually dependent and supporting.
In Chapter , ‘On Regress Arguments for the Value of Valuers’, I examine a common
argument schema for the value simpliciter of human beings. It begins with an argument for
value simpliciter. There must be something of value simpliciter for anything to have value;
the chains of dependence between values must come to an end. According to prominent
versions of this argument, put forward by Joseph Raz and others, human beings meet
the criteria for having value simpliciter. I reject this argument schema, and the notion of
See Vogt ().
On the semantic side of the question, see Geach (), Foot (), Thomson (, ).
This is a way of putting the approach taken by Kraut ().

value simpliciter as theoretically superfluous. If we reject value simpliciter, the chains of
dependence between values must be such that human beings are valuable either: (i) because
we are good-for objects or activities of value; (ii) because we are good-for human beings (or
other beings); or (iii) because we are good-for ourselves. I give reason to favour (iii). I argue
that objects and activities of value have value because they have value-for human beings (or
other beings), and that human beings have value because we are capable of standing in a
relation to ourselves, a relation of being good-for ourselves. This makes the value of human
beings non-derivative on the value of something else, but without invoking the notion of
value simpliciter.
In Chapter , ‘On the Value of Human Beings’, I give a positive account of the value
of human beings. I take the basis of human value to be that we are capable of having final
ends, that is, interests, projects and relationships that are pursued for their own sake. By
working through a proposal by Samuel Scheffler, I argue that to have a final end is (i) to
believe that the end is valuable, (ii) to be guided by the end in long-range deliberation,
(iii) to be engaged with the end in a sustained way over time, and (iv) to be emotionally
susceptible to successes and failures in pursuit of the end. The capacity for having final ends
makes us valuable, I argue, because it makes us capable of leading a good life. And a good
life is valuable because it is valuable for the person whose life it is. The most fundamental
explanation of the value of having final ends, then, is that it makes us (in this sense) good-for
ourselves. The explanation has the air of a paradox. For one, it raises a question about the
reasons we have to respond to human beings. If the capacity to have final ends makes us
valuable because it makes us good-for ourselves, what reason should others have to respond
to us? This is an instance of a more general worry, raised by Donald H. Regan, about
the normative force of goodness-for. I argue that the worry rests on a misunderstanding
about the theoretical role of goodness-for. That human beings are valuable because we are

good-for something or someone explains the value of human beings. That is, it explains
how human beings genuinely have value—value which gives everyone reason to interact
with human beings in specifiable ways. In particular, I argue that we have reason (i) not
to destroy the capacity of human beings to pursue their own ends, and (ii) to help others
pursue their ends.
My project ultimately relates to a wide range of issues in normative ethics, meta-ethics,
and the metaphysics of value. Looking over it now I am struck above all by the open
questions. I am struck too by the ways in which one’s philosophical argumentation does not
always secure the conclusions one had hoped for, or take one in the direction one anticipated.
Still, my hope is to have laid the ground for an account of the value of human beings in
which we are valuable, as other valuable things are valuable, because we are valuable-for
something or someone. My hope is to have shown how this approach can capture important
desiderata for an account of the value of human beings, for example, central obligations to
treat one another in very particular ways. Much of what will need to be said is future work.
In what remains of this introduction, I will describe some of questions, or projects, which
naturally emerge from work in my dissertation.
. Open Questions
While I lend support to the thesis that good is good-for in my dissertation, it remains to
be made out what it is, meta-ethically speaking, for something to be good-for something
or someone. I aim to develop a relational realist account of good-for. The first part of
this label, ‘relational’, refers to the claim that good is good-for. The second part, ‘realist’,
refers to the claim that, as I anticipate, there are frequently, though in some cases it may be
indeterminate, objective facts of the matter about what is good-for something or someone.
In my view, whether something is good-for something or someone depends on facts about

the nature of the subject, and facts about the valuable activity, object, or state of affairs
in question. As I see it, then, we should not understand what is good-for someone to be
a ‘subjective’ matter. And yet, I do think that a subject’s interests, desires and preferences
frequently bear on what is good-for them. This is not because what we want or prefer
determines what is good-for us, but because it is often good-for subjects to have their
interests, desires and preferences met (there are obvious exceptions!). There are further, and
to my mind interesting, epistemological questions about how we can know that something
is good for someone. Do we have to be brought up in a certain way? Is it something we can
in some sense ‘perceive’, though we cannot fully explain why? But these are further matters.
A second topic to emerge from my dissertation is whether the pursuit of ethically bad
ends is bad-for the person who pursues them—such that it will make her own life go
badly. I take a stand on this question in my dissertation, suggesting that it will. This is
an ambitious claim, and it is not one I adequately defend. Still, I find it plausible, and it
is something I hope to take up in future work. One strategy is to argue that the notion
of a good life for human beings is not reducible to a non-normative notion of biological
functioning, or health. The thought would be that a person’s life may be well going in
material respects—the villain may be physically and psychologically healthy—though her
life will not count as well-going in the relevant sense. The notion of a good-life, a life that
is good-for the person who leads it, will be understood to be irreducibly normative. What
does that mean? It means that the notion of a good life is not purely descriptive, but involves
notions like ‘well’, ‘flourishing’ and so on—normative terms that cannot be eliminated.
Then the argumentative burden will have shifted from something’s being good simpliciter,
to a life’s being good-for the person who leads it, where the latter is not something we
can further analyse in non-normative terms. Where would the theoretical gain lie, then?
Is it not the case that the same, or analogous, metaphysical and epistemological worries

come up for the notion of a good life? One might think there is a clear epistemological
gain in shifting from theorising about the good to theorising about the good-for human
beings, since the notion of a good life (understood normatively) is an object of study in
the non-fundamental sciences, and of humanistic reflection more broadly. The notion of a
good life, though normative, may be thought a more tractable notion.
Another strategy, and one I am also sympathetic to, would be to deny that the villain,
the one who pursues bad ends, is leading a good life in material respects—is functioning
well. The strategy would be to turn the tables on the objector, and urge her to find a real
case of a well-functioning villain. The thought would be that, as a matter of empirical
fact, villains tend to be psychologically and cognitively disordered. And there may be deep
reasons for this, owing, for example, to our constitution as agents. I am sympathetic to
the idea, raised for example by Thomas Nagel in The View From Nowhere, that we are
normatively oriented towards the good. Or one might point to the sense in which human
beings are social beings, that we exist in dependent relationships with one another, and
that the life of the villain puts him deeply at odds with other people. I take it that the
thought that it is the good person who has a good life is deeply Platonic (it is the view of
the Plato of the Republic), and, like Plato, I think it is difficult to argue for. In my view,
however, the burden is shifted away from an implausible conception of value (value as value
simpliciter), and towards something that is, if difficult to prove, likely to be true! I should
add that one can take the Platonic line while thinking that good-for is not something we
can further analyse. We might say that someone whose life goes badly will exhibit certain
features (lack of order, psychic conflict, impaired relationships with people, and so on).
But you might think there will still be the question of what makes these features of a bad
life? You might think this is the analogue of G. E. Moore’s open question argument in the
My thinking about this option stems from discussion with Katja Vogt.
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domain of good-for. And I am sympathetic to some version of it.
A third topic is the relevance of so-called agent-relative considerations in ethics. It is
sometimes argued that the notion of what is good-for someone is normatively inert, in the
sense that the good-for someone gives rise to reasons for them, but not to others. If true,
this would be a bad result for theories of the good-for human beings, and for prospects
of making ‘good for’ central to ethics. I reject this argument in my dissertation. I argue
that the fact that we explain the value of something in terms of its being good-for someone,
does not affect the scope of the reasons to which it gives rise. As we might put it, good as
good-for gives rise to perfectly ‘agent-neutral’ reasons. But this line of reply can seem to
push matters too far in the other direction, in failing to capture intuitions about reasonable
partiality. We tend to think that our own good, and the good of those close to us, is a
matter of special importance to us. It guides our deliberations in ways that it does not
guide the deliberations of strangers. The challenge is to find a way to accommodate these
reasonable forms of partiality. I am interested in developing a proposal on which, while
what is good-for someone gives rise to (at least ‘pro tanto’) reasons for everyone, we have
instrumental reasons to attend to the good of those proximate to us. We have reason to
attend to the good of those we are best equipped to attend to, given our competences, our
knowledge of the facts, our standing with respect to them, and so on. This might seem to
make the ground of our special obligations to ourselves and those close to us too weak, or of
the wrong kind. To that I would argue that, while it is sufficient to capture important forms
of partiality, the ground is weak. I would argue that this is so in virtue of our relatedness to
all human beings, and the good of all human beings.

 Kant’s Commitment to Metaphysics of Morals
. Introduction
Kant has long had an image as an austere and aprioristic moralist. This is perhaps of
little wonder given that Kant’s avowed methodological commitment in moral philosophy,
as he tells us in the preface to the Groundwork, is sharply to separate its rational from its
empirical parts, and to work out the foundations of morality with the rational part alone.
Since a notion of obligation lies at the heart of Kant’s moral theory, Kant will put this as a
commitment about the ground or basis of obligation. The ground of obligation is not to be
sought in the nature of human beings or their circumstances in the world; the ground of
obligation is to be sought a priori, in reason (GW :). Since obligation has a master
principle, the Categorical Imperative, Kant will derive the master principle of morality,
and from it, a system of duties, a priori. So much is the purview of moral philosophy
proper, of what Kant calls ‘metaphysics of morals’, and Kant is doing metaphysics in each
of his canonical practical works. The remit of empirical ethics, what Kant calls ‘practical
anthropology’, is to account for the material conditions which stand in the way of fulfilling
obligations. But anthropology is separate from moral philosophy proper, and is given no
systematic treatment by Kant himself. This anyway is the orthodoxy. But the orthodox
Bernard Williams has been one of the more insistent on this conception of Kant in contemporary
discussions. See, for example, the opening of Williams ().
References to all of Kant’s works, except the Critique of Pure Reason, are to the volume and page numbers
of the Preussische Akademie edition, and will be given in the body of the text. References to the Critique of
Pure Reason will follow the standard method of citing page numbers in the first and second editions (A and B).
By the canonical works I mean the Groundwork, the Critique of Practical Reason, and The Metaphysics of
Morals.
This is notwithstanding the publication of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, a record of Kant’s
notes for his paid lectures on anthropology in the form of a textbook. For an account of the provenance of the
work, see Kuehn (, especially p. ix).
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image of Kant has been shifting over the past thirty years or so, and a friendlier, a more
humanistic, an altogether more empirically informed, Kant has grown up in its stead.
The shift is broadly coincident with emergent interest in Kant’s late work, The Meta-
physics of Morals. While it goes over some of the pure foundations from the Groundwork,
this book is more concretely interested in the form morality takes in human life. For
example, where the Groundwork had given just a handful of applications of the principle
of morality, The Metaphysics of Morals exploits very general facts about human beings to
provide a fuller picture of our moral duties to ourselves and others. In the book’s first part,
The Doctrine of Right, the principle of morality is shown to yield externally enforceable
laws for public life. And in The Doctrine of Virtue there is discussion of various topics
in moral psychology. Included there, too, are casuistical asides on concrete matters such
as the morality of serving wine at dinner parties (MM :), or of signing a letter ‘Your
Obedient Servant’ when the custom of politeness strains sincerity (MM :). There is
practical advice on the moral instruction of young people; and practical concern for mak-
ing morality effectual in the life of grownups. The Metaphysics of Morals raises questions,
in this way, about the status of applied and empirical considerations in Kant’s late work. It
At least in the anglophone world, that interest has coincided with Mary Gregor’s  translation, the
first complete translation since the original English language publication in . For notes on the history of
the translation, see the Further Reading in Kant (b). For praise of Gregor’s translation and a sense of its
importance, see Dahlstrom ().
As Sullivan () notes in his Introduction to the Cambridge Edition, this is an important datum against
the thought that the domain of Kantian morality is individual, personal life (p. xii). It may also bear on efforts
to come to terms with the charge that Kant is socially disinterested, or a moral ‘individualist’. Baier ()
puts one version of that charge this way: “What is of interest for my purposes is his [Kant’s] taking of social
cooperation and group membership as not of primary moral importance” (p. ).
These include the relationship between pleasure, desire and the interests of reason (MM :-; :),
moral emotion (MM : ff.), and self-governance (MM : ff.).
See Sections I and II of the Doctrine of the Methods of Ethics.
See MM :, :, :, :.
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has led some commentators to urge that Kant wholly reconfigures the Groundwork division
between metaphysics and anthropology in his mature writings, so that there is development
across the practical oeuvre.
This developmental story finds new emphasis among commentators interested in the
status of virtue ethical considerations in Kant. These commentators argue that The
Metaphysics of Morals makes room for notions of moral development, virtue, character, and
moral perception. This has led to a reevaluation of the core doctrines standardly associated,
for better or worse, with Kantian ethics. To objections against the Kantian model of
deliberation—that it is rule-bound and inflexible; or against the ‘thinness’ of the Kantian
person—that it is empirically insubstantial, the appeal to virtue in Kant has looked to yield
ready lines of reply. Indeed, the incorporation of virtue ethical considerations has been
so pervasive that it has been possible to argue that there is nothing distinctive about virtue
ethical, as against Kantian, theories in normative ethics.
See for example the remarks of Wood (, p. xxx).
Among them are Herman (b, ), O’Neill (), Sherman (), Korsgaard (a), and Baron
().
For an example of a Kantian response to the first kind of charge, see O’Neill (). For a forceful
statement of the second kind of charge, see Williams ().
This is a central thesis of Nussbaum (). Nussbaum argues that to treat virtue ethics as a distinct
position from Kantianism (and utilitarianism) involves a category mistake, for all of these theories have
substantive conceptions of virtue. Encapsulating many of the ideas in the above paragraph, Nussbaum writes:
In one way, this increasingly popular way of talking [of virtue ethics as a distinct position in
ethics] is an obvious category mistake. Immanuel Kant has a theory of virtue, and devotes a
good deal of attention to its exposition. Although The Doctrine of Virtue was at one time a
relatively neglected part of Kant’s moral philosophy, read only by specialists, it is now widely
discussed, and widely recognized as central. Nobody can any longer think of Kant’s view as
obsessed with duty and principle to the exclusion of character-formation and the passions.
[. . . ] Moreover, the rediscovery of Kant’s theory of virtue has also led to serious reevaluation
of the substantive positions of his other ethical writings, as scholars depict a Kant who is less
rigorist and more flexible, less concerned with abstract principle and more concerned with the
exercise of moral judgment, than the Kant of previous generations (p. ).

At the same time, if from another direction, efforts have been made to fill out Kant’s
moral anthropology, the empirical part of moral philosophy to which he never gave sys-
tematic attention, and commentators have turned to Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point
of View, the essays on history, and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. On the
basis of these texts some have claimed that far from being a subsidiary part of Kant’s moral
theory, empirical considerations about human nature actually lie at its foundation. To the
question, “What is Kant’s ethics really about?”, Allen Wood () has urged that where
others would say freedom, or the nature of practical reason, “I say that Kantian ethics is most
fundamentally about human social conflict, its psychological roots and historical meaning”
(p. ). This has led to an air of sea-change, even revolution, in Kant interpretation, with
commentators urging their peers to give up the aprioristic image of Kant as thoroughly
stereotypical and interpretively unsound.
My concern in what follows is to resist these recent trends. Kant’s commitment to
metaphysics of morals has been insufficiently appreciated in the literature. This is no doubt
partly because Kant’s ethics is largely treated independently from his metaphysics generally,
with insufficient attention to their relationship. But I will urge that Kant’s commitment to
See for example the essays on Kant’s anthropology edited by Jacobs and Kain (), and the monograph
by Louden ().
For example, Wood () writes of the “anthropological foundations” of Kantian moral theory (p. ),
and of Kantian theory as “deriv[ing] its intellectual power mainly from its anthropological insights” (p. ).
On giving up stereotypes, see Wood (, p. ); on the revolutionary gain in so doing, see Wood’s
description of the aim of his book: to “help to transform our conception of our own history and of ourselves as
heirs of the Enlightenment. The aspiration of this book is to contribute in some small way to that revolution”
(, p. ).
This has been remarked by Neiman (), who writes: “The excellent and growing body of recent
work on Kant’s moral philosophy has not devoted sufficient attention to the question why Kant holds that
only reason can function as the source of moral principles” (p. ). Neiman hypothesises that the lack of
attention is due to treating Kant’s moral philosophy separately from the critical philosophy. Foremost among
commentators who have given systematic attention to Kant’s notion of metaphysics of morals is O’Neill
(). See also Gregor (, ch. ). Note that while Gregor’s work is cited as an authority by others—by, for

metaphysics of morals—to establishing the foundations of morality and its master principle
a priori—sets real limitations on interpretation. The commitment is so central that to give
up on it is to give up on the Kantian project. That is, I will argue that it is definitive of a
Kantian position that it exclude empirical considerations from moral foundations.
My motivations here are both interpretive and philosophical (if you will allow the
distinction). I would resist the idea that by incorporating empirical considerations, Kantian
ethics is made more philosophically attractive. Recent Kantians have sought to offset
the idea that Kant’s ethics is abstract, ahistorical, or unduly concerned with the motive
of duty, where the thought would be that a more concrete, historically situated, and
sympathetically motivated theory would be preferable. But must we think this? We might
make the general point that simplicity and abstractness are significant philosophical virtues,
perhaps especially in light of the complexity of moral phenomena. We might enlist Kant’s
own observations about the importance of principles in light of our tendencies to rationalise
example, Louden () whose opening chapter is on the topic—it is unfortunately out of print. Another
resource on the topic is Beck ().
I am grateful to Katja Vogt for discussion on this point.
So Frierson () writes in the Preface to his monograph:
From my earliest exposure to Kant’s moral theory, I was drawn to his emphasis on the centrality
of freedom but bothered by the apparent abstractness of the moral law. Thus when I first
approached the Anthropology many years ago, I did so with excitement. I hoped that Kant
would incorporate all the rich details of human life that I found lacking in his Grounding [. . . ]
At first the Anthropology seemed more amusing than philosophically satisfying. However, as I
came to appreciate the details of Kant’s Anthropology and as more neo-Kantians incorporated
anthropological insights into moral theory, I saw that Kant could provide as rich and concrete
a moral theory as anyone (p. ix).
Frierson’s book is an attempt to reconcile the anthropology with Kant’s transcendental freedom.
So Wood () sees Kant as anticipating the historical materialism of Marx (pp. , , ). This is
not an issue I will pursue in this paper, but for relevant criticism see Bielefeldt (, especially p. ).
This is the position taken in chapter  of Wood (). For further discussion see Baron (), who
ultimately defends duty against the many charges against it.

moral demands away when they cease to be convenient (GW : ff.). It might be said,
too, that the abstract form of the moral law is a consequence of the robustness Kant accords
moral normativity, in making moral principles akin to principles in logic or mathematics.
To conceive of moral demands as robust is a way of taking the domain of value very seriously,
and that might be thought a virtue of the Kantian position. Again, that Kant’s theory is
on the face of it ahistorical might be important. Where more historically situated theories
must answer worries about conservatism and relativism, Kant’s theory seems fit to stand
in critique of local practices and prejudices, including those to which Kant himself gives
expression in the writings on history and anthropology. Moreover, while it is surely true
that Kant is not committed to an opposition between duty and inclination, the extent
to which he can and should accommodate motives of sympathy and love should not be
over-stated. For Kant’s characterisation of morality as categorical, as being such that moral
demands must be heeded irrespective of inclination, including sympathetic inclination, is a
distinctive claim that many moral theories will want to recover. So while I recognise that
there have been fruitful exchanges between, for example, Kantians and virtue ethicists, I
would urge caution about accommodating the diverse theoretical commitments of other
positions. It is important to appreciate that many of the most valuable insights of the
It is common for Kantians to wield Kant’s theory against his own unfortunate views about marriage, race
or sexuality. See for example some of the moves in Section I of Korsgaard ().
The claim that Kant is committed to a problematic opposition between duty and love is memorably
encapsulated in Friedrich Schiller’s satire of Kant on helping friends in need: “You must seek to despise them /
And do with repugnance what duty bids you” (Schiller’s satire is cited in Wood , p. ). A contemporary
version of the objection may be found in Stocker (, p. ). For an early defence of Kant against the
objection, see Herman (b); for a pithy clarification of the issue, see Korsgaard (, p. xiii, fn. ), and
Louden (, p. -). I agree with Bielefeldt (, p. ), that Wood overstates the reply to the objection
when he claims that for Kant, “philanthropic love is an indispensable ground of morality” (, p. ; italics in
original).
Scheffler () has helpful discussion of Kant’s challenge to what he calls motivational naturalism at pp.
-.

Kantian position are due to its distinctiveness.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section ., I locate metaphysics of morals
within Kant’s broader philosophical system. In Section ., I lay out Kant’s argument for
undertaking metaphysics of morals. In Section ., I clarify the positive role for empirical
considerations in Kant’s ethics. The first three sections form the basis for evaluating the
interpretive trends at issue for the remainder of the paper. Section . considers the scope
for incorporating virtue-ethical considerations in Kant’s ethics, focussing on the work of
Barbara Herman. I argue that from the point of view of Kant’s systematic commitments,
Herman’s are possible Kantian moves, though they ought to be resisted on other Kantian
grounds. Section . examines Allen Wood’s attempt to read the anthropology into Kant’s
core theorising; while Section . examines Christine Korsgaard’s attempt to read empirical
considerations into Kant’s account of the bindingness of morality. I argue that Wood’s and
Korsgaard’s proposals, whatever their independent philosophical interest, are not plausibly
Kantian proposals. I conclude, in Section ., by showing why this is important to notice.
. Metaphysics of morals
‘Metaphysics’ is Kant’s term for a branch of philosophy. It is a branch of pure, as opposed
to empirical, philosophy, and it is the branch of pure philosophy concerned with synthetic
a priori truths—substantive truths that are knowable on the basis of reason alone. The
task of metaphysics is twofold. It is critically to investigate the capacity of reason to have
substantive a priori knowledge, and it is to determine the body of substantive truths arising
Sherman (, p. ) makes a similar point, though it is an aside in a monograph that brings Kant into
dialogue with Aristotle. Hursthouse () voices a different view when she says of the various positions
in normative moral philosophy: “Let us by all means stop caring about how we distinguish ourselves and
welcome our agreements” (p. ).
His division of the areas of philosophy is prefigured in the first Critique, see A/B, and taken up in
the preface to the Groundwork.

out of pure reason. Call these, for sake of clarity, metaphysics and metaphysics*. There
is metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals, and in both cases, metaphysics must
prepare the way for metaphysics*.
The Groundwork is a work of metaphysics of morals. Its task is to prepare the ground,
or lay the foundations, for the system of duties—the metaphysics of morals*—promised to
come later. We are told that the task of moral foundations involves “nothing more than
the identification and establishment of the supreme principle of morality” (GW :).
‘Identification’ and ‘establishment’ of the principle of morality are ways of describing the
section divisions of the Groundwork. Sections I and II ‘identify’ the principle of morality,
and its source, by analysing the deliverances of common human reason on the nature of
morality and moral worth. From these deliverances, the Categorical Imperative is derived
as the supreme principle and its ‘source’ is taken to lie in reason, and more particularly, in
autonomy of the will. But it remains to be ‘established’ that there really is a principle of
morality with the source and features analysed from common human reason. So Section
III provides a ‘deduction’ of morality, and part of the burden of the deduction is to explain
how morality can have its source in something radically independent of all human interests,
namely, in autonomy of the will. What needs to be shown is that morality can be binding
on agents though it does not rest on their antecedent desires or values. Both of these tasks,
Kant does not always clearly distinguish between them. Guyer (a, p. xiv) notes that the phrase is
used with a “dual sense”; and Gregor (, p. ) recognises a more inclusive and a narrower use of the term.
What I am calling ‘metaphysics’ “investigates the faculty of reason in regard to all pure a priori cognition”,
while what I am calling ‘metaphysics*’, lays out the “philosophical cognition of pure reason in systematic
interconnection” (A/B). I take my gloss of metaphysics* from the rendering of the translation in Beck
(, p. ). My concern in this paper is with metaphysics of morals, though I remark on metaphysics of
morals* in footnote .
On the significance of the metaphors of ‘grounding’ and ‘foundations’ for the title, see Guyer (a, pp.
xiii-iv). On this way of reading the title of the Groundwork, see Korsgaard (, p. x).
I have adapted Gregor’s translation here in light of discussion with Jens Timmermann. ‘Identify’ is better
than Gregor’s ‘search for’, because ‘Aufsuchung’ is a success term.

the analytic task of ‘identification’ and the synthetic task of ‘establishment’, are the work of
moral foundations, or what comes to the same, metaphysics of morals. As I am using the
terms ‘moral foundations’ and ‘metaphysics of morals’, then, they concern both the ground
of morality and its bindingness.
How might we rephrase the concerns of metaphysics of morals in our terms? Meta-
physics of morals is a form, as we might put it, of meta-ethical rationalism. And it is a
form of meta-ethical rationalism in two ways, corresponding to the ‘identification’ and
‘establishment’ functions of the Groundwork described above. It is a form of rationalism i)
because the ‘source’ of morality, that on the basis of which we have moral obligations, is
reason. And it is a form of rationalism ii) inasmuch as it takes reason to be the explanation
of the bindingness of the moral law—of its authority for us. In short, morality is binding
on us not because we want to be moral, or because it serves our interests; we heed moral
commands because they are demands of reason, and we recognise the authority of reason.
It is helpful to consider a contrast class—to consider the kind of theory Kant’s ratio-
nalism excludes. The stalking horse of the Groundwork is the kind of theory which takes
the task of reason to figure out what human beings need in order to live well (GW :).
This form of Aristotelianism puts an “empirically conditioned” conception of reason at
its basis (CPrR :), empirically conditioned because reason is put in the service of the
natural human desire for happiness or welfare. One of the tasks of critique in the practical
philosophy is to prevent empirically conditioned reason from alone presuming to set the
terms for what we should be doing. It is to prevent empirically conditioned reason from
claiming “absolute rule”, and from “expressing itself in demands and commands that go
quite beyond its sphere” (CPrR :). Empirically conditioned reason is the target of
Kant gives a provisional argument against empirically conditioned reason to the effect that reason is
inadequate to the task of securing happiness; lacking insight into our needs and what fulfills them, reason
actually proliferates our needs and makes us ever more unsatisfied (GW :). I take it that this is a relatively

practical critique just as speculative metaphysics is the target of theoretical critique; the
difference is that reason shows opposite tendencies in the two cases. In the theoretical case,
reason tends to stray beyond experience and claim knowledge of the super-sensible, while in
the moral case, reason underestimates the practical reach of pure reason and tends towards
empiricism. The reversal is not lost on Kant (CPrR :).
In sum, Kant’s commitment to metaphysics of morals is a commitment to a substantive
position in meta-ethics regarding the source and bindingness of morality. This commitment
excludes theories which incorporate empirical considerations into the source and binding-
ness of morality, for example, theories which start with the good for human beings. I have
not yet said why Kant is committed to metaphysics of morals, just that he is and what that
commitment comes to. But as the discussion so far makes clear, the commitment is Kant’s
big move in moral philosophy. It is time now to say why he thinks it is needed.
. Kant’s Argument for Metaphysics of Morals
Why does Kant think that a metaphysics of morals is needed? Why must moral foundations
proceed entirely a priori? Here is the characteristic answer Kant gives us:
[T]hat there must be such a philosophy [metaphysics of morals] is clear of
itself from the common idea of duty and of moral laws. Everyone must grant
that a law, if it is to hold morally, that is, as a ground of an obligation, must
weak argument against empirically conditioned reason on Kant’s part, but that the case against it is not
meant to rest on this argument alone. Kant gives a more forceful argument when he characterises morality as
necessary and universal. We will come to this argument later.
That pure reason has so positive a role in the practical philosophy may come as a surprise given that it is
criticised so severely in the theoretical philosophy. Neiman () thinks that to be surprised about this is to
be confused about the nature of reason for Kant. In particular, it is to confuse the aim of reason with the
aim of knowledge. Against this Neiman urges that, for Kant, reason is thoroughly practical. Taken this way,
Neiman encourages us to think of the first Critique as correcting improper demands placed on reason—that
it give theoretical answers to speculative questions—so that it may be given full sway, given primacy, in the
practical domain.
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carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the command ‘thou shalt
not lie’ does not hold only for human beings, as if other rational beings did
not have to heed it, and so with all other moral laws properly so called (:).
The passage begins with the claim that we have an ordinary notion of moral law, and the
suggestion is that because we think in terms of law, morality cannot have an empirical
foundation—that, as the passage continues:
therefore, the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of
the human being or in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed,
but a priori simply in concepts of pure reason.
The passage gives us the characteristics of moral laws that make for the exclusion of empirical
considerations. Kant implies, since he says moral laws hold for all rational beings, that
moral laws are universal, and Kant tells us outright that moral laws are necessary. What does
necessity amount to in the present context? In general, for Kant, something is necessary
if it could not be otherwise—if there are no possible worlds in which it is otherwise for
beings with minds like ours. While Kant presumably thinks that the principle of morality
is the principle of morality in all conceivable worlds that are also moral worlds, the passage
seems to give us a different, a further, way of thinking about moral necessity. Here Kant
seems to treat necessity as a feature of the law’s grip on us; Kant says the law must be
heeded. Moral requirements are practically necessary in the sense that they are rationally
binding on agents. Given Kant’s background assumptions about the connection between
necessity, universality and the a priori, and between the a priori and reason, it follows
That is, for beings whose intuition is sensible.
Note that it is for beings like us, beings with a mixed rational-sensible nature, for whom the law has the
character of bindingness. This is because, unlike angels and unlike God, subjective conditions may stand
in the way of our acting in conformity with reason (GW :). Kant says: “All imperatives are expressed
by an ought and indicate by this the relation of an objective law of reason to a will that by its subjective
constitution is not necessarily determined by it (a necessitation)” (GW :) See also the preceding passage in
the Groundwork.

that if morality is necessary and universal, it must have its source in reason. So Kant’s
argument for excluding empirical considerations from moral foundations—for undertaking
metaphysics—turns on the nature of morality: that morality is such that it is binding on
agents (is practically necessary), and holds for all dependent rational beings (with universal
scope).
. The Positive Role for Empirical Considerations
We have been discussing metaphysics of morals as the preparatory or foundational part of
moral philosophy. We have outlined the kinds of questions it enquires after, as well as the
constraints that, as a division of pure philosophy, are imposed on answers to those questions.
We have seen that it is Kant’s conception of morality that drives the exclusion of empirical
considerations from its foundations. The question we turn to now is: what is the positive
role for empirical considerations in Kant’s theory? We ask the question because we want an
interpretive basis with which to adjudicate the claims of recent interpreters to the effect that
Kant is not the aprioristic philosopher we have taken him to be.
Now it is uncontroversial that empirical considerations enter in ‘anthropology’. Ac-
cording to the divisions of philosophy set out in the preface to the Groundwork (GW
:), anthropology is the empirical counterpart to metaphysics of morals. But, for Kant,
anthropology is not strictly speaking a branch of moral philosophy at all. This is presumably
because anthropology is not normative but, as we might put it, strategic and psychological.
For example, a feasible task for anthropology is to institute what Kant calls an “aesthetic of
morals”: the vivid arousal of feelings of disgust and horror in the face of transgressions of
Kant thinks that necessity and universality are hallmarks of the a priori. As Kant puts it in the first
Critique, universality and necessity are “marks by means of which we can securely distinguish a pure cognition
from an empirical one” (B). Since Kant thinks we inquire a priori only into what reason itself contributes
(Bxviii), that we have aprioricity shows that the source of that cognition is reason.

the moral law which serve to fortify commitment to duty (MM:).
So far the picture is this: we have moral foundations which admit nothing empirical,
and moral anthropology which depends on empirical facts about human beings, but is
non-normative. Does anthropology exhaust the role of empirical considerations in Kant’s
theory? Indeed, can it? It would seem that more needs to be said. For while Kant insists that
pure reason must determine the requirements of morality on its own, those requirements
must be determinate, ultimately, for human beings. Consider that the principle of morality
is to serve a deliberative function. On a standard reading, we are to formulate the maxim
of a prospective course of action, and test whether the maxim can be universalised; if not,
we cannot will to act. Now in specifying our maxim (what we propose to do for some
reason), we must specify the circumstances of our action and our motive. That specification
would seem to involve empirical content. In this way, the application of the principle of
morality seems to incorporate empirical considerations. Unlike anthropology, however, its
results are normative: some such particular action is permissible, or must, or must not, be
done. The application of the principle of morality would appear to lie somewhere between
foundations and anthropology.
So indeed, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant complicates the Groundwork divisions by
envisaging a part of moral philosophy that is neither metaphysics nor anthropology, but
includes empirical content to form an addendum to metaphysics. In fact, as I would put it,
See also MM : where anthropology is said to concern “the development, spreading, and strengthening
of moral principles (in education in schools and in popular instruction)”.
There is controversy over whether deliberation is indeed the purpose, or the sole purpose, of the
Categorical Imperative. Plausibly, Kant does not intend us to test every maxim of action, though he does
intend us to test some. This is the view taken by Louden (), but for a different view, to which Louden’s
paper is a reply, see O’Neill ().
For the idea that it is in maxims of action that empirical (situational) content enters Kant’s theory, see
O’Neill ().

there seems to be several layers of addenda to metaphysics, moving from the more abstract
to the more concrete, as more empirical content is incorporated. It is in the addendum to
metaphysics that the application of the moral principle presumably belongs. And it is in
the addendum to metaphysics that ethics falls into “casuistry” on matters such as being a
responsible host, and being thrifty, on abstaining from flattery, and complaint. We are told
that casuistry is not part of systematic philosophy, but is “woven into ethics in a fragmentary
way” (MM :). Kant marks this out, as it were, textually, by placing casuistical remarks
in sections that are separate from the body of the text. In this intermediate philosophical
domain lies the task, also, of working out the duties that govern treatment of human beings
of particular rank, age and sex, of particular states of learnedness, cultivation and health
(MM :-). Again, Kant tells us that this application of the moral law “cannot be
presented as sections of ethics and members of the division of a system (which must proceed
a priori from a rational concept), but can only be appended to the system”. Kant adds that
“[y]et even this application belongs to the complete presentation of the system” (MM :).
The qualification is presumably meant to signal that the duties to particular individuals,
while they cannot be part of metaphysics in incorporating empirical content, still issue in
necessary connections between a person’s will and the treatment of someone. They have to
that extent the kind of normative content that makes them unsuitable for anthropology.
What emerges is this. There is a sharp distinction between the foundations of morality,
on the one hand, and the various dimensions of applying the principle of morality, on
the other. The principle of morality is purely rational even if its application may draw on
On the importance of observing the section divisions in The Metaphysics of Morals, the divisions between
what is part of systematic philosophy and what is not, see Katja Maria Vogt (a, p. , p.  and ff.).
On this point see Gregor (, p. ).
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experience. What the principle commands on a given occasion is pure in the sense that
the will is determined, not by inclination, but by the law. However, working out what one’s
duty is involves applying the principle, and with that, empirical data (which for Kant is
neither here nor there morally). In sum, the role for empirical considerations in Kant’s
moral philosophy is as follows. Empirical considerations enter indisputably outside of
metaphysics, for example, in the application of the moral law in concrete situations, and in
anthropology. But empirical considerations in no way enter in the determination of the
source or bindingness of morality.
It follows that it is not the consequences of a given action that rule out a maxim, but the contradiction
that an agent would incur were he to act on it. I am grateful to Jens Timmermann for this point.
I am grateful to Jens Timmermann for discussion on these points.
There are further questions about the role of empirical considerations in what I have called metaphysics
of morals*: the system of duties arising out of pure reason. In the Groundwork, metaphysics of morals* is said
to be a branch of pure philosophy. But Kant made his systematic divisions of philosophy before he came to
the task of actually setting out a system of duties. It is conceivable that in turning to the task, he came to see
that more empirical content is needed for the specification of duties than he at first assumed. As he writes of
the projected, comparable task in the theoretical philosophy, “An organon of pure reason would be a sum
total of all those principles in accordance with which all pure a priori cognitions can be acquired and actually
brought about. The exhaustive application of such an organon would create a system of pure reason. But since
that requires a lot, and it is still an open question whether such an amplification of our knowledge is possible at all
and in what cases it would be possible, we can regard a science of the mere estimation of pure reason, of its
sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason” (B; long italics mine). It seems to
me that Kant never wrote a metaphysics of morals* as it was envisaged in the Groundwork, and that he was
then unsure precisely what form it would take.
Insofar as we have what the Groundwork called a metaphysics of morals*, it contains less an account of
all the particular moral principles to which rational beings are subject, but, more abstractly, the systematic
divisions into which those principles fall—divisions between duties to oneself and others, between perfect and
imperfect duties, and between duties of ‘right’ and duties of ‘virtue’. When Kant introduces the examples
of duties in the Groundwork, he says they will be systematically set forth in a future metaphysics of morals*.
But it is worth noting that the future task is said to be not so much the elaboration of the examples, but the
elaboration of the divisions to which those examples belong. Kant says, “It must be noted here that I reserve
the division of duties [i.e. between perfect and imperfect] entirely for a future Metaphysics of Morals, so that the
division here stands only as one adopted at my discretion (for the sake of arranging my examples)” (GW :
fn; italics mine). This being so, we might urge that Kant never wrote a metaphysics of morals* understood as
a system of duties for rational beings. If the book with that title contains metaphysics*, it contains it in virtue
of the account of the systematic divisions among duties, and their associated notions. In this way, we may
take The Metaphysics of Morals to be a strangely mixed kind of book. It is a mix of metaphysics as critique, of
metaphysics* in the sense just outlined, and of the various divisions of practical philosophy which lie outside
of the system of metaphysics strictly speaking, and to which any mention of specifically human duties belongs.

. Virtue-Ethical Lessons from The Metaphysics of Morals
Clearly, that empirical considerations enter in the extra-systematic reaches of moral philoso-
phy bears on certain ways of thinking about Kant as an aprioristic moral philosopher, and
some Kantians have fought against the charges of apriorism from precisely this point of
view. Barbara Herman is a case in point, and I turn now to Herman as issuing the first of
three interpretive challenges to Kant’s apriorism.
Herman is interested in the philosophy of applied Kantian ethics, or in what Herman
(a) calls “middle theory”. Middle theory is so called because “it lies between the high
theory of value and the low theory of applications”; middle theory “effects the translation
of the basic conception of value in the principles of practical rationality into principles
that fit the circumstances of human action, judgment and deliberation” (pp. , ).
Since Kant’s own work in this area is schematic, middle theory “provides the missing link
in a reconstruction of Kantian ethics” (p. ). It does so by supplying the necessary,
supporting conditions for the Categorical Imperative to work as a test for maxims (, p.
). Herman has sought to substantiate Kant’s claim that the application of the Categorical
Imperative requires judgment in light of experience (MM :; GW :). Her proposal
is roughly as follows. In order to make use of the a priori principle of morality an agent
must accurately formulate the maxim of his action. If he is not to conceive of his situation
idiosyncratically, he must, among other things, have some understanding of the moral
bearing of his situation. In Herman’s terms, he must be able to single out what in his
situation calls for “moral attention”—the “morally salient” marks and features of his action
and circumstances. For Herman that presupposes a capacity for “moral perception” (what
she also calls a “moral sensitivity”), as well as the possession of moral concepts, and these
Page references are to the reprinted (collected) editions of Herman’s papers.
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will need to be acquired as part of a normal upbringing.
Herman’s work in middle theory in this way appeals to notions traditionally of interest
to the virtue ethicist. Middle theory, Herman says, makes room for a notion of character
in Kant. Let me note two qualifications about this move. Firstly, it is important to be
clear that there are two ways a notion of character may be invoked. On the one hand,
the idea might be that while what matters, morally speaking, is the exercise of practical
reason, the exercise of practical reason presupposes the right formation of our desiderative
natures. On the other hand, the idea might be that what matters, morally speaking, is
character, where character is understood as an assemblage of qualities or traits (the virtues of
courage, temperance and so on), where these are defined, roughly, as separate dispositions
to behave appropriately in relevant situations. Whether Kant’s theory can in principle
accommodate a notion of character depends on whether it is invoked in the first or second
way. Since the first gives no foundational role to character, it is at least consistent with
Kant’s systematic commitments. But the second can in no way feature in Kant’s theory; in
See Herman (, pp. -), and Herman (, p.  and ff.).
Or at least, to virtue ethicists working in a certain tradition. The tradition is Aristotelian, but in the
interpretive vein of Wiggins () and McDowell (). See the papers collected in the first part of McDowell
().
 Herman (b) tells us that: “Kant’s notions of virtue and character are in no way peripheral to
the understanding of moral judgment and action. We are able to consider the nature of a Kantian moral
agent—what motives, feelings, thoughts, and commitments guide her deliberations and actions. There is
then room to develop an account of moral personality that places moral activity within the ongoing practical
commitments of a good life” (p. x). This position is developed in Herman (), but see also Herman ().
See Bk. VI, Ch.  of the Nicomachean Ethics in Aristotle (). McDowell has emphasised the primacy
of practical reason, and of virtue as necessary for practical reason, in contemporary discussions.
The second is the more common conception of the role of character in contemporary virtue ethics. For
influential formulations of the position along these lines, see Watson () and Hursthouse (, ch. ).
Watson explicitly contrasts this approach with that of McDowell at (p. , fn. ). These theories tend to
make little mention of practical reason, or where practical reason is mentioned, it can be difficult to see how it
is integrated into the overall picture. This may be because it is hard to see what (fundamental) role is left for
character once reason enters the account. I am grateful to Katja Vogt for bringing me to see this point.
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putting an empirical notion at the foundation of moral theory, it is ruled out, not least, by
Kant’s systematic commitments. (“Not least” because in failing to make moral action action
from duty, it cannot be part of a Kantian proposal).
The second qualification is that the notion of character, whether it is employed in the
first or second way, is not Kant’s own. To have character, or virtue, for Kant, is just to be
the kind of person who commits himself to action from duty; it is to be someone who
determines himself to act by thought of the moral law (MM :). In fact, the idea of
virtue in The Metaphysics of Morals is explicitly contrasted with the more Aristotelian idea of
virtue as “an aptitude and [. . . ] long-standing habit of morally good actions acquired by
practice” (MM :). To the extent Kant is interested in character, he is not interested in
Aristotelian character.
There are philosophical reasons for this. Firstly, for the Aristotelian style virtue ethicist, a
person must have a good upbringing to get it right ethically speaking. But it is important for
Kant that this not be so. It is part of Kant’s Enlightenment appeal that no matter what one’s
training and background, everyone is capable of knowing what their duty is, and of doing
It is sometimes complained that Kant’s ethics suffers for lack of a role for character of the second kind.
See, for example, the references to MacIntyre and Foot in Louden (, pp. -). But we might side with
O’Neill () in thinking that the point should rather go the other way; that virtue theories which give a role
to character of the second kind need to be corrected by the Kantian (and indeed the Aristotelian) emphasis on
practical reason.
As Kant puts it, virtue is “the moral strength of a human being’s will in fulfilling his duty, a moral
constraint through his own lawgiving reason, insofar as this constitutes itself an authority executing the law”
(MM :).
A similar contrast is drawn in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. In one sense, character is
an assemblage of particular traits, and in another character is the mark of a principled person, a person who
acts from duty. Of the distinction, Kant tells us that “the first is the distinguishing mark of the human being
as a sensible or natural being; the second is the distinguishing mark of the human being as a rational being
endowed with freedom. The man of principles, from whom one knows what to expect, not from his instinct,
for example, but from his will, has a character” (A ).
The distinctiveness of Kant’s conception of virtue and character is for the most part well taken in the
literature. It is remarked in many of the essays in Betzler (). See also Baxley ().
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their duty. Secondly, where Herman suggests that our formation of practical reason requires
the right formation of our desiderative natures, Kant would more likely see matters the
other way. The thought would be that we must first settle on the right rational scheme—on
the right principle—and cultivate our natures in terms of it. So much is suggested by his
remarks about the educative function of anthropology (quoted above). Thirdly, where
Herman suggests that the proper formulation of maxims will require moral thinking that is
responsive to local values and practices, she must contend with Kant’s notion of common
human reason. For Kant, the Categorical Imperative is a formalisation of the implicit ideas
that reason simply has, and it is not clear that this is meant to be socially articulated.
In sum, I would argue that Herman’s work in “middle theory”, while it invokes notions
that require some care, amends Kant’s view in ways that are at least consistent with his
system. In this Herman may be taken to draw out an important lesson, namely, that Kant
permits empirical considerations to enter in the application of the moral law, that is, outside
of his system. Still, while the rapprochement between Kantianism and Aristotelianism
has the potential to address longstanding objections to the Kantian view, we should resist
finding too easy a confluence of ideas.
. A Foundational Role for Human Nature?
In the next two sections I turn to proposals which make what I take to be more controversial
amendments. They are controversial in allowing empirical considerations to enter the
account of the source of morality, on the one hand, and the bindingness of morality, on the
other. It is to the first of these that I now turn.
In an influential paper, Allen Wood (, pp. -) claims that ethics is concerned
I am grateful to Wolfgang Mann for discussion on this point.
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with the conduct of human beings, and accordingly, must be “based” on knowledge of
human nature. Wood asks whether Kant’s ethics presents an exception to ethics so defined.
It would appear to present an exception, indeed an objection, Wood says, given Kant’s
commitment to metaphysics of morals. Against appearances, Wood argues that Kant’s ethics
is “founded” on an empirical account of human nature, and, as such, presents no exception
to his definition of ethics. “Even in a theory whose fundamental principle is a priori”,
Wood tells us, “that account will be based on an empirical account of human nature, on
an anthropology” (p. ; see also p. ). Wood takes this finding to license some radical
interpretive conclusions: “To see Kantian ethics my way is to focus on very different issues
from those which have usually occupied Kantian moral philosophers” (p. ). He goes on:
My aim here is not to decide the issues I have just been raising, but only
to legitimize them. They are issues about human nature and its historical
destiny, falling entirely outside the scope of a Kantian ‘metaphysics of morals’,
belonging instead to a critical examination of the anthropological foundations
of Kantian moral theory. We cannot begin to evaluate these foundations,
however, until we have first admitted their existence, and that requires us to
overcome some traditional ways of looking at Kantian ethics (p. ).
The claims are repeated in Wood (), where the interpretation is worked into a book
length study. Since the claims are radical, and roundly influential, we must look into
Wood’s arguments.
Wood argues as follows. If we attend carefully to Kant’s argument for metaphysics of
morals, we will see that it is a practical argument, and rests on empirical claims about the
nature of human beings. Kant argues, for example, that human beings are beset by many
“Kant’s position is grounded on a distinctive theory of human nature and history” (p. xiii); “Kant
never meant to deny the essential place in ethics of an empirical study of human nature” (p. ). Despite
the continued presence of these claims, the monograph seems to be more circumspect than the early paper.
For one, in accordance with the systematic divisions outlined above, the book is divided into two parts,
Metaphysical Foundations and Anthropological Applications.
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unruly inclinations, and that only the thought of pure reason, unmixed with empirical
incentives and feelings, has an influence on the human heart sufficient to master them.
By contrast, a theory which grounds morality in a mix of inclinations and feelings as well
as rational concepts causes the human mind to waver about what is required of it (GW
:-). Human beings are also incapable of following examples of virtuous conduct, so
they need an a priori principle of morality to live by (GW :). Moreover, the motive
to morality must be the a priori motive of duty because only then can good actions be
reliably produced (GW :; :). The purity of the moral law (and motive) serves these
practical functions, and since the practical functions depend on empirical claims about
human beings, Wood concludes: i) that anthropology drives the need for purity in moral
foundations, so that ii) the basis of morality turns out to be human nature, after all (Wood,
, pp. -).
What are we to make of i) and ii)? In a clear sense, even if i) is true, ii) in no way follows.
That is, even if we need metaphysics of morals for psychological-cum-motivational reasons,
it does not follow that metaphysics of morals is itself anthropological. The fact that we have
an instrumental justification to pursue the pure justification of morality does not make the
pure justification of morality itself instrumental. So it seems that Wood must be using the
notions of “foundation” and “basis” here in a rather special sense. Indeed, Wood tells us that
he means “foundations” in “a somewhat larger sense” than is usually intended, so that in
speaking of the foundations of morality he is speaking of the significance of morality and its
role in human life (p. ). Now of course philosophers can define terms as they see fit, but
since the notions of “foundation”, “grounding” and “basis” are technical terms in Kantian
ethics, doing so here is at best highly misleading—all the more so given the dialectical set
up of Wood’s paper (see above).
Moreover, i) needs to be qualified. Wood is quite right that Kant thinks there are
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practical reasons for undertaking metaphysics of morals, and right that these rest on claims
about the nature of human beings. But the argument for metaphysics of morals cannot rest
on the practical argument, and it is not meant to. It cannot rest on the practical argument
because the practical argument depends on contingent facts about human beings, facts that
may have been otherwise. Human beings may have been constituted so that we had no
psychological need for the principle of morality to be formulated a priori, but the principle
of morality would still have been a priori for that. Further, the argument for metaphysics
of morals is not meant to rest on the practical argument, but on an argument to which
Wood here makes no mention, viz., the argument from the character of the moral law. In
confining his attention to Kant’s practical reasons for undertaking metaphysics of morals,
Wood leaves out of the account what I take to be the real philosophical impetus behind
Kant’s project. As I argued above, Kant is not just concerned to undertake metaphysics of
morals for anthropological reasons, Kant is concerned to undertake metaphysics of morals
because of what he thinks morality is.
. Bindingness Without Metaphysics?
I turn now to a final attempt to incorporate empirical content into Kant’s account of the
foundations of morality, this time into Kant’s account of bindingness. While there have
been a number of efforts to do this on the part of both neo-Kantians and Kant interpreters,
I will be concerned with the efforts, in particular, of Christine Korsgaard. Korsgaard’s view
has been articulated in a number of important publications over many years. It is not my
In the monograph, in the course of laying out Kant’s foundations properly so called, Wood (, ch. )
describes the argument from the character of morality. That argument is not brought into contact with the
earlier account of Kant’s practical argument, and it is unclear how Wood now understands their relationship.
See the essays collected in Korsgaard (a), the Tanner lectures published as Korsgaard (d), and
more recently the Locke lectures published as Korsgaard ().
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concern here to give a detailed account of Korgaard’s view, nor to trace out the relationship
between the different versions. Rather, I want to examine the first big move in Korsgaard’s
response to what she calls “the normative question”, a response Korsgaard marshals from
lines of thought in Kant; and I want to show how Korsgaard’s response fails as a Kantian
proposal in violating Kant’s basic commitment to metaphysics of morals.
The normative question is the question of how moral requirements are binding on
us, where that may be understood as the question of how moral requirements are both
authoritative and motivating independently of what we may happen to want. This is the
question Kant asks in the third part of the Groundwork, and in many ways Korsgaard’s
response is an extended reconstruction of Kant’s first moves. Kant argues (i) that in willing
to act we cannot but take ourselves to be free agents; and that (ii) the notion of free
agency in question is that of giving the law to ourselves, so that freedom really is autonomy.
Kant has already argued for an equivalence between autonomy and morality. So from a
would-be datum about our agency—that we must take ourselves to be free if we are to act
all—morality is taken to follow.
For Korsgaard, the normative question makes itself felt from the first person point of
view of deliberating over what to do, and in particular, deliberating over whether to satisfy
the demands of morality when doing so would come at some cost to the agent. What is
wanted is an explanation of our reasons to act in accordance with morality which makes
those reasons salient from the agent’s point of view. It must be clear how the demands of
This has been more than ably carried out elsewhere. See especially Fitzpatrick (), but also O’Hagan
().
This is not meant to be a close textual analysis of the opening two sections of Groundwork III (GW
:-:). My sketch follows Korsgaard’s own account of Kant’s argument in Korsgaard (c).
Or at least, morality is taken to follow “analytically”. Kant thinks it still needs to be proven “synthetically”,
and that is what the remainder of the third part of the Groundwork is taken up with. This is unimportant for
present purposes.
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morality have normative force for the agent. Korsgaard begins with our agency because she
takes a concern with agency to be given for human beings; our agency is something for
which we cannot reasonably ask the question, But why should I be an agent? Since we can
guarantee the normative force of our agency, to the extent moral principles can be shown to
be a function of agency, we will guarantee the normative force of moral principles.
In what sense is agency a given concern for human beings? Sometimes Korsgaard writes
as if agency is a given concern because agency is inescapable or “practically necessary” for
us. That is to return to the Kantian thought that we cannot act except under the idea of
freedom. As Korsgaard () puts it, “Human beings are condemned to choice and action.
Maybe you think you can avoid it, by resolutely standing still, refusing to act, refusing to
move. But it’s no use, for that will be something you have chosen to do, and then you
will have acted after all. Choosing not to act makes not acting a kind of action, makes
it something that you do” (..). The problem with this response is that the fact that
something is inescapable for us does not guarantee that it has normative significance for us.
We may be forced to be agents and yet regard our agency rather dimly, so that our sense
of normative significance is quite disconnected from our situation as actors in the world.
To answer the normative question, Korsgaard needs agency to be an inescapable normative
concern for us.
Given this problem, a more promising response may be found in Korsgaard’s remarks
See Fitzpatrick (, section I).
This idea is given extended treatment in Korsgaard (c).
Enoch () develops this criticism of Korsgaard at some length. As he puts it, Korsgaard’s interlocutor
may say: “‘Perhaps [. . . ] I cannot opt out of the game of agency, but I can certainly play it half-heartedly,
indeed under protest, without accepting the aims purportedly constitutive of it as mine”’ (p. ).
See Enoch (): “The kind of necessity the game of agency has to enjoy in order to solve the problem
we are now in is normative necessity” (p. ).
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about practical identity and identification. Here the thought is not so much that we are
constitutively bound to be agents, but that we are constitutively bound to take a normative
interest in our agency. We must not only act, but see our actions as extensions of ourselves,
and not, moreover, just any old self, but ourselves considered under the auspices of a
practical identity that we care about. As Korsgaard takes over themes from Harry Frankfurt
(), we must act on reasons with which we identify. And now the thought is that
since we care about our reasons, care about being agents, if it can be shown that this care
commits us to acting morally, then it can be shown that we really are bound to act as
morality requires. Taken this way, Korsgaard’s solution to the normative problem is to posit
an essential connection between morality and caring, not just any care, but a care that is
constitutive of our humanity.
As will be clear, Korsgaard means her proposal to be an extension of Kant’s own solution
to the normative problem. There are ways of reading part III of the Groundwork which
have Korsgaard’s solution coming close to Kant’s own. For it can look as if Kant is saying
something like the following there. We are bound by morality because we must take
ourselves to be free, where in doing so we must take ourselves to be members of a noumenal
world whose laws are the laws of morality. Since we are mixed beings—since we also have a
phenomenal nature—the question is how the laws of the noumenal world are authoritative
for the phenomenal world. And then the thought might seem to be that the laws of the
noumenal world are regarded as authoritative because as phenomenal beings we aspire to
being noumenal beings. This reading is encouraged by Kant’s confirmation of the deduction
of morality in common human reason (GW :). Kant pictures “even the most hardened
scoundrel” as aspiring to be the better person he knows himself capable of being:
See Lecture  of Korsgaard (d).
See Korsgaard (d, p. , fn. ).
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This better person, however, he believes himself to be when he transfers himself
to the standpoint of a member of the world of understanding, as the idea of
freedom, that is, of independence from determining causes of the world of sense,
constrains him involuntarily to do; and from that standpoint he is conscious
of a good will that, by his own acknowledgements constitutes the law for his
evil will as a member of the world of sense—a law of whose authority he is
cognizant even while he transgresses it (GW :-).
Since Kant’s deduction in Groundwork III is notoriously difficult, it is very natural to turn
to this more commonsensical formulation, so that Kant’s solution to the normative problem
turns out to be that morality is binding on us because we are motivated by a self-ideal.
That is, morality gets its grip on us in virtue of the desire of our phenomenal self to live up
to our better self—to our noumenal nature.
It should be clear from the foregoing, however, that this cannot be Kant’s view. It cannot
be Kant’s view because it rests the explanation of morality on something empirical, namely,
the desires of our phenomenal self. For the same reason, whatever the independent merits of
Korsgaard’s solution to the normative problem, it cannot be Kant’s solution. This is because,
while it may secure the bindingness of morality in some sense, it does so by appealing to
caring, where care, following Frankfurt, is explained in the naturalistically respectable terms
of belief and desire.
In the end Kant may not give us a satisfying explanation of categorical bindingness. In
the Groundwork he takes an explanation of the interest we take in morality to be beyond
the limits of moral inquiry (:-); and in the second Critique he faces up to the limits of
explanation by telling us that categorical bindingness is simply a fact of reason. It is just
I take this to be the reading of Kant favoured by Velleman ().
For a criticism of Korsgaard on grounds that she gives, like Frankfurt, a metaphysically deflationary
account of Kant’s notion of the will, see Herman (, especially section III).
But see, for example, O’Neill’s() suggestive postscript on pp. -. See also chapter  of Franks
().
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a given that we take ourselves to be bound by morality. However unsatisfying, unlike the
route taken by Korsgaard in positing categorical cares, and unlike the route which explains
bindingness in terms of motivation by a self-ideal, to appeal to a fact of reason at least has
the advantage of being consistent with Kant’s commitment to metaphysics of morals.
. Conclusion
Let me close by saying that my criticism of Wood’s and Korsgaard’s proposals as not tenable
Kantian proposals is no mere matter of terminology. It has been the concern of this paper
to argue that Kant’s commitment to metaphysics of morals is basic to the kind of project he
is engaged in in moral philosophy. His commitment to metaphysics of morals follows from
the kind of thing he takes morality to be. Now Kant is at his most fervent in those parts of
his writing where he insists on a methodological advance over his predecessors—over those
who, despite their quibbles with one another, are united by a shared oversight or blunder.
In the critical philosophy, that advance consists in limiting the aspirations of pure reason
to know by examining the preconditions of knowledge itself. The result is a thorough
dressing down of traditional metaphysics—that great site of “mock conduct” and “groping
among mere concepts” (Bxv)—and, against empiricism, the provision of a role for reason in
working out the necessary conditions for experience. In the practical philosophy Kant also
dismisses the fantastically ambitious optimism of some forms of rationalism. This shows
itself in the fact that morality is in the end an idea of reason, and resistant to proof. But
Kant’s main target here is not reason’s propensity to transcend experience, but as we might
put it, its failure to do so. Kant’s particular target are moral theories which, in blending
rational and empirical considerations, “substitute for morality a bastard patched up from
limbs of quite diverse ancestry” (GW :). The result is a thorough rebuke to the moral
credentials of empirically conditioned practical reason, and a steadfast commitment to the
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rational purity of moral foundations. In incorporating empirical considerations into the
foundations of Kantian ethics, Korsgaard and Wood violate the very move which Kant takes
to be his singular contribution to moral philosophy.
This paper grew out of Katja Vogt’s graduate seminar on Kant and his critics in the Spring of . I
am hugely indebted to Katja for emphasising Kant’s commitment to metaphysics of morals in that seminar,
and for many subsequent conversations. I owe a large debt to Wolfgang Mann, who provided incisive
editorial suggestions on an earlier draft, and helpful discussion on several points. I am grateful also to Jens
Timmermann, David Velleman, Joseph Raz, Katie Gasdaglis, and Brad Weslake.
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 Responsibility and the Value of Intelligible Beings
. Introduction
I begin with Kant’s distinction between two standpoints we can take on human beings. We
can regard them practically, as agents, or we can regard them explanatorily, as things in
nature. Taken in the first way, human beings are sources of thought and action; thoughts
are in some sense theirs to think and direct, conduct is theirs to control. Taken in the second
way, trains of thought and courses of conduct are set by the promptings of nature; it is
not they but it that makes things happen. Call the first the intelligible standpoint and the
second the sensible standpoint.
In the third part of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the intelligible stand-
point emerges in the first place first-personally. It emerges to accommodate a would-be
practical datum. The datum is that we cannot act except under the idea of freedom (:).
That means that when we are deliberating about what to do we must regard our deliberation,
our reason, as authoring the terms of our conduct. For Kant that is to say that we must,
as a matter of practical necessity, regard our wills as free. In so regarding our wills we are
constrained to take the intelligible standpoint on ourselves, to think of ourselves as members
of an intelligible world. Kant takes this perspective to exclude a perspective on ourselves as
sensible or phenomenal beings. For he thinks we cannot both reason about what to do and
take our reason, as he puts it, to “receive direction from any other quarter”, in particular
not the quarter of our sensible nature (:). We must take our reason to author the terms
Kant talks of the two standpoints in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (:): A rational
being is said to have “two standpoints from which he can regard himself [. . . ]”. The talk of standpoints here
should not be confused with the deflationary two-aspect interpretation of Kant’s idealism according to which
noumena and phenomena are two aspects of the same thing. That is, talk of two standpoints should not be
taken to be metaphysically innocuous, and in my account of Kant’s view I will move back and forth between
talk of the standpoint on another as an intelligible being and talk of his being an intelligible being. Jens
Timmerman () is helpful on this point (see p. , fn. ).
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of our conduct independently from sensible influence. The exclusion between the two
standpoints is taken to hold in the other direction, too: from a standpoint on ourselves as
sensible beings our actions are necessarily determined by natural causal laws—our agency
does not here come into view.
.. Regarding Others as Intelligible Beings
For the Kant of the Groundwork, then, it is primarily ourselves whom we must regard
practically as intelligible beings, for it is by the necessity of acting under the idea of freedom,
if we are to act at all, that we are brought to the intelligible standpoint. But what now
about our ways of regarding other people? Does Kant think we are to assume the practical
standpoint on them—to regard other people as intelligible beings? And would so regarding
them exclude a standpoint on them as sensible beings? That is, would considerations about
another’s sensible nature be excluded from our practical ways of relating to, and of our
deliberations concerning, them? As the two standpoints are distinguished in Groundwork
III it is not clear. It is clear that all rational beings must regard themselves as intelligible
beings from the standpoint of action, but that is not the same as saying that we must so
regard them, and exclusively for practical purposes. At least, Kant does not here put things
this way.
Still, we can see how he may be so interpreted, for we might read such a prescription
back into the second part of the Groundwork where we encounter the idea that human
beings have value of a singular kind, and that morality is a matter of responding in the right
way to that singular value. Kant tells us that the ground of the value of humanity is rational
nature and that we must in all of our actions relate to human beings as rational beings, that
doing so is to respect them (:). What it is to relate to human beings as rational beings
will depend on how we understand rational nature, in turn. But one constraint on any

Kantian account of the value of rational nature is that it cannot be an empirical property.
So much is guaranteed by the fact that Kant takes rational nature to be shared by human
beings, angels and rational aliens—by the class of all conceivable rational beings. We can
put this by saying that rational nature is not sensible but intelligible for Kant. Human
beings have the singular value they have in virtue of their intelligible nature. So if we are
required to appreciate and respond to the value of human beings, then we must appreciate
and respond to them as intelligible beings. Doing so will be part of what it is to value them
in the right way.
.. A Dilemma About Responsibility
This is one route to the thought that the Kantian theory of value entails that we value others
as intelligible beings. Depending on our conception of the ground of value (depending on
our conception of rational nature), there are different ways of spelling out what that comes
to. On one such spelling out valuing persons as intelligible beings involves appreciating them
as sources of thought and action—as free agents. This is the kind of proposal with which I
will be concerned in what follows. In particular, I will be concerned with two contemporary
Kantian accounts on the part of David Velleman () and Christine Korsgaard () to
the effect that we must always value others as intelligible bearers of freedom. I will argue
that notwithstanding their evident attractiveness, the views have striking consequences for
our interpersonal relations, in particular, for the part of our interpersonal relations in which
we hold people responsible for their actions. I will raise a dilemma to bring this out. I
will argue that Velleman’s view invites the consequence that we must never hold people
That we are to regard others as intelligible beings is perhaps most explicit in the Introduction to the
Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant conceives of our relation to others (to other persons)
always and automatically as agents. Likewise, in the Third Antinomy of the Critique of Practical Reason
Kant appears to give a completely general account of freedom so that its ascription is not in the first place
first-personal. There we need not, as in the Groundwork, infer his position about the third-person case.
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responsible for wrongdoing, while Korsgaard’s view entails that we must always hold people
responsible for wrongdoing. While they each give us positive reasons to accept one or other
of these consequences, I argue that neither should be accepted for neither capture important
moral aspects of relating to others as sensible beings.
.. Kant’s Dilemma
It will be helpful to trace the lines of thought in Kant which lead to the two horns of the
dilemma. For it is one to which Kant may be thought committed on account of his views of
freedom and agency. The views of Velleman and Korsgaard are vulnerable to the dilemma
inasmuch as they inherit (versions of ) these lines of thought from Kant.
I begin with the first horn. It arises in Kant’s attempt to prove that a morality with the
characteristics he explicates indeed applies to us—is valid for us. Kant’s first, and for present
purposes crucial, move in this attempt is to argue that if we presuppose freedom then the
validity of morality follows analytically. It follows analytically because freedom and morality
are “reciprocal concepts”: “a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same”
(:). Not many people are convinced by Kant’s argument to this conclusion but, as we
will see later, it is a crucial part of the deduction of morality in Groundwork III. It yields a
conception of freedom, positive freedom, as acting in accordance with moral laws. If we
add the premise that freedom is a necessary condition on responsibility, as Kant thinks it
The analytic connection between morality and freedom is in outline the following: rational beings make
things happen by willing them, and for the will to set the terms of action it must be free from constraint,
negatively free—it cannot be acted upon by physical forces, it cannot be subjected by inclination—the will
must cause itself. Since the concept of a cause entails that of laws, for Kant, and since the will is free it cannot
be a natural law—it must be that the will gives the law to itself. The will is autonomous and Kant has already
argued that autonomy is a formulation of the moral law (:-). So Kant tells us, “a free will and a will
under moral laws are one and the same” (:-).
The argument is rehearsed in the Critique of Practical Reason at :.
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is, then we have the conclusion that a person is never responsible for wrongdoing. This is
the first horn of the dilemma.
The second horn emerges from a natural move in response to the first. The move is to
say that freedom is not acting in accordance with moral laws, freedom is being capable of so
acting. If a will is free that can act as the moral law demands, and if freedom is required
for responsibility, then we are responsible for immoral actions insofar as we could have acted
morally. If we add the premise that we are always capable of acting as morality requires,
then it follows that we are always responsible for wrongdoing. The additional premise is
licensed by a central Kantian contention, and a core part of Kant’s method, namely that
everyone can work out what morality requires. And meeting these requirements is no less
possible: “[t]o satisfy the categorical command of morality is within everyone’s power at all
times" (:). It follows that inasmuch as we have done something wrong, we are always
At least, this is a way of rephrasing his position. Kant does not use ‘responsibility’ (Verantwortung) as
a technical term in the Groundwork. Rather the thought is that we are free when we are the source of our
actions, when we self-legislate, and so initiate a causal train. Actions that we initiate in this way are then
properly speaking attributable to us.
This account of freedom is implicit in Kant’s discussion in the ‘Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of
Pure Practical Reason’ in the Critique of Practical Reason.
Kant gives a pithy statement of this commitment in the Critique of Practical Reason: “the moral law
commands compliance from everyone, and indeed the most exact compliance. Appraising what is to be
done in accordance with it must, therefore, not be so difficult that the most common and unpracticed
understanding should not know how to go about it, even without worldly prudence” (:).
Likewise, “to command morality under the name of duty is quite reasonable...for in regard to this, what
[a person] wills to do, that he also can do” (:).
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responsible; there are no excuses, no taking account of agential frailty.
So much for the dilemma. I do not take either side to be obviously misbegotten. Indeed,
I will now try to motivate first the one side and then the other. I will do so by considering
views I take to be independently interesting and attractive. These are the views of Velleman
and Korsgaard. They by no means exhaust the Kantian positions in the literature and as we
will see they in some ways depart from and extend Kant’s views. I choose them not because
I take them to be faithful in all respects to Kant, but because they give forceful expression
to central features of his thought. But I will argue that neither view is in the end acceptable
for neither take moral account of important dimensions of our sensible nature. That in
any event will be my diagnosis, and I will take it to countenance a disjunctive conclusion:
either we uphold a dual conception of our nature as intelligible and sensible beings but
There is a question about what Kant would take the scope of responsibility for wrongdoing to be. When
he tells us that each of us is capable of doing what morality requires, does he mean that we are all capable
of doing what is in accordance with morality, or more strongly, that we are all capable of doing what is in
accordance with morality from the motive of duty? It might seem obvious, given that only actions from duty
have moral worth, that Kant is committed to the second reading. But if Kant thinks we cannot be sure what
precisely motivates an action, not even in our own case, then it might seem he holds the first sort of position:
within the scope of praise and blame is only whether someone has acted in accordance with the moral law.
This would take the duty of perfecting our own motives outside the scope of responsibility, which is perhaps
quite right.
Kant explicitly addresses the problem of responsibility for wrongdoing in the Critique of Practical Reason.
He raises it as part of the problem of free will and determinism:
If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in accordance with the natural
law of causality, a necessary result of determining grounds in preceding time, then it was
impossible that it could have been left undone; how then can appraisal in accordance with the
moral law make any change in it and suppose that it could have been omitted because the law
says that it ought to have been omitted?
He answers that it can be said to have been omitted because a person regards himself as “determinable only
through laws that he gives to himself by reason”, so that every action is “to be regarded in the consciousness of
his intelligible existence as nothing but the consequence...of his causality as noumenon” (:).
So considered, a rational being can now rightly say of every unlawful action he performed that
he could have omitted it... (:)
Moral appraisal in this way sets its store by the potential of everyone to realise their freedom and be moral.
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uphold it so that the relevant parts of sensible nature are not excluded from the valuation of
intelligible nature; or we reject the dual conception of our nature. I will close with reasons
to prefer the second conclusion to the first.
. Velleman on Valuing Others as Intelligible Beings
I begin with David Velleman’s in many ways deeply Kantian account of valuing persons in
‘Love as a Moral Emotion’. Velleman is centrally concerned with the evaluative attitudes we
are to take towards persons. My question is what is implied by his account for the evaluative
attitudes we are to take towards the actions of persons, where that includes evaluating their
actions as good and bad, right and wrong, and making ascriptions of responsibility for
wrongdoing. I will begin by foregrounding Velleman’s account of valuing persons, and then
I will draw out an implication for responsibility for wrongdoing.
.. The Pre-existing Value of Intelligible Beings
I take the heart of Velleman’s conception of valuing persons to be that we must fully wrap
our minds around, fully understand, the singular value that they have. The idea that persons
have value is given in the Groundwork as the idea that persons are ends-in-themselves.
Persons are said to have a nature, rational nature, that marks them out as ends-in-themselves,
and makes them singularly (“absolutely”) valuable (:-). That it is the nature of persons
that gives them value means that persons have value independently of any and all empirical
properties, and independently of moral credentials. So persons, as Velleman puts it, are
“objects of motivating attitudes that regard and value them as they already are” (p. ).
We are familiar with the passages in Kant where he takes even those who behave terribly, even the vicious,
to be objects of respect. (See for example (:) of the Metaphysics of Morals). Plausibly, it is this aspect of the
ends-in-themselves idea which underwrites the classical Kantian view. It says that respect is owed to all persons,
not in virtue of merit but because persons have a nature that gives them value. Recently, commentators have

We saw above that rational nature for Kant is not an empirical but an intelligible property,
and Velleman takes the object of value to be precisely “the intelligible essence of a person”
(p. ). In this he takes over Kant’s description of intelligible nature as a person’s true or
proper self—what a person is in himself rather than what, as an empirical human subject,
he merely appears to be (Velleman, p. ; Kant :-). In so describing the object of
value the terms are set for our task as valuers of persons. The kind of value that persons
have warrants a mode of appreciation “in which we submit to the object’s reality” (p. ),
and that submission is such that we “stan[d] back in appreciation of the rational creature he
is” (p. ). Our task as valuers, at least in the first place, is to be right appreciators—to
appreciate persons for the value they really have.
.. Right Appreciation: Respect and Love
For Velleman, right appreciation finds expression in the attitudes of both respect and love.
Velleman’s paper is in part an account and an endorsement of the theory of value that Kant
developed for respect, but Velleman uses the account of respect to propose a theory of
value for love. His central thesis is that the object of respect and love both is the Kantian
intelligible subject, so that respect and love are different modes of paying tribute to that
subject. The relevant difference between the attitudes for present purposes is that respect
involves a kind of intellectual grasp, an idea of, the intelligible nature of persons, while
love involves appreciation of that intelligible nature as something manifest in the empirical
persona. In this last Velleman departs in a significant way from Kant for whom it would not
make sense to try to cognise the intelligible subject. Such an attempt would be for reason to
challenged the classical conception of Kant’s view. Stephen Darwall () has drawn attention to passages
where Kant seems to take more like the merit view, though Darwall does not in the end defend this view as
Kant’s. The merit interpretation has been defended by Richard Dean (). One way to challenge the merit
interpretation would be to underscore the theory of absolute value which grounds respect for Kant. I take this
up in ‘Absolute Value and the Specialness of Human Beings’.
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“impotently flap its wings without moving from the spot in the space, which is empty for it,
of transcendent concepts called the intelligible world, and so lose itself among phantoms”
(:). And yet I think Velleman’s adaptation lends the Kantian theory of valuation some
intuitive traction. The idea is that while we may have the idea that all persons have a special
kind of value, when we interact with them that value may fully come to strike us. We may
be brought to a striking realisation of the humanity in them, striking because heretofore
their humanity was a mere idea to us. We might think of this as a dawning of personhood.
What occasions the full appreciation of personhood for Velleman is a person’s empirical
behaviours and qualities, but importantly, these empirical properties merely symbolise or
serve as conduits for the real source of value, namely, intelligible nature.
In this way Velleman’s theory of valuing persons gives some, albeit symbolic, accommo-
dation to the sensible features of human beings. At least when we love them, we appreciate
the intelligible nature of persons by attending to their sensible nature. But it seems that
in this there is an asymmetry between the good and bad in sensible nature, between those
aspects of the sensible being that reveal intelligible nature and those aspects that do not. For
it seems Velleman is committed to excluding the bad aspects of sensible nature from proper
valuation of persons.
.. Exclusion of the Bad in Sensible Nature
To see why, consider more precisely what Velleman takes the object of valuation to be. It is
“the ideal of a rational will”; a will “that must ‘think itself into the intelligible world”’, as
Velleman quotes Kant from the Groundwork, “as the bearer of freedom, which cannot be
found in the sensible order” (p. ). Velleman is identifying the object of valuation as the
being Kant introduces in order to deduce morality. To identify the properties of that being
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we need to say more about the deduction. We have already encountered the first move of
the deduction: it is the move which says that if we presuppose freedom—if we presuppose
that we determine ourselves to activity independently of external sensible influence—then
morality follows analytically. But supposing morality may be derived from freedom, we
still need to establish that the condition of morality can be satisfied: that rational beings, we
human beings among them, can be free (: ). And what reason have we to believe that?
Kant gives a reason grounded in our practical lives, and it is here that we meet the
would-be practical datum: that we can act only by taking ourselves to author the terms
of our conduct independently of natural causal laws. Now Kant thinks we need to tell
a story about how this practical datum is at least not dismissible out of hand, for it is
threatened by our knowledge that all of our actions are necessarily determined. The story
is that our deliberative perspective points to our membership in an intelligible world with
its very own laws. So we have the picture of two realms: the natural realm governed by
laws of nature, and the intelligible realm governed by laws of freedom. If we were purely
intelligible beings then, paradoxically as it sounds, we would be determined to be free. And
given the analytic identity between freedom and morality, that means that we would be
Velleman comes to his account of the object of valuation by way of an interpretive puzzle. The puzzle is
how persons can be the object of Kantian respect when Kant initially formulates the object as the moral law,
and not persons (:). Velleman’s solution is that respect for law is merely prefatory for what, more fully
spelled out, is respect-for-persons-who-are-lawgivers. Respect for law is respect for persons because the law is
the law of the rational will, and the will is ours. (See Jens Timmermann () on ‘Reverence’, p. ). A
direct piece of textual support for Velleman’s reading is at ::
Our own will insofar as it would act only under the condition of a possible giving of universal
law through its maxims—this will possible for us in idea—is the proper object of respect; and
the dignity of humanity consists just in this capacity to give universal law though with the
condition of being itself subject to this very lawgiving.
I am not here concerned with Velleman’s interpretive puzzle, though I think his interpretation is the right one.
In what immediately follows I will trace a short path through the Groundwork which bears out, while it does
not argue for, Velleman’s reading.
See the argument in footnote  above.
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determined to act for the sake of the moral law. On the other hand, if we were purely
natural beings then we would act always for the sake of our desires and inclinations. But
human beings are members of both worlds. The question is how the laws of the intelligible
world are authoritative for us. Kant says rather elliptically that the laws of the intelligible
world “ground” the laws of the phenomenal world (:). We can draw out the thought by
appealing to the confirmation of the deduction in common human reason (:-). We
take the laws of our intelligible will to be authoritative for our sensible will: the intelligible
will serves and is acknowledged by us to be an ideal for the sensible will. Morality is now
said to be grounded in that ideal will.
The relevant upshot for our purposes is that the object of valuation on Velleman’s view,
the ideal of a rational will, is the bearer of freedom and morality both. It is the subject which
must think itself into an intelligible world with its very own non-natural (moral) laws. The
object of valuation is in Kant’s sense positively free. That means that the non-ideal sensible
will, the bearer of inclination and desire and the source of the bad in sensible nature, is
unfree. It is for that reason not properly put to the person’s account.
We have in this way the following grounds for excluding the bad in sensible nature from
proper valuation of persons. When we respect someone, as is requisite, we are to direct
our thought and attention to their intelligible natures. Intelligible subjects are the bearers
of freedom and morality both, so we are to direct our thought and attention to what we
might call the core of goodness in them. All empirical considerations are irrelevant to the
mode of valuation proper to respect, including the bad aspects of sensible nature. When
we love someone, on the other hand, an optional mode of valuation, we are to direct our
thought and attention to intelligible nature, but we are to exclude only the bad features of
sensible nature. Since the bad in sensible nature is not caused by the intelligible subject, the
source of morality and freedom, it is not part of the empirical persona through which the
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intelligible self is revealed. The bad in sensible nature is for that reason irrelevant to how we
see persons.
.. Love as an Ideal for Interpersonal Relations
I have just said that love is an optional mode of valuation for Velleman, but we might think
his view gives us reason to treat love as an ideal of interpersonal relations. If our task in
valuing persons is to be right appreciators, and if in loving a person we appreciate their value
most fully, it would seem that loving is the better, the more appropriate, kind of attitude.
Now Velleman accounts for the selectivity of love—the fact that we love some people and
not others—in two ways. We are, on the one hand, imperfect diviners of personhood, and
we are, on the other, finite in our emotional capacities for loving people (p. ). But why
not make it our project to become better at discerning personhood in others, and more
capacious in our emotional resources? Since the object of love is personhood, and since
personhood is had by all persons, ideally anyone can be an object of love for us. Realising
this is a matter of attending well, of really looking at the one before us. We might think
Velleman’s view invites us to see love in this way as an ideal of interpersonal relations.
This is a delicate point. Insofar as Velleman’s is a Kantian proposal, love cannot be the maximum response
to the value of persons if that means something like: the very best we can do. For Kant, no action is morally
good in excess of duty for the simple reason that the good just is action from duty. If Velleman’s view invites us
to see love as an ideal response to the value of persons, and if the view is to remain Kantian, love must be
not merely an aim, but requisite for, interpersonal relations; like respect, love must become a duty to others.
Now Velleman denies that love is a duty to others, but it is not clear why by his own lights it should not
be, and it would be a worthwhile further task to see how love may be construed as a duty within a Kantian
framework. A natural place to turn would be ‘The Doctrine of Virtue’ in the Metaphysics of Morals. Here
we find that “the duty of love for one’s neighbor can...be expressed as the duty to make others’ ends [one’s]
own” (MM :). This is the practical love of the ‘philanthropist’ who shows “active benevolence” towards
human beings—‘’whether or not [she] finds them worthy of love” (:). Kant calls this active benevolence,
‘benificence’: the duty to promote the ends of others.
Velleman is not likely to be sympathetic to the Metaphysics of Morals picture, for Velleman does not take
love to be in the first place practical—love on his view does not aim for anything (p. ). Now some of
Velleman’s antipathy towards conative accounts of love may be mitigated by recalling the reciprocal character
of the duties of love and respect in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’. Kant characterises love and respect by analogy
with the natural forces of attraction and repulsion: “the principle of mutual love admonishes [rational beings]
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.. A Model of Interpersonal Relations
I think there is something deeply attractive about Velleman’s conception of valuation, and
about the model of interpersonal relations it invites us to hold. In what immediately follows
I want to motivate the model by putting before us an intuitive example. The example is
an old and oft-cited one: it is of a mother and daughter-in-law from Iris Murdoch’s The
Sovereignty of Good (). Let me briefly describe it. There is a mother (M) who is silently
disparaging of the woman her son has married (D): she finds her shabby, impertinent,
rude—beneath her family’s station. But Murdoch stipulates that M is a good woman, she
is self-critical and wants to attend to D in the right way. “Attention” is a term Murdoch
uses for aiming to appreciate in an object of value the value that it really has. So M sets
about attending to D, and gradually D is found to be not ‘shabby’ but ‘unpretentious’, not
‘impertinent’ but ‘candid’, as one set of descriptions is substituted for another.
Murdoch makes the case for this substitution as moral progress, but there is a question
about how to understand the progress exactly, and it is important for my purposes to be
clear about the moral lesson we are being asked to draw. On one reading of the example,
M’s work is primarily value-epistemic. She asks herself whether her judgements of D are
to come closer to one another”; that of respect “to keep themselves at a distance” (:). Though they
have opposite valences, love and respect are “united into one duty”, in such a way that where the one is the
principle of action, the other is “joined to it as accessory” (:). So if the maxim of my action is to promote
the interests of this man from the duty of love, respect enjoins that I do so without violating his self-respect
(:). That means that though my action is meritorious—though it puts him under obligation to me—I
must make as if I owe it to him. Far from “bristling with uncalled-for impingements” (Velleman, p. ), Kant
tells us we must “carefully avoid any appearance of trying to bind the other” by our beneficence; better still,
we should practice beneficence “in complete secrecy” (:).
And yet I think no end of secrecy will obscure the fundamental differences between the two accounts. Love
on Velleman’s view is in the first place a recognition of value, it is not cause for furthering the ends of others.
We find, albeit slim, textual grounds for making love in Velleman’s sense a duty in the Lectures on Ethics.
There Kant makes a distinction between well-wishing love—what appears to be the ancestor notion of love as
beneficence—and well-liking love—delight in another’s perfection (:). Both are duties, and the object of
well-liking love is the “the kernel of good will” in all persons, including the villain (:). Though these are
scanty textual grounds they provide a provisional conceptual bridge between Velleman’s love of persons and
love as a Kantian duty.
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justified or not, whether they are after all the product of prejudice: “I am old fashioned
and conventional. I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again” (p.
). In that case, M’s undertaking is epistemically laudable—she is rooting out false or
distorted judgements—and we can understand the achievement as an achievement of right
understanding: of forming attitudes and thoughts appropriate to the object of value.
But I take it the example is meant to be one in which M’s initial judgements are not
false in this straightforward way. Or at least, we can imagine the case as one in which D is
rude and shabby in the ways M is initially inclined to find her. How then might we conceive
of M’s undertaking? Perhaps we could say that M is engaging in a piece of “constructive
emotional reform”. M wishes she did not feel disdainful of D, wishes she could see her in
a more loving way, and so because she likes to maintain loving relations with the people in
her life, or wants to keep her family together. But now M’s bid looks delusive—she seems
to be fudging her new and favourable judgements of D, albeit for laudable ends. While
there is nothing amiss in trying to value people, positive valuation tends to resist our efforts
at inducement. To understand the example this way would be to saddle Murdoch with
an untenable moral psychology, but it would also be to disregard the conditions she lays
down for the case: of the various motives we attribute to M we cannot say that “she deludes
herself ” (Murdoch, p. ). If she is moved by love, love must have a closer connection to
truth, here to the truth about D. “The love that brings the right answer”, Murdoch writes
in another connection, “is an exercise of justice and realism and really looking” (Murdoch,
p. ). How are we to put these things together?
Velleman himself brings Murdoch’s notion of attention, though he does not discuss the
case of M and D, together with Kantian valuation. Both are said to be modes of valuation
As David Pugmire puts it (, p. ).
It must happen, as Pugmire () writes “as by grace, or not” (p. ).
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in which what is valued is seen in the right way—really seen, where the really may be taken
to contrast with the merely apparent. We might picture Murdoch’s attention, in Velleman’s
terms, as our looking through or past a person’s empirical persona and to his true or proper
self—to the core of goodness in him. Alighting on that core of goodness our eyes are
“opened to what the other really is” (Velleman, p. ). So M’s love is a discovery, on the
one hand, for the object of her love is just what we all possess by virtue of being persons.
And M must steel herself to loving, on the other, for on this view we are imperfect diviners
of personhood: “[w]hether someone is lovable depends on how well his value as a person
is expressed or symbolized for us by his empirical persona. Someone’s persona may not
speak very clearly of his value as a person, or may not speak in ways that are clear to us”
(Velleman, p. ). M’s coming to see D as ‘refreshing’ and ‘unpretentious’ is a dawning of
personhood, then; ‘refreshing’ and ‘unpretentious’ are what she is valued-as, but importantly,
in Velleman’s terms, these are “conduits rather than sources of value” (p. ). In contrast
to the first reading, M’s shift in attitude is not a consequence of eliminating false beliefs
or judgements, where D turned out to be not unceremonious (etc.) at all. Rather, as we
may imagine, M has looked past D’s irritating habits, past her unceremoniousness, and to
Velleman’s true or proper self which is revealed in the attributes marked out by the new
thick terms. We could picture this as a shift in perception of what is salient about D. So
M’s love is achieved—it does not happen “as by grace, or not” (Pugmire, p. ); but against
the second reading, it is not delusive either. And in this way we can put love together with
“justice and realism and really looking” (Murdoch, p. ).
.. The First Horn of the Dilemma
Let me recall the dialectic. I have been giving an account Velleman’s view of valuing persons.
The view says that we are to direct our thought and attention to the intelligible subject, the
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bearer of morality and freedom, so that what in human beings is less than ideal becomes
irrelevant to how we see them. I have used the example from Murdoch to bring out what I
think is attractive in this conception of our attitudes towards persons. I turn now from our
attitudes towards persons simpliciter to our attitudes towards persons-as-agents-of-actions.
So consider a case in which D wrongs M in some way. She sabotages Sunday lunch, or
she gives away the broach, a family heirloom, M had made her as a gift. And suppose D
does this out of insolence or spite. The question I now want to ask is whether Velleman’s
view invites the consequence that D is not to be held responsible for her actions. The
consequence is not entailed by Velleman’s view, for his is an account of the attitudes we are
to bear towards persons; it is not an account of the evaluative attitudes we bear towards
persons qua agents of some action. But I submit that it is a natural extension of his view.
The extension requires just that valuing persons involves directing our thought and attention
only to actions (and to parts of the self ) with which the intelligible self is causally involved.
Since the sensible self is the locus of actions that fall short of morality, and since the sensible
self is not free, if freedom is a condition on responsibility, it follows that a person is not to
be held responsible for wrongdoing. In the terms of the example, M is to fix her attention
not on D’s bad behaviour, but on the person she really is, someone, in Velleman’s final
gloss on personhood, with the capacity for love of others, even if that is not now exercised.
There needn’t be revision in M’s description of D’s behaviour; we needn’t imagine that the
sabotaged lunch becomes comedy in M’s mind, or the dispensing of the hierloom a way to
lighten the burden of history; ‘sabotage’, etc., may be quite the right description. We are
imagining, rather, that in alighting on the person, M is alighting on the good in D—on
“that better side of the person which constitutes [her] true self ” (Velleman, p. )—so that
D’s insolence and spite are consigned to an inessential, or false, part of her nature. It may be
that M struggles to maintain this perspective; it may take continual recommitment. But as

Murdoch says, the work of attention is an “endless task”; it requires discipline (, p. ).
Now Velleman may well resist this extension to his view. He may insist on the distinction
between the attitudes we take towards persons and the attitudes we take towards the actions
of persons, so that the question of whether one should value everyone as a Kantian person
is separate from the question of whether one should ascribe responsibility (or not) from the
perspective of seeing others as Kantian persons. This is a possible move, though perhaps
not in the end a plausible one. For we might think that in taking up evaluative attitudes
towards the actions of persons we are always also assuming an attitude to the source of the
action, that is, to the person. But it is not my concern to argue this here. What matters for
my purposes is not whether Velleman himself is committed to the first horn of the dilemma,
but whether some view is which yet provides a defensible model of interpersonal relations.
This last I have constructed from resources Velleman brings to the table.
While I have tried to bring out reasons in favour of the view, I want to argue that it
licenses revision of our practices of holding responsible for wrongdoing that we have moral
reasons to uphold. Consider that the judgement that someone is responsible is a special kind
of judgement. This is sometimes put by saying that judgements of responsibility go beyond
favourable or unfavourable description. In what way they go beyond is a matter of dispute.
Some take it to be a matter, in the terminology of P. F. Strawson (), of expressing reactive
sentiment—generically, praise and blame; others, following T. M. Scanlon (), take it to
be a matter of demanding justifications, and of engaging in forms of moral argument. It is
not important for my purposes which account we adopt. What matters is that judgements
of responsibility are constituted by a characteristic range of practical responses to others.
These forms of response are a crucial part of our moral lives. That is a broadly Strawsonian
point. Strawson took our responsibility practices to be deeply bound up with participation
in interpersonal relationships. We are responsive to the good or ill will people bear towards

us and towards other people, just as we are responsive to their attitudes to the principles,
values and objects we care about. Our responsiveness finds expression in holding one
another responsible when we or others or things we care about are slighted. This is a natural
part of our relations with others and it is significant because it communicates our moral
expectations to them. In my view the centrality and the role of these practices provides a
strong reason to preserve them. Clearly, the moral justification of blame and associated
negative attitudes requires extended defence, and in a longer version of this paper I will give
that defence. For now, I want to point to just how radical a revision to our practices the
Velleman-inspired view requires.
In fact, Strawson’s point is taken over and strengthened by Christine Korsgaard (),
for whom personal relations not only significantly involve the spontaneous exchange of
negative reactive sentiment, but actually require it—for Kantian moral reasons. So, as
we will see, Korsgaard gives us additional considerations for taking the first horn to be
unacceptable. Unfortunately, her grounds drive her to the second horn.
. Korsgaard on Respecting Others as Agents
Korsgaard begins squarely with the distinction between the intelligible and explanatory
standpoints. Her question is whether it is ever permissible to regard a person from the
explanatory standpoint, the standpoint from which he is a creature whose behaviour is set
by desires and inclinations according to a causal history. Indeed we are often tempted to
treat a person who is being infuriating, who is overwrought, enduring difficulties, or is not
themselves, as an “obstacle to be worked around” (Korsgaard, p. ); efforts to engage
them rationally give way to a concern with how to manage them best. Korsgaard says she is
inclined to think this disrespectful, and for a rationale she turns to Kant:

The reason we must view another as a fellow rational person rather than a
psycho-social phenomenon is not that he is in fact one of these things rather
than another. In fact, he is both. That another is responsible is what Kant
calls a postulate of practical reason: a belief or attitude that can be formulated
theoretically, but is practical and moral in its basis (p. ).
And the moral basis of the practical postulate is said to be this:
[T]he moral law [. . . ] commands that you treat everyone as an end in himself.
Unless you hold others responsible for the ends that they choose and the
actions that they do, you cannot regard them as moral and rational agents, and
so you will not treat them as ends in themselves (p. ).
The idea is that treating people as responsible is a necessary condition on our treating
them as ends in themselves, and treating them as ends in themselves is commanded by the
moral law. One way to make out the connection Korsgaard envisages here between treating
someone as a responsible agent and treating them as an end in itself is by noting that, on
her view, to treat humanity as an end in itself is to treat someone above all as capable of
rational, self-determined choice. Then the thought is that to treat someone as capable of
rational choice is to treat them as an agent, and to treat them as an agent is to hold them
responsible for what they do (choose). It follows that if we must always treat people as ends
in themselves then we must always treat them as capable of rational choice—always treat
them as agents. I take it this is Korsgaard’s line of thought. And the conclusion is clear: we
must always treat agents as responsible, for that is part of what it is to respond in the right
way to their humanity. Shifting to the explanatory stance, in which we regard what agents
do and say as natural or ‘psycho-social’ phenomena, is tantamount to disrespect.
This position is not without appeal. Part of its appeal is that it requires us to relate to
agents as being capable of good will. I am to hold you responsible for the bad choice you
For that is what Korsgaard (b) takes ‘humanity’ essentially to be. (See especially p. ). Since Kant
does not take the choice between good and evil to be agency in any sense, insofar as Korsgaard’s is a Kantian
proposal, the capacity to choose here must be the capacity to choose good ends.

made in acting as you did, because by doing that I show you that I believe you can do better.
As Korsgaard () puts it in another connection: holding someone responsible ‘declares
to its object greater faith than she has in herself ’ (p. ). It might seem to that extent to
join ranks with the Kantian commitment, attractive to many people, that all human beings
have moral worth in virtue of their potential to be moral, something it is incumbent on us
to recognise by holding them to high standards.
Additional points of appeal may be brought out by noting that, for Korsgaard, to relate
to another as a responsible agent is primarily to be prepared to enter into reciprocal relations
with him. She says:
To hold someone responsible is to regard her as a person—that is to say, as a free
and equal person, capable of acting both rationally and morally. It is therefore
to regard her as someone with whom you can enter the kind of relation that is
possible only among free and equal people: a relation of reciprocity (, p.
).
The idea of reciprocity brings out the egalitarian dimension of Kantianism that many
have found attractive. One might think the idea of a reciprocal relation is the idea of a
relation in which participants are open to being affected by one another. If we think that
includes being affected by one another’s moral point of view, then regarding them from an
explanatory perspective will be a way of muting their claim to affect one’s own rational and
moral thinking. It is a way of not regarding the person as someone from whom one can
Pamela Hieronymi () has argued that to show anger towards a wrong-doer is to give recognition of
her moral significance; it is to show that we ‘count her as worth being upset by’ (p. ). Hieronymi is in line
with Korsgaard here.
Though note that insofar as this is meant to be a Kantian view there is a problem with the idea of
equality here, for Kant takes the value of human beings to be such that it is non-comparative. This is part
of what Kant means when he says that human beings have a dignity and not a price value (:-). And of
course being equal is a kind of comparison. Velleman is very clear that the value of human beings for Kant is
non-comparative, though he may spoil his insight in saying that “all persons should be judged to have the
same value” (p. ).

learn.
In sum, Korsgaard’s claim that we have a moral obligation to hold wrongdoers responsi-
ble may be thought attractive because it shows that we see them as capable of good will. It
may be thought part of a commitment to egalitarianism, the belief that others are on an
equal footing with us, and in that sense able to be our critics—hold us responsible—too.
.. The Second Horn of the Dilemma
And yet, for all that, I think Korsgaard is committed to a stark and unattractive view. An
obvious problem is that it seems unable to accommodate a certain class of excuses. We
tend to take factors like stress, upset, fatigue or grief to mitigate holding people to account.
But Korsgaard must say that not to do so is to fail to respect their humanity, their capacity
for rational choice. This follows from yoking the stance of holding responsible to respect
for persons as ends in themselves (given her account of these terms). The result is a rather
demanding model for inter-personal relations, one that seems insensitive to a variety of
agential frailties.
Now Korsgaard recognises the problem. The rationale she has given on Kant’s behalf
for holding people responsible seems to entail an “intransigent’ view”; this is the second
horn of the dilemma:
[I]f we do regard people as free agents, fellow citizens in the Kingdom of
Ends, then it seems as if we must treat them as transcendentally free and so
as completely responsible for each and every action, no matter what sort of
pressure they may be under (p. ).
And this is a problem because:
Lawrence Stern () nicely makes this point. His term for engaging those we hold responsible in moral
argument is ‘dialogue’, and he sees it as a way of being ‘genuinely open to the other’s influence’ (p. ).

[T]he obvious fact is that we live in neighbourhoods which are different
distances from the Kingdom of Ends, and it seems merciless to give this
obvious fact no weight (p. ).
Indeed so. How does Korsgaard respond to the problem? In essence she responds by
appealing to parts of Kant’s oeuvre where he seems to take a different view. Specifically,
she points to parts of his work where he appears to relax the (would-be) requirement to
engage people from the intelligible and not the explanatory standpoint. The claim now is
that while it looked as if Kant required that we engage others practically to the exclusion
of the explanatory standpoint, that doing so was tantamount to respecting them, in fact
Kant mixes these standpoints. So much is revealed by his belief in the efficacy of political
institutions, and of moral education, for these require that good conduct can be (naturally)
caused (see Korsgaard, , Section V). However much this is true, and however Kant
permits a mixing of standpoints, so mixing them is debarred by the rationale for holding
people responsible which Korsgaard attributes to him. That it is Kant who asserts p and
not-p is no grounds for concluding that we may after all assert them together.
It is worth considering whether there are better replies in the neighbourhood. To
offset at least one form of the intransigence worry, perhaps Korsgaard could argue that the
rational-moral capacities constitutive of agency are compromised in circumstances of deep
grief, exhaustion or stress. Then when agents do wrong under those circumstances they do
It would also seem to be debarred by the position Korsgaard (c) takes elsewhere:
[T]he supposed problems about responsibility and ontology arise from a common source:
a failure to appreciate the radical nature of Kant’s separation of theoretical and practical
reason, and of their respective domains of explanation and deliberation. When these domains
are separated in the way that Kant’s philosophy requires, the problems about responsibility
disappear... (p. ).
The problem about responsibility Korsgaard addresses here is the first horn of a dilemma: that people are only
responsible for morally right action. If the separation of the practical and the theoretical is meant to resolve
this problem, then it does so only at the cost of landing on the second horn, the problem of intransigence.

not do wrong as agents, and they do not fall within the requirement always to hold agents
responsible. That requirement would instead read: always hold agents responsible when
they act as agents. This might be part of a more nuanced picture of moral capacity that
does not see it as possessed in all circumstances by those who meet a minimal threshold.
But notice that if Korsgaard accepts the amendment, and if, according to what we said
above, the capacity to choose rationally which is constitutive of agency is also constitutive
of humanity, then it looks as if we have bought a reply to intransigence at the cost of losing
grounds for respect. For in falling out of agency, the subject falls out of humanity and
thereby insurance by the requirement to treat humanity as an end. This consequence is
not one many Kantians are willing to accept, for it undermines a central commitment:
that respect is owed to all human beings, as Korsgaard (b) puts it elsewhere, ‘[a]s their
right’ (p. ). This brings out a deeper problem for the proposed amendment insofar as
it is to be a Kantian amendment. And that is that the rational capacities constitutive of
agency for Kant are not empirical properties of us, but are borne of our nature as intelligible
beings. In that way it does not make sense to think of them as possessed in some but not all
circumstances. And that is the reason respect is owed to all rational beings independently of
whether their rational capacities are in good form.
A different route for Korsgaard might be to argue that the stringency of Kant’s would-be
requirement always to hold agents responsible is an ideal of human relations proper to
inhabitants of the Kingdom of Ends, but not to those in neighbourhoods remote from
The minimal threshold view of moral capacity is held in different forms by many compatibilists, and
like Korsgaard they seem liable to charges of intransigence. For example, Kadri Vihvelin () defends a
view of responsible agency as the possession of a set of intrinsic properties which are the causal basis of a
disposition to choose on the basis of reasons. Since the intrinsic properties are possessed by the agent even
when the ability is not manifest, say, because she is tired, she is still responsible. Or take the view of Fischer
and Ravizza () according to which moral capacity is essentially rational self-control. An agent must be
capable of recognising and responding to relevant reasons, a capacity he is said to possess if he is shown to
have been reasons-responsive on occasion. As Michael McKenna suggested to me, the intransigence of such
views might be mitigated by taking the causal basis of agential capacity to be affected by external factors.

it. Given the conditions of the actual world, where agents are inconstant, imperfectly
rational and suffer defects of natural constitution, we need the governance of a non-ideal
theory. Then the ideal theory becomes not an obligatory standard for inter-personal
relationships, but a goal they should strive to meet, or a model of what they would ideally
be (p. -). The obvious reply to this line of thought is that in the Kingdom of Ends
there would be no wrongdoing, for everyone would be perfectly rational, so there would
be no holding responsible for wrongdoing. As an ideal model of inter-personal relations
Korsgaard’s rationale is incoherent, and since it fares badly as a model for current relations,
by Korsgaard’s own admission, it is unclear what end it serves.
The Diagnosis
I began this paper by considering Kant’s dual conception of human beings in the Ground-
work as it is given in the language of standpoints. Kant thinks, as we saw, that we take a
standpoint on ourselves as intelligible beings from the first person perspective of deliberation.
And Kant thinks, as we saw, that this standpoint excludes a standpoint on ourselves as
sensible beings, for as a matter of practical necessity, the thought was, we cannot both
deliberate and take our deliberation to be under causal influence from nature—from our
nature as embodied creatures. The two standpoints were in this way shown to be exclusive
I adapt the following line of thought from the style of reply Korsgaard (b) gives to the problem of
Kant’s uncompromising idealism in the face of the contingencies of a non-ideal world. These include Kant’s
seeming injunction against lying to the murderer at the door, his injunction against suicide in the face of acute
misery, and his requirement to perfect our talents even when we lack the means or opportunity to do so. To
respond to these problems Korsgaard adapts John Rawls’ distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, what
Korsgaard calls a double-level theory, to Kant.
Korsgaard shifts between conceiving of holding responsible as a stance towards someone’s actions or
attitudes, and conceiving of it as a stance towards persons themselves, wherein we speak of so-and-so’s being a
responsible person. It makes sense to say that in the Kingdom of Ends, relations will be of a reciprocal kind
among responsible people, but this is not the sense of responsibility that needs to be addressed here, which is
responsibility for some action.

for Kant.
But then the question was whether we are to take a perspective on other people as
intelligible beings, and whether in taking that perspective we are to exclude considerations
about their sensible nature from practical ways of relating to them. I offered the positions
of Velleman and Korsgaard as contemporary Kantian positions which in different ways take
over the transposition of the intelligible standpoint to the third-person case. Both take
regard of others as intelligible beings to be borne of Kant’s theory of valuation, in particular,
of what it is to value persons as ends-in-themselves. For Korsgaard, as we saw, to value
persons as ends-in-themselves is to assume the intelligible standpoint on them, and that
means to treat them always as agents. To take up the explanatory standpoint, to regard them
as sensible beings, would be to fail to keep “the humanity of others and so their capacity for
good will always before our eyes” (Korsgaard, p. ); and more strongly, it would be to
“write [someone] off as a person” which is something we do only “at [our] own moral peril”
(p. ). On the other hand, for Velleman, as we saw, to value persons as ends-in-themselves
is to appreciate the real or proper part of them which is the purely intelligible part. Sensible
considerations are excluded from valuing the real and proper part inasmuch as they belong
to the person as he merely appears—to what Kant calls the human being, and Velleman the
“empirical persona” (Velleman, p. ).
My strategy in the paper was to argue against these versions of Kant’s theory of valuation
by showing how they entail, or in Velleman’s case invite, unpalatable consequences for our
relations with other people. In particular, I argued that they deliver peculiar results for
holding others responsible for wrongdoing. They deliver the result either that people are
never to be held responsible for wrongdoing or that people are always to be held responsible
for wrongdoing. My argument against these conclusions turns on offering a normative
justification of our practices of holding people responsible. Against the Velleman-inspired

view I argued that holding others responsible for wrongdoing is sometimes appropriate. I
argued that the practical forms of response constitutive of holding responsible—making
demands for justification, engaging in robust forms of moral argument, blaming and related
forms of censure—play an important role in communicating our moral expectations to
others, and in holding them to standards we think they should share. Against Korsgaard,
on the other hand, I argued that holding others responsible for wrongdoing is not always
appropriate. I argued that our practices of excusing wrongdoing agents whose behaviour
is borne of stress or ill-health, or whose behaviour is out of character, are appropriately
excused on occasion. In this I take myself to be defending our ordinary practices of holding
people responsible for which it is sometimes but not always appropriate.
One way to put my criticism is to say that the Velleman and Korsgaard style views invite
overly simplified accounts of the conditions of responsibility. To the question of under what
conditions we are to hold another responsible for wrongdoing they give brute answers: it is
never for the one, and always for the other. And that is because they take all that is relevant
to determining those conditions to be whether someone possesses a rational nature. If they
do then Korsgaard says that they must always be held responsible for their conduct—to hold
them responsible is what it is to value their rational nature. If they do then the Velleman
style view says that they must never be held responsible for their conduct—to not hold them
responsible is what it is to value their rational nature. My criticism may be put by saying
that to work out the conditions under which someone is responsible, and so how we are to
relate to them, we need to know more than whether they possess rational nature—we also
need to know empirical facts about them. If a person has been impertinent and ungracious,
then we need to know this. If he has been suffering under strain or exhaustion then we need
to know this. The problem is that the views take considerations about another’s sensible
nature to be irrelevant. But they are not: our stance towards others is and should be sensitive

to empirical matters.
. A Disjunctive Conclusion
What generates the unpalatable consequences for responsibility, then, is a conception of
human beings according to which there is the part which engages our practical responses,
rational nature, and the part which engages our theorising, sensible nature. But sensible
nature does not come into view as practically relevant, and agency does not come into view
as explanatorily relevant. Against this, and on the basis of the line of criticism developed
here, it seems to me that there is one of two positions available. Let me outline them in
turn.
.. Concessive Kantianism
The first is a concessive Kantian position. It retains a dual conception of our nature as
intelligible and sensible beings, and it says that a person’s intelligible nature is the object
of valuation. But it adds that to appropriately value another’s intelligible nature is not
to exclude consideration of sensible nature. On this sort of position, consideration of
sensible nature is part of what it is to value intelligible nature. So while on the view I
attributed to Velleman appropriate valuation of the intelligible subject meant discounting
the infractions borne of sensible nature, on this view counting them would be precisely to
value the person appropriately. Engaging the person in robust forms of moral argument,
demanding justification and so on would be what it is to respect them. In this the view
would be closer to Korsgaard’s position. But it would be unlike Korsgaard’s position in
that not taking account of the frailties borne of an empirical constitution would amount to
improper valuation of the intelligible subject. The form of intransigence that Korsgaard is
forced into by her injunction always to regard persons as agents would on this view be a

failure of respect.
The question is whether this is viable as a Kantian position, or whether it is ruled
out given attendant Kantian commitments. One might think it ruled out, for example,
on grounds of Kant’s rationalism. Kant takes moral requirements to hold for all rational
beings as a matter of necessity, and since he thinks that necessity cannot be grounded
empirically, he excludes empirical considerations from the grounds that can be given for
moral principles. It is in this sense that he takes himself to be doing metaphysics of morals.
Now one formulation of the supreme principle of morality is that we must value persons
always as ends-in-themselves, and we have seen that that may be understood to mean that
we must value persons as intelligible beings. But does it imply further that in valuing
persons as intelligible beings we must exclude consideration of their sensible nature? Does
Kant’s rationalism license this exclusion? Now in a clear sense, for a morality that is meant
to hold of all and purely rational beings, considerations about sensible nature will not be
forthcoming. Purely rational beings do not do wrong, and do not have bodies, so we need
not be told how to treat them when they do wrong, or when their bodies impede their
agency. But human beings are not purely rational beings, we are taken to have a dual
nature. How does Kant’s rationalism speak to us? One way to focus the question is to ask
whether Kant includes in his formulation of the principle of morality considerations that
are particular to beings with a dual rational-sensible nature. He seems to do precisely that in
the Groundwork. The bulk of the Groundwork addresses itself to beings with a dual nature.
This is why the supreme principle of morality is formulated as an imperative—a perfectly
rational will does not need to be commanded to do his (its) duty. This is also why the
deduction of morality in the third part of the Groundwork aims to show that the categorical
imperative is valid for and binding on human beings. If this is right then it is not clear
that Kant’s methodology in the Groundwork would give us grounds against the concessive

Kantian position.
.. Rejection of the Distinction Between Intelligibility and Sensibility
A second and non-Kantian position says that we ought to give up on a conception of human
beings as having a dual intelligible-sensible nature. On this view we are mixed beings, we
are sensible agents, and should be treated and understood both ways together so that our
sensible nature is practically relevant, and so that our agency is a sensible feature of us.
I want to offer reasons in favour of this kind of position by turning to a neglected
observation of P. F. Strawson (). Strawson gave analogues, albeit metaphysically defla-
tionary analogues, of Kant’s distinction between the two standpoints; Strawson’s were the
participant stance and the objective stance. But what interests me is a move Strawson
makes towards effacing the distinction he draws for us. “I am aware”, Strawson writes, that
in distinguishing the two stances “I have presented nothing more than a schema, using
sometimes a crude opposition of phrase where we have a great intricacy of phenomena” (p.
). He goes on to describe some of that intricacy by discussing cases in which we do not take
either the participant or the objective stance in any pure form. Strawson’s example is of
raising children. Children are creatures in the process of acquiring the capacities that make
them appropriately held responsible, and of the capacities that allow them to appropriately
hold others responsible. But children are not yet fully possessed of either capacity. So our
treatment of children represents what Strawson thinks of as a “compromise” between the
two stances; we shift back and forth between them, sometimes assuming the one stance and
The participant is the stance we take towards agents—those we engage in the practical forms of response
constitutive of holding responsible. The objective is the stance we take towards non-agents—those we
withdraw from the measure of our normal practical responses in favour of a stance of prediction, explanation
and control. So as Strawson sets up the distinction, we take the two stances towards different kinds of being,
agents and non-agents. In this Strawson’s differs from the Kantian distinction which imagines that we are
both kinds of being—that we take up both positions, as it were, for different purposes.

sometimes the other.
I want to suggest that most of us represent intermediate cases in Strawson’s sense, and I
want to suggest that our intermediate position should make us think differently about the
distinction he draws. To motivate my claim, let me adduce some very general considerations
about human beings, and I apologise in advance both for stating what may seem like
crude platitudes, and for stating them in a way that lacks much necessary refinement and
complexity. Adult human beings are in various stages of passage to rational agency, and
the passage is not linear—we often regress and then regain ground. In this passage our
rationality is continually hostage to our physical life, to low-level physiological matters
like how much sleep we had and when we ate, to more psychological matters like how
concentratedly we are attending to our environment, or how anxious or confident we feel.
Our rationality is hostage to our environments too as, in a very deep way, our environments
shape our upbringing with all the accidents of education and parentage that brings, to more
fleeting arrangements like the noise outside our window or even our position in a room.
Now for Strawson our attitude towards normal adult human beings is in the normal
case an attitude towards rational agents. Strawson considers that we sometimes take up
an attitude towards normal adult human beings in which we regard them as patients—as
merely sensible creatures. Then we shift to the explanatory standpoint. We may do this,
Strawson thinks, for a variety of reasons: ‘as a refuge, say, from the strains of involvement;
or as an aid to policy; or simply out of intellectual curiosity’ (p. ). And he thinks that we
may vacillate between these perspectives, taking up sometimes the one and sometimes the
other. In this way our attitude towards normal adult human beings is sometimes like our
attitude towards children in being intermediate between the two stances. But note how
different that idea of vacillation is from what I take to be a more standard kind of case, that
of excusing someone for, say, forgetting about a date with us because they were preoccupied

with their work. It does not seem to me that in excusing a person under these circumstances
we switch from regarding them as an agent full-blown, to regarding them as a creature
full-blown, albeit in such a way that we flicker back and forth in our regard. Rather, it
seems to me that our attitude is towards an embodied agent, someone whose rationality is
hosted by and hostage to the physical world. He is for us neither a pure agent nor a purely
causally determined one.
I am willing to grant that the distinction Strawson draws may be useful for certain
purposes, but I want to suggest that we should understand it to be quite porous. That
is, if we take up a perspective on someone as an agent, then we should do so in a way
that is informed by a conception of them as a sensible being. Likewise, if we take up a
perspective on someone as a sensible being, then we should do so in a way that is informed
by a conception of them as an agent. My suggestion is that the stances ought not to be
thought of as isolated from one another. It is perhaps worth recalling here that it is just
this mixed perspective that Korsgaard wants in the end in order to accommodate a variety
of agential frailties. Now in a clear sense Korsgaard is prevented from taking this mixed
perspective for reasons Strawson is not. For Korsgaard takes her analogue of Strawson’s
participant stance to be morally required towards beings with a rational nature. So where
Strawson says that we take the participant stance but shift also to the objective stance in
such a way that our stance may not be purely one or the other, Korsgaard must say that to
so shift is to fail to treat a person as an end-in-itself. Her position in this way forces her
to insist on a thorough screening off of the two perspectives from one another. And that
means that the friend who forgets our arrangement cannot be excused on grounds of strain
or stress. Excusing him would involve an illicit mixture of the two perspectives. But I want
to add to this now that Strawson’s idea of two perspectives as separate but potentially held
together in a kind of tension, is not sufficient either. If it is to be adequate to our perspective

on normal adult human beings, the two sides of the distinction must shape one another
and not merely be flickered between.
Now we said that Strawson’s distinction is a metaphysically deflationary one, but the
distinction (or version of the distinction) in Kant is metaphysically robust. In Kant we
are thinking not of ways to regard someone, but of the positions they occupy as members
of different worlds. Our rational agency on this conception is really not an empirical
feature of us. In this way, the distinction seems less amenable to softening. And if the
above considerations are on the right lines, if the rational nature of human beings should be
thought of and engaged as part of their sensible nature, then it might seem that we lose our
grip on the Kantian picture of a dual-natured rational and empirical being.
Note that Korsgaard reads Kant’s two standpoints in a non-metaphysical way in line with the two-aspects
reading of Kantian idealism. In this she is able to see herself as an inheritor of a version of Strawson’s
distinction. But see footnote  above.
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 On Regress Arguments for the Value of Valuers
. Introduction
The topic of this paper is, in a sense to be qualified, the value of human beings. More
particularly, I am interested in examining accounts on which human beings are valuable
simpliciter—valuable independently of whether we are valuable for anything or anyone.
More particularly still, I am interested in examining an influential argument schema for the
value simpliciter of human beings. The argument schema, and it is a regress argument, has
two parts, and is simple to state:
(i) for anything to be valuable, there must be something which simply is
valuable—which is valuable simpliciter; the chain of dependence between
values must come to an end; (ii) human beings meet the criteria for being
valuable simpliciter.
Versions of the argument have been put forward in discussions of human value by Christine
Korsgaard and Joseph Raz. But part (i) of the argument has rather wide currency. Versions
are given by G. E. Moore, and Aristotle; and an analogous argument is made in epistemology
concerning, not value, but justification and knowledge. The conclusion of my paper is in
a clear sense negative: I will argue that both versions of the schema fail to establish their
conclusions. But there is a positive lesson. The positive lesson is that we have reason to
develop an account of the value of human beings without making recourse to the notion
of value simpliciter. We can capture core desiderata for an account of the value of human
beings by taking all value, including human value, to be value for something or someone.
It is a background hypothesis of this paper that there is no such thing as value simpliciter.
My background hypothesis is that all value is value for something or someone, or more
strongly, that value is value for. By that I mean that when something is valuable it is valuable
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because it has some feature or features which make it such that it is valuable for something
or someone. Now I do not propose to defend this background hypothesis directly here.
Rather, my strategy is to argue against the view that we must take something, human beings,
or valuers, to be valuable simpliciter for anything to be valuable at all. The hope is that in
securing this more restricted conclusion, an important step is made towards defending the
background hypothesis.
The plan for the paper is as follows. In Section . I explicate the notion of value
simpliciter, distinguishing it from related notions. In Sections . and . I give the two
versions of the argument schema for the value simpliciter of human beings. In Section . I
lay out various alternatives to the claim that the chain of dependence between values must
come to an end with value simpliciter. In Section . I give reason to favour the alternative
on which the regress terminates in a kind of reflexive relation, so that objects and activities
of value are valuable for human beings, and human beings are valuable for ourselves.
But first a note about terminology. I have been speaking of the value of ‘human beings’,
but there is a tradition, and it is part of a rationalist tradition, of speaking rather of the
value of ‘persons’. For Kant, human beings have an empirical and a noumenal nature and it
is our noumenal nature—what, as persons, we share with rational aliens and angels—which
makes us valuable. In speaking of the value of ‘human beings’ I am marking a departure
from the Kantian tradition. For I am interested in the value of human beings as we are
actually, that is empirically, constituted. But talk of human value is not without problems
of its own. For one, as Harry Frankfurt () has made the point, it carries the implication
that we are interested in the value of human beings as opposed to other animals. And yet,
we would be interested in whatever feature makes us valuable whomever possessed it. It is
perfectly possible for other creatures to possess the feature in question, even if we seem to be
I give reasons for this background commitment in ‘Responsibility and the Value of Intelligible Beings’.
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the only creature to possess it in fact.
Another problem stems from well known difficulties with giving a unified account of
the value of human beings. The value of someone in a persistent vegetative state is not well
accounted for in terms of agency, or reasoning, or valuing—or other common candidate
bases; and likely not a capacity for these things either. Their value, and the obligations we
have to treat them in certain ways and not other ways, will need to be grounded differently.
For this reason, we might speak not of the value of ‘human beings’, and not of the value
of ‘persons’, but of the value of ‘agents’, or ‘reasoners’, or ‘valuers’. Since I am principally
concerned with views which treat our capacity to value as the basis of our value, I will speak
of ‘valuers’. If I use the term ‘human being’, it should be kept in mind that I am concerned
with the value of human beings as valuers.
. The Notion of Value Simpliciter
I turn, then, to the notion of value simpliciter which is at stake in the arguments under
consideration, and begin by offering a working definition. Something is valuable simpliciter
iff it is valuable independently of whether it is valuable for anything or anyone. Rough
synonyms for value simpliciter include ‘absolute value’, ‘value sans phrase’, and ‘value in
itself ’. Though there are conceptual differences, these are all terms which mark value, or
goodness—terms I will use interchangeably—as non-relational.
The opening of Kant’s Groundwork (:), where Kant is discussing the value of a good
will, helps to unpack the notion. It is not important for our purposes that Kant is discussing
In stating my preference for a pluralistic account of the value of human beings, I am committed: (i)
to giving some basis or criterion for the value of human beings; (ii) to taking that basis or criterion to be
something other than that we are a certain kind of being; (iii) to making the practical significance, and so the
value, of a given criterion clear. These commitments would take some argument, but I leave that task to one
side here.
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the value of a good will ; what matters is his characterisation of its value features. Kant
tells us that a good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, or because of
its suitability for attaining some end. Usefulness, Kant says, would add nothing—it would
serve only to attract those who have no appreciation of its proper worth; and fruitlessness
would take nothing away. As the oft-cited passage would have it:
Even if, by a special disfavor of fortune or by the niggardly provision of a
stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out it
purpose—if with the greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the
good will were left [. . . ]—then, like a jewel, it would still shine forth by itself
as something that has its full worth in itself (:).
To capture what is distinctive about the notion, it is worth considering a contrast class.
So compare our usual ways of explaining the value of things—the value of a pencil, or a
gift, or a trip to a museum. We tend to explain the value of these things by pointing to a
positive difference they make to something or someone: they are useful, or beneficial in
some broader way. The pencil allows us to make marginalia, the gift to show gratitude
for hospitality, the trip to a museum to bring our studies of Tutankhamun to life. The
example of the pencil is an example of instrumental value, of something that is valuable
because of what it brings about, or causes. The examples of the gift and the trip to the
Note that Kant characterises the good will by way of more than one value notion. The good will
is absolutely valuable—valuable whether or not it is valuable for anything or anyone. This is what I am
calling value simpliciter, and it is the notion I am focussing on. But the good will is also unconditionally
valuable—roughly, valuable in all circumstances. These concepts are related in Kant, but I am not here
drawing attention to the would-be unconditionality of the value of the good will.
At least, these are explanations of the value of certain objects and activities of value along one explanatory
axis. And there is likely more than one. For example, we sometimes seek to explain the value of things
by pointing to the features on the basis of which they are good for something or someone. For example,
having friends is valuable because we are known by our friends, can express ourselves uninhibitedly with
them, can count on them for advice (and so on), where these things are valuable because they are valuable for
us—perhaps we think they are part of what make our life go well. I distinguish these axes of explanation in
‘On the Value of Human Beings’, but for our limited purposes here we can leave the complexities aside. I note
however that drawing a distinction of this kind would be part of a response to the challenge to the good for
theorist raised by Wolf ().
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museum are examples of non-instrumental value. The gift does not cause but is expressive
of gratitude, and the trip to the museum does not cause but is part of the enlivening of
one’s studies, where gratitude and enlivened studies are valuable for us, as it were, for their
own sake. So we have two kinds of value for something: value for the sake of something
else (instrumental value), and value for its own sake (non-instrumental value). Crucially,
the kind of value at issue in the opening of the Groundwork is wholly unlike either case. It
is the kind of value that is valuable whether or not it is useful or more broadly beneficial for
anything at all.
Kant seems to see, rightly, that there is something striking about the idea.
There is, however, something so strange in this idea of [...] absolute worth
[...], in the estimation of which no allowance is made for any usefulness, that,
despite all the agreement even of common understanding with this idea, a
suspicion must yet arise that its covert basis is perhaps mere high-flown fantasy...
(:).
If it is liable to be thought high-flown fantasy, we might ask, why covet it? I take it there
are two related intuitions here. First, the notion seems to bear out the distinctiveness of
the value of human beings. We have the intuition that human beings are valuable whether
or not we are valuable for anything or anyone else. Our value is thought to be in this
way non-derivative. To take human beings to be valuable simpliciter is to capture the
intuition about non-derivativeness by invoking a distinctive kind of value, one that yields an
explanation that is quite unlike the explanation of other valuable things. Second, the notion
seems to bear out the distinctiveness of the duties owed to human beings, the sense in which
our duties regarding them are not defeasible. The notion of value simpliciter would seem to
capture the distinctiveness of these duties by invoking a distinctive kind of value, one that
has a practical valence that is quite unlike the practical valence of other valuable things.
Now, for Kant, the value of human beings, or rather, the value of persons, is different in
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kind from the value of other kinds of things. Persons have a value like nothing else in the
world. The views I will engage with in this paper share that intuition: the value of valuers
is different in kind from the value of other valuable things, in being valuable simpliciter.
But it is worth pointing out that there is a long tradition of invoking the notion of value
simpliciter for other valuable things. For figures in the tradition of G. E. Moore and W. D.
Ross, candidate bearers of value simpliciter include aesthetic appreciation, knowledge, and
virtue. On these views, the appreciation of aesthetic objects is valuable independently
of whether it in some way benefits those who engage in it, by, say, enriching their lives.
The thought is rather that value dwells in the aesthetic participant. Likewise, having
knowledge is thought to be valuable independently of whether it expands the imagination,
permits good deliberation, enlarges one’s sense of the possible, or in some other way enriches
a person. So nothing about the concept of value simpliciter requires us to restrict it to
human beings, or more generally, to valuers.
It is worth pausing at this point to situate the notion of value simpliciter in relation to
other philosophical topics in the theory of value. Recent discussions of the contrast between
value simpliciter and value for, or as it is also put, between good and good for, address a
particular metaphysical question: is good a relational property, or is it non-relational.
For Ross (, pp. -) the list includes pleasure, knowledge, and virtue; for Moore () the greatest
goods fall under aesthetic enjoyment, and the pleasures of human intercourse (p.  and passim).
For a recent defense of the Moorean position, see Regan ().
At least, this is how I would phrase the issue. For recent work on the good as good for see Kraut (,
, ); Rosati (, , ); Smith (); Regan (); and Raz (). Kraut gives the fullest
treatment. I am sympathetic to many features of his account, though I do not share his view that the issue
turns principally on whether value is taken to be a reason-giving property or not, so that “friends” of value
simpliciter see value as reason giving, and “foes” do not. See Kraut (, pp. -, and passim). That makes
the question indistinguishable from the question of whether a buckpassing account of value is true. But in my
view the issue about buckpassing is orthogonal; it comes up in giving a substantive meta-ethical theory of
value. Moreover, it seems to me that one can think there is such a thing as value simpliciter, without taking
value simpliciter to be reason-giving. It can be taken to play a different theoretical role, for example, an
explanatory role. Finally, I do not share Kraut’s eliminativism about value talk, and a fortiori, about talk of the
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This question is sometimes put in semantic terms: is ‘good’ a relational predicate—such that
it functions logically as good for some S—or is it non-relational. The question has a long
history, but it departs from the focus in meta-ethics on the question of whether evaluative
judgements are true or false, and whether value predicates refer to real features of the world.
It departs from these questions by focusing first—before one turns to questions about
cognitivism/non-cognitivism, and realism/anti-realism—on a specific metaphysical issue,
namely whether value-properties are relational or not. The notions of value simpliciter and
value for are compatible with a range of substantive meta-ethical views, and the question
of interest here does not require one to take a stand. Meta-ethical questions come up in
an account of the nature of value only in a second step, and this is not a step taken in the
present paper.
Partly for this reason, it is important to head off any unclarity introduced by the jewel
analogy in the quotation from Kant above. There are difficult questions about how to
interpret the analogy, but it can seem to encourage the view that absolute value, or value
simpliciter, is a self-standing value property, of the sort posited by value realists. Then there
are questions about how Kant can accommodate that kind of picture given his broader
philosophical commitments. I do not wish to enter upon those controversies here. The
relevant question for my purposes is not whether Kant can be a moral realist or not, but
value of human beings. See for example Kraut (, p. , f.n. ). I think it is fine to call objects, individuals,
or activities ‘good’ or ‘valuable’, and fine to say that because they are good or valuable they give us reason to
respond to them in certain ways. All this is consistent with taking the objects to be valuable because they are
valuable for something or someone. On this last issue, see my ‘On the Value of Human Beimgs’.
For relevant work on the semantic side, see Geach (), Foot (), Thomson (, ). I agree
with Kraut (, p. ) that the question is not best construed as being about the meaningfulness of sentences
with the word ‘good’ in them, but of understanding what makes those sentences true.
I am grateful for discussion with Katja Vogt and Ralf Bader on this point.
For a non-realist reading of the jewel analogy, see Sensen (a,b).
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whether he is committed to a notion of value simpliciter, something’s being valuable whether
or not it is valuable for anything or anyone. I take it the answer to that question is clearly—
yes. It is then a further matter whether what Kant calls absolute value is a self-standing value
property, or something that categorically must be valued, so that “X has absolute value” is
equivalent to “X is such that it must be valued no matter whether anyone wants to value it;
no matter whether valuing it is useful to anyone, or beneficial; indeed, no matter whether it
makes a difference of any kind to anything or anyone at all”. If the second reading is to be
preferred, then the philosophical burden, for Kant, shifts from postulating a self-standing
value property to postulating categorical bindingness.
There is a question of whether the notion of value simpliciter is the same as the notion
of ‘intrinsic value’. But that notion is ambiguous. It can be taken to mean, simply, valuable
for its own sake; or it can be taken to mean, more ambitiously, valuable in its own right,
irrespective of whether it is valuable for anything else. Taken in this second way, the notion
is comparable to the notion of value simpliciter which interests me. But the notion of
intrinsic value typically goes together with a host of other ideas. For example, a marker of
intrinsic value has traditionally been the so-called ‘isolation test’ described by Moore (),
wherein we ask whether something of value would be valuable if it were the sole thing in
the universe. The isolation test is too restrictive for the notion of value simpliciter. The
notion of value simpliciter may be such that other things must be good for it—meaning
that it cannot exist in a world taken in isolation—though its value does not depend on its
being good for anything or anyone.
I use the term ‘postulation’ advisedly, here. On either reading, it is best to take Kant to treat the matter not
as a subject of proof, but of postulation. Incidentally, this is a way of overcoming some of the epistemological
problems Sensen (a,b) raises for the realist interpreter.
This is the notion of interest for Raz (, pp. -), who makes the case that value simpliciter need
not be ‘autarchic’.
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Or again, it is generally thought that what is intrinsically valuable is valuable on the
basis of its intrinsic properties. But I take it that it is perfectly conceivable for something
to have value simpliciter on the basis of its extrinsic properties. For we should draw a
distinction between the nature of the properties on which something of value depends—
whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic properties; and the explanation of what makes those
properties valuable—whether their value is to be explained in terms of being good for
something or someone, or whether their value is to be explained in terms of their being
valuable in their own right, or simpliciter. To bring out the distinction, consider that we
might take a work of art to be valuable on the basis of its intrinsic properties—its use of
colour and light etc.—though we take its value is to be explained in terms of its capacity
to enrich our lives in certain ways—in terms of its being non-instrumentally good for us.
Then something can be valuable on the basis of its intrinsic properties, though its value
is relational. Or again, we might have a view (however implausible) which says that the
oldest tree in the world is valuable in virtue of being unique or rare—where uniqueness
or rarity are extrinsic properties—though the value of something with those properties
is thought to be self-standing: it is valuable whether or not it is valuable for anything or
anyone. Then something can be valuable on the basis of its extrinsic properties, though its
value is non-relational. The view need not be plausible; conceivability is all we need to see
that the questions come apart.
For these reasons, while the notion of intrinsic value lines up with the notion of
value simpliciter in some of its uses, since ‘intrinsic value’ is ambiguous, and since it is
encumbered with historical-cum-conceptual baggage that need not encumber the notion of
value simpliciter, I will not make use of it.
Variants of this distinction, and of cases which purport to bring it out, are discussed by Kagan () and
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen ().

. The Regress Schema: A Source Intuition
I turn, then, to the first of two versions of the argument schema for the value simpliciter of
human beings. Both versions rest on an intuition about the structure of value explanations.
The first starts from the thought that value has a source—that it must come from somewhere.
A version of the argument is given in Korsgaard (, a). For ease of exposition, I will
take it to proceed in two stages.
.. Stage 
Stage  bears comparison with the regress argument for the existence of a first cause. It
begins with the thought that some things are good, or have value, and it asks: what is the
source of the value of these things? Where does their value come from? The conclusion of
the argument is that their value must ultimately come from something that has value in
itself, or simpliciter. The argument is that without a source that is valuable simpliciter,
we would have to take the value of objects or activities to derive from other things, which
There are actually two versions of the argument schema in Korsgaard’s presentation which are not clearly
distinguished, an argument from justification, and an argument from explanation. I focus on the latter,
and I abstract away from various subtleties in Korsgaard’s presentation. Korsgaard takes her argument to
be an interpretation of Kant’s argument for the value of humanity, but it is not best so construed. [See
Timmermann ()]. Note that where I am using ‘value simpliciter’ and ‘value for’, Korsgaard makes use
of a contrast between ‘unconditional’ and ‘conditional’ value, one she takes to be equivalent to the contrast
between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ value in Kant. I would argue that these are actually different distinctions (the
conditionality/unconditionality distinction pertains rather to the circumstances under which something is
valuable). The use of different terminology has one main consequence for my purposes. The way in which
value can be relational, on Korsgaard’s account, is that it derives from valuers. This is different from value
being relational in the sense that it is valuable-for something or someone—useful or more broadly beneficial
to it or them. Though it is a key difference from the notion of issue in Kant, and different from the notion at
issue in Raz, it shares sufficiently much with them to warrants consideration here.
Korsgaard invokes Kant’s argument for a first cause from the antinomies of the first Critique:“if we
explain a thing in terms of its cause, we then go on to explain the cause itself in terms of its cause, and this
process continues. Reason does not want to rest until it reaches something that needs no explanation [. . . ]
say, something that is a first cause or its own cause” (, p. ). Though the first cause argument leads to
an antinomy in theoretical reason, Korsgaard argues that there is no such antinomy in the argument for the
existence of value simpliciter (what she is calling ‘unconditional value’) in the practical case (, p. ).
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derive their value from other things in turn, and so on ad infinitum. But then it is hard
to see how value comes on the scene, or gets going. So we must posit an original source
of value—something that is valuable simpliciter. As Ross (, p. ) encapsulates the
thought: if nothing had value in itself, “value would seem always to be borrowed, and never
owned; value would shine by a reflected glory having no original source".
.. Stage 
Stage  of the argument says that human beings, as valuers, are the source of the value of
other things. Human beings are the source of value because we confer value on things by
choosing them according to rational standards. The capacity to choose ends according
to rational standards is what our humanity consists in. And our humanity is said to be
absolutely valuable—valuable simpliciter.
.. Responses to the argument
What are we to make of the argument? Of the first stage, we might urge that the idea that
value has a source is a supposition of meta-ethical constructivism, and is denied by realists.
To that extent, the argument rests on a contentious, theoretical premise. But perhaps more
importantly, even if one thinks that value has a source, it does not follow that the source is
itself valuable, let alone valuable simpliciter. For one might think that value ‘comes from’
valuers who are themselves not valuable, or who are valuable only insofar as they are a
necessary condition on the value of other things. To think otherwise is to be misled by a
The chain of derivation Korsgaard considers, and she is here invoking candidates which Kant discusses,
are from our ends, to our desires, to the faculty of desire, to reason.
Korsgaard () also quotes Ross, at p. .
See Korsgaard (a, pp. -).
By for example Raz (, p. , fn. ). See also Scanlon ().
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picture of transference, a picture encouraged by talk of value ‘traveling’ from human beings
to objects (Korsgaard , p. ), as if value were an electrical charge, or a substance that
rubs off on things.
Of the second stage of the argument, we might agree that the capacity to set ends, or
as Korsgaard also puts it, the capacity to value, is valuable. But why think it is absolutely
valuable—valuable simpliciter? For Kant, our humanity is absolutely valuable not because
it is a capacity to set ends in general, but, if we are to make use of this idiom, because it is a
capacity to set moral ends. It is our ability to align ourselves with our rational as against
our sensuous nature that gives us special worth. If we give that up, as Korsgaard gives it
up, then it is not clear why the power to set ends should be taken to call for a special kind
of value. An alternative story would take the power to set ends, or as I would prefer, the
power to have or pursue ends, to make us valuable because it makes us good for something.
As we will see, I think something close to this is likely to be true.
. The Regress Schema: An End to the Chain of Dependence
Now consider the second version of the argument. A version is given in Raz (, ,
). Like the first, it comes in two stages, and like the first, it rests on an intuition about
the structure of value explanations.
This general line of argument was made by Schneewind (), Sussman (, p. ) and others, and
was conceded by Korsgaard herself. In an appendix to (Korsgaard a), she writes that whereas in her early
writings she took humanity to have value simpliciter, in the later writings human beings confer value even on
themselves.
On this point, see Timmermann ().

.. Stage 
Stage  starts with the thought that the value of many valuable things is explained in terms
of their being valuable for something or someone. In Raz’s example, using engine oil is good
because it allows the engine to run more smoothly. Cinema going is good, as friendship
and games of tennis are good, because they are good for those who participate in them (to
the extent the movie is worth watching, the friends are worth having, and each is engaged
with in the appropriate way). Next, it is noted that when we explain the value of these
things, we suppose that the thing for which they are good is itself good for something or
someone in turn. Engine oil is good because it allows the engine to run more smoothly, and
a smooth-running engine is good because it allows us to get places, and getting places is
good . . . . Likewise, cinema going is good, as friendships are good, because they are good
for us, and we are good . . . . But then the thought is that the chain of dependence between
values must come to an end somewhere for any of the links to make sense. The chain of
dependence must come to an end with something that is valuable in itself, or simpliciter.
An infinite chain of dependence between values is implausible.
.. Stage 
Stage  of the argument says that human beings, or rather, valuers, meet the criteria for
being valuable simpliciter. Valuers are such that objects and activities of value are good for
them—find their point by being engaged with by them—and such that their value does not
depend on their contributing to the good of anything or anyone else. Valuers are valuable
See Raz (, pp. -). Raz says that his is not a point about infinite regress. What he must mean is
that the problem is not merely that there is an infinite regress, for infinite regresses are sometimes plausible.
But I take his point to be that it is not plausible in this case: an infinite regress undermines value explanation.

in themselves, or simpliciter.
.. Two notes about Stage 
There are two important things to notice about Stage  of the argument. First, the argument
cannot be merely that for anything to have value there must be something non-instrumentally
valuable. That is, the argument cannot be that in order for watering the plant to be valuable,
it, the plant, must be, or be related to something that is, valuable for its own sake—say,
eating the fruit of the plant which brings pleasure (something non-instrumentally valuable
for us). This argument, an argument from instrumental to non-instrumental value by
regress, is often taken to be almost truistic. Its key premise is that instrumental value is
by definition value that conduces to some positive good. The argument is that there can
only be instrumental value provided that what is instrumentally valuable is appropriately
related to what is non-instrumentally valuable. The assumption is that of a cause and effect
pair, the cause is valuable only insofar as it derives its value from the effect, so that without
non-instrumental value there can be no valuable effect. Now, I am not taking a stand on
whether this is the right account of instrumental value. It might be denied. One might
think that the value of a cause in a cause and effect pair does not depend on the effect’s
having non-instrumental value, but on its standing in the appropriate kind of relationship
to the effect. In that case, it is not that the goodness of watering the plant derives from the
non-instrumental goodness of the plant. Rather, watering the plant is a good thing to do
because of the relation it bears to the plant—the relation of being suitable or of benefit to it,
See Raz (, pp. -).
See Zimmerman (). The argument is defended by Conee (). See also discussions by Beardsley
(), and Harman ().
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where the value of that relation is foundational.
But the important point for my purposes is that the argument under consideration is
considerably more ambitious. It says that the value of non-instrumental goods, like health,
or a pleasant afternoon, or a good life, must be valuable for something, valuers, who are
valuable in themselves: valuable whether they are valuable for anything or anyone. The
notions of non-instrumental value and value simpliciter are different notions, and we should
not assume that the same argument works in both cases. It is worth noting that a slide
here is likely to be encouraged by use of the term ‘intrinsic value’, which, as noted above, is
ambiguous between valuable for its own sake, and valuable simpliciter. My point is that the
argument from instrumental to intrinsic value by regress might be sound in the first sense,
and unsound in the second.
Second, it is worth noting that stage  of the argument bears comparison with Aristotle’s
argument for a final end. Aristotle thinks that there must be some one final thing for the
sake of which all our more particular actions are undertaken, for without it they will all be
undertaken in vain. His line of thought is nicely brought out by way of a series of questions
and answers about any proposed course of action.
Why take a trip to Paris? Because I want to improve my French. Why improve
your French? Because I want to read Proust in the original. Why read Proust
in the original? Because it is one of the great works of fiction, and much is lost
in translation. Why read great works? ...
Aristotle’s thought is that the question and answer series will ultimately terminate with:
because it will make my life go well—something about which it does not make sense to
I am grateful to discussion on this possibility with Brad Weslake.
See Nichomachean Ethics, a -.
I take this way of modeling the Aristotelian argument from Vogt ().
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ask, and why do that? Aristotle’s argument is both a metaphysical and a psychological-
cum-motivational argument. As a metaphysical argument, it can be treated on a par with
the argument schema under consideration, and my remarks about it (below) can be taken
to apply to the Aristotelian argument, equally. The argument tends to be defended in
its metaphysical form. But as a psychological / motivational argument it might have
independent force and warrant independent consideration. On this version of the argument,
when we reflect on our motivations for acting, we see that our motivations for our more
particular actions are in the service of a single, fundamental motivation for our lives to go
well. Without that fundamental motivation, the thought is, we would not be motivated to
do anything—our more particular ends would seem pointless to us. Whatever force the
argument has as a proposal about the structure of our motivations, it is important to notice
that, so construed, it does not license a conclusion about the nature of the final end, for
example, that it is valuable in itself or simpliciter. Psychological / motivational arguments
do not license metaphysical conclusions. For we should draw a distinction between, as I
would put it, our ways of pursuing or valuing things, and the explanation of the value they
have.
See Broadie () and Lear ().
For a qualified defense of Aristotle’s argument taken as a thesis about our ‘background motivations’, see
Vogt ().
Indeed, I think it is unlikely that the value of a good life is best explained in terms of its being valuable
simpliciter. Rather, I think it is best explained in terms of its being (at a minimum, or most fundamentally)
good for the person whose life it is. But I will not make the argument here.
This as a way of formulating a distinction influentially drawn by Korsgaard (). In Korsgaard’s
formulation, there are two distinctions: “One is the distinction between things valued for their own sake
and things valued for the sake of something else—between ends and means, or final and instrumental goods.
The other is the distinction between things which have their value in themselves and things which derive
their value from some other source: intrinsically good things versus extrinsically good things” (p. ).
Korsgaard’s treatment has been influential, and it has been refined in subsequent discussions. [See Kagan
(); Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (); and Langton ()]. The notions of ‘intrinsicality’ and
‘extrinsicality’ at issue in Korsgaard’s treatment are not fully standard. It is standard to define intrinsic value as

. The Alternatives
So much for the second version of the argument schema. What are we to make of it? A
clear way to evaluate the argument is to ask whether there are plausible options besides
terminating the regress in value simpliciter. Could the chain of dependence between values
come to an end with something that is not itself valuable?—call that option (NV). Or could
the dependence go on indefinitely?—call that option (IR). Let me take the options in turn.
Raz () argues against (NV):
If A is good for B which is itself devoid of value, that A is good for B is no
reason for anyone to do anything, nor a reason for valuing A in any way at
all. It is as if A’s value is without value. In other words, it, A, is without value.
If B is good, but only inasmuch as it is or can be good for C, then whether
the value of A means anything (as explained above) depends on whether C
is valuable. If A is watering or spraying a protective spray on B, which is a
plant—which is good because it enables B to produce C, its fruit—then the
value of watering or spraying A depends on whether the fruit is of any value
(assuming that B is not valuable in any other way). If there is nothing good in
the fruit, what good is watering it? (p. ).
The claim here is that for the value of something to be explained in terms of the contribution
it makes to something else, the thing to which it contributes must itself be valuable, and so
on for each of the links in the explanatory chain. As we might put it, each of the nodes in
value on the basis of intrinsic properties, and extrinsic value as value on the basis of extrinsic properties. But
Korsgaard seems to have in mind non-relational versus relational explanations of the value of things, where her
example of a kind of relational explanation is explaining the value of something in terms of its relation to our
attitudes (desires or interests). It is for this reason that I would put the first of her distinctions as a distinction
in the explanation of value (while recognising that there is more than one axis along which explanations can
be given, and for that reason, more than one explanatory distinction); and the second as a distinction in
practical reason concerning how we value things. For Korsgaard, we have reason to keep the distinctions
apart because we should allow the possibility of there being something the value of which is to be explained
relationally, though it is to be valued as an end (for its own sake). An example would be a work of art the
value of which is explained in terms of its capacity to enrich our lives in certain ways, though it is to be valued
for its own sake. I agree that cases of this kind show that there is a distinction to be drawn here. It would take
further argument to make the case that the distinction is a good one, and that it actually has instances. I offer
considerations in favour of a distinction of this kind in Section  of ‘On the Value of Human Beings’.

the chain of dependence must be good. One might be inclined to object on grounds that
there is an ordinary use of ‘good for’ on which ‘x is good for y’ and y is not valuable. For
example, we might say that while weapons are good for the victors to win the war, their
victory is not a good thing. Or, we might say that while certain conditions are good for the
growth of a certain bacteria, the growth of that bacteria is not good. But perhaps this is
merely a loose way of speaking. Perhaps we are here simply spelling out a causal relationship,
so that having bombs would cause or enable the enemy to win the war, as certain chemical
conditions enable growth of the bacteria. The proposal might be that we should reserve the
expression ‘good for’ for cases where the objects, activities, states, or events being related are
valuable, and to that extent, reason giving. As Raz says of what is instrumentally good for
something:
It is often assumed that something is instrumentally good just if there is
something for which it is good, however valueless, or even bad, that thing is.
But if something is instrumentally valuable it is valuable. It is worth having, or
keeping or acquiring, or it has exchange value, etc. But if all that can be said
for it is that there is something it is good for, e.g., that it is good for making
people suffer, it does not follow that it is good. Indeed, as in this example, it
may well be bad (p. , fn ).
This seems right to me. In any event, I am prepared to grant that each of the nodes in
the chain of dependence must be good. For my purposes, it would not be a happy result if
it turned out that valuers—by hypothesis, the substitution instance for the final node in the
chain of dependence—were not valuable. What is wanted here, after all, is an account of
the value of valuers.
In ‘On the Value of Human Beings’ that what is good for something or someone is also good is a claim I
show myself to be committed to, and defend.
Of course, that is to set aside the possibility that human beings are not valuable, a view that likely has
adherents, and for interesting reasons. It is my understanding that for the ancients, human beings are not
bearers of value. Other things have value for us, but we are not valuable. To that extent, the idea that human

What then of option (IR)? If each of the nodes in the chain of dependence must be
valuable, why not take it that they are each valuable for something or someone else, and
so on ad infinitum? That is, what precisely is wrong with an infinite chain of dependence
here? It is something of a philosophical reflex that infinite regresses are thought problematic,
though what precisely is amiss is not always made fully clear. It takes some work to spell it
out. In this context, one problem is that if we are to imagine an infinite chain of dependence
between values that is not circular but linear, so that the value of a node depends on some
further node in the chain not yet appealed to, it follows that there would need to be infinitely
many things. And it seems implausible to think that the existence of value depends on
there being infinitely many things. That is at least one reason to find an infinite regress
problematic in this case.
Consider, then, a further option, option (C), on which the dependence between values
has a circular structure. There are at least two ways to conceive of this:
On (C): objects and activities of value are valuable because they are valuable
for valuers, and valuers are valuable because we are valuable for objects or
activities of value.
On (C): objects and activities of value are valuable because they are valuable
for valuers, and valuers are valuable because we are valuable for other valuers.
(C) explains the value of valuers in terms of our being good for such things as mathematics,
surgery, global justice, or a valuable relationship. There are two forms this explanation can
beings are valuable is a distinctively modern one, and likely has a religious history. [See Vogt ()]. My
reason for taking human beings to be valuable rests on a set of assumptions about the relationship between
reasons, action, and the world. That set of assumptions has been articulated in the writings of Raz over many
years, and I am influenced by his treatment. See for example the papers in Raz (). As I would put it in the
context of human beings, if we think human beings must be treated in certain ways and not in other ways, it
is because we take there to be something about them which licenses that treatment. Call that an evaluative
feature. This would take some argument to establish, and there is much more to say on both sides. I merely
mean to state my auxiliary reason for setting aside the possibility that human beings are not valuable.

take, corresponding to the two kinds of value for: instrumental and non-instrumental value.
First, we might be valuable insofar as we make a positive causal difference to things—we
advance a discussion, we innovate a technique, or conduct an important study. Second, we
might be good for objects of value by being part or constitutive of them, as when we are
part of a valuable relationship, or a member of a valuable community.
(C) explains the value of valuers in terms of our being good for other valuers. Again,
there are two forms this explanation can take. We can be good for others by, say, promoting
their good. Or we can be good for others by being part of their good, as Harry is good for
Harriet in being her friend. To the extent the friendship is a valuable one, Harry enriches
Harriet’s life—he is part of what makes her life go well. On this model, I am valuable
insofar as I contribute to, or am partly constitutive of, the good of others, and others are
valuable insofar as they contribute to, or partly constitute, my good (and the good of still
others). We can imagine quite complicated forms of interdependence here, with many
different kinds of relationship: that between friends, but also neighbours, teachers and
students, colleagues, fellow citizens, and so on.
Both (C) and (C) are alternatives to terminating the regress in value simpliciter. Is
there reason to prefer one candidate over the other? Of (C), it is worth noting that the
explanation of value in each of the cases discussed—advancing a discussion, pioneering an
important study, being part of a valuable relationship—can be pushed further. Advancing a
discussion is good because it is good for knowledge, we might say, and knowledge is good
because it is good for human beings. Conducting an important study is good because it is
good for beneficiaries of the study. Relationships are good because they are part of the good
That human beings are dependent social beings, and that the good for human beings is interdependent
in a robust way, is central to many ancient views in ethics. John Cooper () and Alasdair MacIntyre ()
develop these lines of thought in Aristotle. Katja Maria Vogt (b) has emphasised this line of thought in
the Stoa. Samuel Scheffler () has emphasised the importance of at least close personal relationships in
contemporary discussions.

of their participants. If that is right, the explanation ultimately turns on our being good
for human beings (or other beings). To that extent, (C) is best construed as a version of
(C). Of course, there are other ways to conceive of the value of valuable things. Another
possibility is to take knowledge, relationships (and so on) to be good simpliciter. On this
view, human beings are valuable because they make valuable contributions to values, and
those values simply have value. Friendship, say, just is valuable, and the value of human
beings derives from their participation in the value of friendship. This option seems to me
implausible. If one is to invoke the notion of value simpliciter, why invoke it for values,
and not for human beings? To do so is to make the value of human beings derivative on the
value of something else in a way that calls for explanation.
What then of (C)? (C) seems in many ways plausible, and it already presents an
alternative to the claim that we must terminate the regress in value simpliciter. One worry
might be that (C) does not capture the intuition that the value of human beings is non-
derivative: such that our value does not depend on our being good for anything or anyone
else. Recall that this was a key intuition driving the appeal to value simpliciter. Another
worry might be that (C) seems to miss something important about the value of being good
for others. Being another’s friend or sister or teacher is of value to them, when it is, but it is
also of value to oneself. Participating in these and other ways in the lives of others, taking on
the responsibilities that are part of those forms of participation, may be part of our own
good. It might seem arbitrary, then, to pick out our relations to others as explaining our
value, when we often also bear those relations to ourselves.
This suggests a third way of spelling out a relational explanation of human value. (C)
says that we are valuable because we are good for objects of value. (C) says that we are
Compare Raz’s (, p. ) argument that there is an asymmetry between valuers and values: values are
good because they are good for valuers but, at least in the ordinary case, valuers are not good because they are
good for values.
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valuable because we contribute to the good of others by, for example, standing in valuable
relations with them. A third option, call it option (R), starts with the observation that the
closest relation we bear is a relationship to ourselves.
On R: objects and activities of value are valuable because they are valuable for
valuers, and valuers are valuable because we are such as to stand in a valuable
relation to ourselves: a relation of being good for ourselves.
On this option, the chain of dependence between values comes to an end with a kind of
reflexive relation.
Now it need not strike us as immediately obvious what it should mean for valuers to be
valuable for ourselves. But supposing the idea can be given content, it is noteworthy that
(R) has immediate advantages over (C). (R) would make the value of human beings, if not
non-relational, then at least non-derivative on the value of anything else. This is important
because, without making recourse to a notion of value simpliciter, it would capture an
important intuition to the effect that human beings are valuable irrespective of whether we
are good for anyone or anything else. There would be to that extent something fundamental,
or basic, about this explanation of the value of human beings. (R) need not deny that we
may be valuable in other ways—that our value may also be explained in terms of our being
good-for others, say. It need claim only that being good for ourselves is primary. Further, if
(R) is defensible, we can exploit a view on which there is only one kind of value—value for
something or someone. Accordingly, the value of human beings, as befits beings who are
after all part of nature, will not be thought different in kind from the value of other kinds
of things.
What is more, I think (R) can exploit an account of the basis of human value which is
independently plausible. Let me now say something briefly about the basis of our value,
and by way of doing that, let me further explicate the proposal.

. Being valuable for Ourselves
We can develop option (R), and give content to the notion of being good for ourselves, by
drawing on Raz’s and Korsgaard’s intuition to the effect that human beings are valuable in
virtue of being valuers. Now there are different ways to understand what is to be a valuer,
and Raz and Korsgaard offer differing accounts of it. At a minimum, I take it that to value
is to pursue projects, interests, relationships, and self-ideals for their own sake. To value is
to have commitments or goals in terms of which we structure our more particular actions.
This being so, to be a valuer is to be a certain kind of agent, one who acts in sustained and
coherent ways. The relevant question to ask, at this point, is why being a certain kind of
agent, one who acts in sustained and coherent ways, makes us valuable? On the proposal
we are exploring, being a valuer makes us valuable, not simpliciter, but for something or
someone—in particular, it makes us valuable for ourselves. What is it to be valuable for
ourselves? One possibility is that to be valuable for ourselves is to be valuable for our lives.
On this construal, to value is to pursue goals and commitments the pursuit of which makes
us valuable because, the thought would be, it makes our lives go well. Then we must ask
about the value of a good life. If we are not to make the value of a good life foundational by
making it valuable simpliciter, a good life will need to be valuable because it is valuable for
something or someone. Plausibly, a good life is valuable most basically for the person whose
life it is. (Most basically because, likely, it will be valuable for others too). As it begins to be
explicated, then, proposal (R) comes to have the structure of (R*):
On (R*): objects and activities of value are valuable for valuers, and being
a valuer is valuable because it makes us capable of living valuable lives, and
valuable lives are valuable because they are valuable for the person whose lives
they are.

What terminates the chain of dependence on (R*) is less a reflexive relation than a circle.
The direction of value explanation takes us from objects of value to valuers, from valuers to
lives, and from lives back to valuers. The circle is non-vicious to the extent that different
aspects of the valuer is appealed to. Plausibly, we appeal first to whatever particular cognitive
and dispositional features make for valuing, in the first instance, and to the individual being
or organism as a whole, in the second. Clearly, I have given the barest sketch of how this
alternative might be developed. It remains to give a detailed account of valuing, and it
remains to make the case that being a valuer in fact makes our lives go well. I cannot hope
to make those cases here, but I make some headway elsewhere.
. Conclusion
The task of the present paper has been to present various alternatives to terminating a chain
of dependence between values in value simpliciter. I take there to be at least two plausible
alternatives, what I have called options (C) and (R*). I have given reason to prefer (R*) on
grounds that it preserves an important desideratum in an account of the value of human
beings, namely, that our value is non-derivative on the value of anything else. I have sought
to develop (R*) by drawing on the views of Korsgaard and Raz to the effect that what makes
human beings valuable is that we are valuers. If R* can be suitably explicated and defended
we can retain the idea that human beings are valuable in virtue of being valuers at the same
time as we take the value of human beings to be continuous with the value of other things in
being valuable for something or someone. At least, the possibility of a plausible alternative
to terminating the regress in value simpliciter gives us reason to develop an account of the
value of human beings without making recourse to the notion of value simpliciter.
see ‘On the Value of Human Beings’.

 On the Value of Human Beings
. Introduction
I begin with a very basic thought. We think human beings should be treated in certain
ways and not in others—that we are subjects of ethical concern. We needn’t think human
beings are unique in this respect. We think there are ways we should and should not treat
animals, and alien beings (should any be discovered). And there is a case to be made for
ancient ruins, and mountain ranges; for childhood keepsakes, and works of art. Whereas
once, at least in some quarters, all of ethical theory was thought to fall out of a doctrine
of respect for human beings, this is now widely recognised to be implausible. Still, we can
identify a mistake while we see the impulse to make it: what we owe to human beings is a
part, a very central part, of ethics.
From what we owe to human beings it is a short, albeit not a trivial, step to the value of
human beings. We take that step when we ask what it is about human beings that makes
us subjects of ethical concern. That we ‘have an elbow’, or ‘a vestigial appendage’, that we
‘walk upright’, are so many joking candidates; but they make a serious point. If human
beings are such as to merit being treated in certain ways, it is because something about us is
good—is valuable. The question of this paper is: what makes human beings valuable,
and accordingly, such as to be treated in certain ways and not in others?
The question is ambiguous. When we ask about the value of human beings we may
be asking about the feature or features on which our value depends—are we valuable in
virtue of being moral agents, or valuers in general; in virtue of being rational, self-conscious,
They are the joking candidates of Robert Nozick (, p. ).
Though there are differences in the notions ‘good’ and ‘valuable’ in ordinary usage, I will use them
interchangeably in what follows.
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or something else? Or we may be asking for an explanation of why the feature or features
confer value on us—does the feature simply make us valuable—valuable simpliciter? Or
does the feature make us valuable because it makes us good-for something or someone?
The question of the value of human beings in this way sets the stage for three tasks. One,
call it basis, is to make out the value-conferring feature of human beings. A second, call
it explanation, is to give an account of what makes that feature value-conferring. A third,
call it response, is to show how ethical responses to human beings are responses to the
value-conferring feature of us.
This paper forms part of an argument by inference to the best explanation for an account
of the value of human beings. In full, the argument aims to establish that the account
provides an explanation of the value of human beings, and that this explanation is preferable
to the alternatives. Though I will at points remark on the comparative explanatory merits of
my account, my focus here is on providing the explanation. That is, in this paper, my central
aim is to describe a possible basis of human value, to show that it provides an explanation
of human value, and to describe the reasons to which it gives rise. On my account, the
basis of human value is our capacity to have final ends, that is, as a first approximation, the
capacity to pursue interests, projects, self-ideals, and relationships for their own sake. I will
propose an account of what it is to have final ends, but it is the novel explanation of how
this grounds human value that is of distinct philosophical interest. It rests on a plausible
conception of the nature of value in general, and has been overlooked in the literature.
The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin, in Section ., with an analysis of what
it is to have final ends. Adapting a proposal of Samuel Scheffler (), I argue that the
capacity to have final ends is constituted by a set of cognitive, emotional, and deliberative
dispositions. To have a final end is (i) to believe that the end is (non-instrumentally)
valuable, (ii) to be guided by the end in long-range deliberation, (iii) to have a stable

disposition to treat the end as reason-giving in relevant deliberative contexts, and (iv) to be
emotionally susceptible to successes and failures in one’s pursuit of the end.
I turn, in Section ., to explanation. My explanation of the value of human beings
depends on the notion of benefit or goodness-for. I argue that having final ends makes
human beings valuable because it makes us capable of being good-for something or someone.
Who or what are human beings capable of being good-for? I make the case that having final
ends makes us capable, in the first place, of being good-for ourselves. That is, on my view,
the primary explanation of the value of human beings turns on our capacity to be good-for
ourselves. Note that there are several axes along which explanatory questions may be asked.
They may be metaphysical or more broadly meta-ethical. The explanatory question that
interests me here is whether value is a relational or a non-relational property in the sense
that is at issue in the distinction between value-for and value simpliciter. I am not here
asking meta-ethical questions, for example, about realism and anti-realism. Those questions
are off-stage for present purposes, though they are no doubt relevant for a full account of
the nature of the value of human beings.
The claim that our value turns on our being good-for ourselves has the air of a paradox.
It raises a question about the reasons we have to respond to human beings. If the capacity
to have final ends makes us valuable because it makes us good-for ourselves, what reason
should others have to respond to us? This is an instance of a more general worry, raised
for example by Donald H. Regan (), about the normative force of goodness-for. In
Section ., I argue that the worry rests on a misunderstanding about the theoretical role of
good-for. By examining a response to this worry due to Joseph Raz (), I show how my
account of the value of human beings gives rise to reasons to respond to human beings that
are reasons for everyone.
More particularly, in Section ., I show that by taking the basis of human value to

be the capacity to have final ends, we can help ourselves to an account of what we owe to
others that has some claim to being Kantian (though it is grounded in a non-Kantian theory
of value). On this conception, the value of human beings gives rise to reasons: (i) not to
impede or destroy the ability of others to have final ends, and (ii) to further or promote the
final ends of others.
The resulting proposal is distinctive in a number of ways. In the literature on the value
of human beings, the chief task is often taken to be that of determining the basis of human
value. The question of how the proposed basis explains the value of human beings is often
neglected. This is particularly evident in the Kantian literature. There, interpreters see the
main question as being whether the basis of human value is the capacity for autonomy, or
the capacity for setting ends, or a good will (or something else). But interpreters seldom
consider how these proposed bases confer value on their possessors, and what the status of
the value is meant to be.
Where the explanatory question is taken up, a traditional view is that human beings
are valuable in themselves, or good simpliciter. Something is good simpliciter iff its value
does not depend on its being good-for anything or anyone. This is sometimes put in
the language of absolute, intrinsic, or non-relational, value. I depart significantly from
traditional explanations in making no appeal to these value notions. A major motivation
for explaining human value in terms of good simpliciter is that explanations in terms of
good-for have not been thought forthcoming. The impetus of this paper is to offer a viable
explanation of the value of human beings which turns on our being good-for something
This is the guiding question in the interpretive disputes between, among others, Christine Korsgaard
(a), Allen Wood (), Paul Guyer (b) and Richard Dean ().
A notable exception is Oliver Sensen (a,b).
That human beings are good simpliciter is the position taken in Korsgaard (, a), and Raz ().
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or someone. This is to employ an explanation which makes our value continuous with
the value of other things. My task is to show that the account nevertheless captures what is
distinctive about human beings, and what is owed to human beings.
. The Basis of Human Value
Consider what we are asking about when we ask about the basis of value. Imagine we are in
the market for a transistor radio, and ask our friend what makes hers a good model. Or
imagine we are standing before a work of art, before one of Constantin Brancusi’s Bird in
Space, and ask ourselves: what makes it valuable? When our friend points to the portability
of her radio, and to the ease with which it picks up a signal, she is speaking to what I am
calling the basis question. Likewise, when we try to say something about the sleekness of
bronze on marble, or the sense we get of flight, and poise, we are pointing to features of
Brancusi’s sculpture on which its value supervenes—at least in our estimation.
To make claims about the features on which the value of an object in part supervenes
is to identify features of the object such that, necessarily, any object with those features,
together with other features of the object, has the value in question (and might not have it
without them). To make claims about the features on which the value of an object wholly
supervenes is to identify features of the object such that, necessarily, any object with those
features has the value in question (and might not have it without them). These features
admit of further categorisation. They can be further categorised as intrinsic or extrinsic
properties, as evaluative or non-evaluative, and so on. It is not uncontentious what precisely
these distinctions come to, and our classifications will not always be straightforward. But
Note that I will use the terms ‘valuable-for’ and ‘good-for’ interchangeably.
Is it obvious that a property like portability is a non-evaluative property? What if portability is a reason
to buy the radio? On some views about the nature of reasons, portability will be thought to constitute the

I leave these issues aside in what follows.
My hypothesis is that the value of human beings wholly supervenes on the capacity to
have final ends. What does that mean? To give content to the proposal, we need an account
of what it is to have final ends. As we will see, the account will be important when we turn
to the explanation of human value. Providing the account is the task of the present section.
The notion of a final end is familiar from Aristotle’s theory of action, and my account
owes a clear debt to Aristotle. I share the idea, for example, that an end is something we
aim to bring about via our actions, be it a product or an activity. I share the idea, too, that
our ends form chains of dependence that are hierarchically structured. One undertakes to
sharpen one’s pencil with a view to sketching out one’s argument, and one sketches out one’s
argument with a view to writing it up coherently, and one writes up arguments coherently
with a view to doing decent philosophy, and one does decent philosophy for its own sake.
What it means for the ends of sketching, writing and doing philosophy to be hierarchically
related is for the ends further downstream, philosophy in this case, to be those for the sake
of which the earlier, the upstream, actions are undertaken. Philosophy is in this way a final
end. As a final end it rationalises more local ends, and gives them direction and point. We
can put this by saying that final ends guide our long-range deliberations and give us a plan:
to write this novel, to be spontaneous, to restore the vintage motorcycle, to specialise in
pediatric surgery.
And yet, the notion of final ends which I will employ departs from Aristotle’s in
important respects. Aristotle is primarily interested in the idea that there is a most final
reason to buy it, in which case portability is an evaluative property after all. In that case, anything can be an
evaluative property, and the difference between the evaluative and the non-evaluative is not entirely useful.
I draw here from Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.
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end. Aristotle tells us that the most final end will be ‘complete’—that for the sake of
which everything else is undertaken, though it is not undertaken for the sake of anything
else; and ‘self-sufficient’—such that nothing could be added to make it better. I do not
assume that there is a most final end, and so, a fortiori, I do not assume that a final end
will be ‘complete’, and ‘self-sufficient’. My notion of final ends is relatively weak. On my
view, a final end can be pursued both for its own sake and for the sake of something else (as
a vocation is pursued both for its own sake, and for the sake of gainful employment). A
stronger notion of final ends may also require: (i) that a final end be an abstract value (for
Aristotle it is happiness, but other candidates might be freedom, justice, and rightness); and
(ii) that a final end be something an agent would not revoke, or put into question, when
pressed. My account of final ends is not committed to these further ideas.
What is more, my primary interest is in what it is to have a final end—in the attitudes
and dispositions involved in making something part of our life in the way that final ends are
part of our lives. This is not Aristotle’s primary concern, and his claims do not take us very
far in this direction. For an account of what it is to have a final end we must turn elsewhere.
To have a final end is to relate oneself to values in some way. A natural question, then,
is whether to have a final end just is to value something. Samuel Scheffler () gives the
most systematic account of valuing in the literature. At the heart of Scheffler’s account is the
observation that ‘to value’ is too simply analysed as ‘to desire for its own sake’, or ‘to believe
valuable’ (or some combination). We can desire something for its own sake without valuing
it (an ice-cream say); and we can believe that something is valuable without valuing it (I
can believe that fiction writing is valuable without valuing fiction writing myself ). Whereas
Note that on some interpretations of Aristotle, the most final end is disjunctive, i.e., a list of various
possible high-level final ends.
I am grateful to Katja Vogt for urging me to say more about my conception of ‘finality’.

there seems to be no upper limit to the number of things we can desire, and no upper limit
to the number of things we can believe valuable, there does seem to be an upper limit to the
number of things we can value (p. ). Valuing seems to involve more, and to have a richer
structure, than desiring or believing valuable. Scheffler makes the case for the following
four conditions. To value X involves at least (p. ):
i) A belief that X is good or valuable or worthy,
ii) A susceptibility to experience a range of context-dependent emotions regarding X,
iii) A disposition to experience these emotions as being merited or appropriate,
iv) A disposition to treat certain kinds of X-related considerations as reasons for action
in relevant deliberative contexts.
So if I value my sister, I believe that she (and possibly our relationship) is valuable. But more
than that, I am susceptible to disappointment if she cannot make the trip from England,
and to delight if good news comes her way. I am disposed to find these appropriate ways to
feel about her. Moreover, when she receives the good news, I am inclined to celebrate it
with her, and when she makes the trip from England, I make plans to do things I know she
will enjoy.
Do Scheffler’s conditions capture all we want for an account of having final ends?
It is important to note that his concern is to give an analysis of the ordinary notion of
I should note that it is not obvious to me that there is a single notion of ‘valuing’ at issue in philosophical
discussions. While the account of Joseph Raz () bears comparison with that of Scheffler—valuing for Raz
involves belief that the object valued is valuable, together with a range of attitudes and responses appropriate
to the value (p. , fn. )—Raz envisages different stages of relating to values. We acknowledge values when
we form beliefs and other attitudes that are consistent with the value they have (p. ). We respect values when
we do not destroy, and perhaps make an effort to preserve, them (p. ). And we engage with values when we
participate with values more full-bloodedly: “when we listen to music with attention and discrimination, read
a novel with understanding, climb rocks using our skill to cope, spend time with friends in ways appropriate
to our relationships with them, and so on and so forth” (pp. -). I will remark on an important point of
difference between the accounts of Raz and Scheffler below.

‘valuing’. Among the things we can ordinarily be said to value, for Scheffler, are projects and
relationships, but also a family photograph, a friend’s sense of humour, and the opinion
of a trusted advisor (p.  and passim). I am prepared to grant that we use the notion
of ‘valuing’ to cover this range of phenomena. But the list makes clear that the notion is
importantly different from the notion of having final ends. One cannot have a friend’s sense
of humour as a final end, nor a family photograph, nor someone’s opinion. These are not,
in the relevant sense, ends; nor are they capable of giving deliberative structure to a life in
the manner of final ends.
Still, Scheffler’s conditions might be thought to capture important components of the
final ends idea. The first is the condition of believing valuable. Valuing, we might think,
involves believing valuable to the extent that it is a rational attitude. An attitude is rational
if it is responsive to reasons, and being responsive to reasons involves (at least tacit) belief
in some good-making feature of the object responded to. We form intentions on the basis
of this belief. We interpret and explain the actions of others by attributing this belief to
them. Or so I will assume. This conception of the relation between agents and value is
my motivation for building ‘believing valuable’ into the account of what it is to have final
ends. On my view, valuing, like having final ends, is a rational attitude, and accordingly, I
will assume that it involves believing valuable.
The second is the condition of emotional susceptibility. For Scheffler, if the photograph
one values is destroyed, one is disposed to be upset by its destruction; if the friend loses
Compare T. M. Scanlon (, p. ): "We value many different kinds of things, including, at least the
following: objects and their properties (such as beauty), persons, skills and talents, states of character, actions,
accomplishments, activities and pursuits, relationships and ideals".
For an argument to this end, see Chapter  of Joseph Raz (); Raz (); Raz (, pp. -).
Scheffler’s motivation for including the condition of believing valuable is less theoretical. Scheffler takes
the condition to be part of the ordinary meaning of ‘to value’. In this he draws a contrast with the ordinary
notion of ‘to care’, which, he says, does not involve believing valuable.
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her sense of humour, one is disposed to be worried about one’s friend—even disenchanted
with her. It seems right that having final ends will be partly constituted by this kind of
susceptibility. And yet, it seems the character of emotional susceptibility in the case of final
ends will have a different structure. Recall that final ends guide one’s conception of one’s
life, and one’s long-range deliberations. It seems that one will be vulnerable to how and
whether one’s conception comes to pass, and to what interim successes and failures mean for
one’s conception. It will be a susceptibility not in the first place to the object one pursues,
but to one’s pursuit of it—not to the fate of mathematics, but to the fate of one’s pursuit of
mathematics. The vulnerability will be to how the end turns out for one.
Scheffler’s fourth condition concerns dispositions to act. For Scheffler, when one values
something, one is disposed to treat it as reason-giving, not merely in a single context—
once—but in contexts that are relevantly similar. The condition should capture the
sense in which someone cannot value for an instant, but only over time, and with a degree
of persistence. As it stands, however, the condition is too weak to capture the temporal
dimension. For a person can have and then lose a disposition to treat something as reason-
giving in relevant contexts. In a burst of enthusiasm, I can be disposed to treat writing
as reason-giving in relevant contexts in the future, and lose that disposition as soon as I
sit down to write. To value writing, the disposition to treat writing as reason-giving must
itself be stable. This seems true of having final ends, too. The disposition to treat an end as
Scheffler’s third condition is being disposed to find one’s emotional susceptibility appropriate. I take this
condition to be entailed by the belief that the end is valuable, together with the susceptibility to experience
emotions regarding one’s success or failure in pursuit of the end. Accordingly, I do not list it as a separate
condition. The entailment requires the assumption that believing valuable entails (at least tacitly) believing
that emotional susceptibility is appropriate; and it requires the assumption that being emotionally susceptible
entails (at least tacitly) believing that one is emotionally susceptible.
That valuing, for Scheffler, is in this way multi-contextual is a point of difference from Raz (). At
least where Raz speaks of engaging values, nothing rules out the possibility that one can properly engage with
values on a single occasion, as when one goes to the opera, listens with appreciation and understanding, and
never goes again. I will come back to this difference in Section ..
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reason-giving in relevant contexts must be a stable feature of one’s motivations.
In sum, I take having final ends to include, but to go beyond, valuing in Scheffler’s
sense. On the model of Scheffler’s four conditions, I propose that one has a final end iff
one:
i) has a belief that the end is valuable,
ii) is guided by the end in long-range deliberation,
iii) has a stable disposition to treat the end as reason-giving in relevant deliberative
contexts,
iv) has a susceptibility to experience a range of appropriate emotions regarding the
success or failure of one’s pursuit of the end.
So if appreciation of vintage motorcycles is a final end for me, then I believe that appreciation
of vintage motorcycles is valuable. But more than that, I am disposed to plan my vacation
time around the annual expo, or to restore the motorcycle that has been fifty years in the
family. In the meantime, I am disposed to read the relevant trade magazines, and to scour
trading sites for hard to find parts. Should I fail to find the signature handle bars for the
restoration, then I am disposed to feel frustrated. Should the bike be restored to its former
stature, and a glory trip taken around the country, I am disposed to take real pleasure in the
execution of my plan.
This point about motivational stability is emphasised by Harry Frankfurt () in his account of caring.
To care about something, for Frankfurt, is to be committed to caring about it: “[t]he question of whether
a person cares about something pertains essentially to whether he is committed to his desire for it [. . . ]
or whether he is willing and prepared to give the desire up and to have it excluded from the order of his
preferences” (p. ). My view differs from Frankfurt’s in that having final ends involves (but is not wholly
constituted by) a commitment to having the end. And though Frankfurt takes the commitment to feature in
the content of the attitude of caring itself, it need not. The commitment could be a fact about the person. For
example, it could be a second-order dispositional fact.

Obviously, there is more to say about final ends. Some final ends will have a clear
end-point or moment of completion. Others will be more diffuse, with no clear end-point.
It seems possible to have a final end without knowing that one has it as an end, or without
knowing that the end is final. It may be that one’s final ends reveal themselves in one’s
behavior, rather than in one’s avowals and claims. A person may have several final ends,
and they may be of varying importance to her. Final ends may be related to one another in
various ways (hierarchically, or as parts of wholes, or in some other way); or they may be
largely unrelated. Though it is possible for final ends to be largely unrelated, there may be
normative pressure to unify them. There are likely other constraints. For example, a person’s
final ends cannot be manifestly incompatible with one another (as being a long distance
runner is incompatible with being a sumo wrestler). I raise these points to indicate some
of the further issues and open questions. But I will largely set them aside in what follows.
. The Explanation of Human Value
That it is some kind of involvement with values that makes human beings valuable is a
common starting point in accounts of human value. I am taking as a hypothesis that the
kind of involvement with values at issue is having final ends, and I have given an account of
what it is to have final ends. My strategy is to defend the account by showing how it yields a
plausible explanation of the value of human beings. It is to this explanation that I now turn.
So far, in speaking of the features on which the value of an object supervenes, I have said
nothing about why those features make the objects valuable. Why, to return to our earlier
I am grateful to Wolfgang Mann for discussion on this point.
I owe this example to Wolfgang Mann.
It is central to the account of human value in Christine Korsgaard (, a, d), and Joseph Raz
(, ), and part of the proposal of Robert Nozick ().

examples, is being portable such as to make a radio valuable? And why is being made of
bronze, or evoking flight, such as to make Brancusi’s sculpture valuable? If the radio is easy
to carry, we might take it out to the garden to listen to a program while we prune the fruit
trees. Being made of bronze, we might say, the statue has a certain luminosity; while evoking
flight, the statue expresses certain physical concepts (space, mass, balance, curvature) in
an unusual or imaginative way. These are candidate answers to what I am calling the
explanatory question: what makes a property, or a set of properties, value-conferring? The
first thing to note about the explanations just given is that they are partial. We can raise
explanatory questions anew of each of them: what about being able to listen to a program
while we work in the garden makes the radio valuable? What about being luminous, and
what about the expression of physical concepts, makes the sculpture valuable? Perhaps
we will say that working to a program in the garden makes the work pass more quickly.
Perhaps we think that, in being luminous, the sculpture affords a pleasant visual sensation,
and pleasure just is good—good simpliciter. Perhaps we take the expression of physical
concepts to enrich our understanding of how the world works, where understanding the
world is part of what enriches a life. It is possible for at least some of these explanations to be
pushed further. And it is likely that the explanations given are overly schematic. Presumably,
the way in which Brancusi’s sculptures enrich our understanding of physical concepts is
connected with their capacity to bring pleasure, and so on.
These explanations admit of classification, and this classification is of some importance
for what follows. It seems we have broadly two kinds of explanation here. We have features
of an object which purport to make it valuable in itself—valuable simpliciter; and we
have features of an object which purport to make it valuable-for something or someone.
Moreover, there seem to be two ways something can be valuable-for something or someone.
It can be valuable in virtue of the causal contribution it makes to something else of value,

call this instrumental value; or it can be valuable in virtue of being part or constitutive of
something else of value, call this non-instrumental value. So if the explanation of the value
of having a pleasant visual sensation is that a pleasant visual sensation just is good, then a
pleasant sensation has value simpliciter (value whether or not it is has value-for anything).
If the explanation of the good of having a radio in the garden is that it makes our work pass
more quickly, then having a portable radio is instrumentally valuable-for someone. If the
explanation of the good of understanding the workings of things is that it is part of what
enriches our lives, then the value of having an understanding of things is non-instrumentally
valuable-for someone.
In setting up the explanatory distinction as a distinction between good and good-for,
I am following Raz (, pp. -, and passim). I take the distinction between good
and good-for to be an instance of a more general distinction between non-relational and
relational value. Something has non-relational value iff its value does not depend on its
relationship to something or someone. Something has relational value iff its value depends
on its relationship to something or someone. It is possible for something to have relational
value without being good-for something or someone. For example, the value of a good will
for a Kantian may be thought to depend on a relationship to valuers, though its value does
not depend on its being good-for something or someone. Some commentators, for example,
Michael Smith (), treat relational value as synonymous with good-for. Though one can
stipulate terms as one sees fit, I think this usage elides important differences. My interest
here is in the notion of good-for, and though good-for is a form of relational value, it
is a specific kind of relational value. Note that there are important further questions
about what it is for something to be valuable simpliciter, and what it is for something to be
On relational as against absolute value, see Railton (, p. , and passim).
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valuable-for something or someone. But for present purposes, I will not take a stand on
them.
.. The value of human beings as bearers of final ends
So much for the theoretical options for explaining value in general. The argument now
proceeds as follows. In ‘On Regress Arguments for the Value of Valuers’ I made conceptual
space for an account on which the capacity to pursue final ends makes us valuable by making
us valuable-for something or someone. I considered an option on which the capacity to
pursue final ends makes us valuable-for other human beings, and I considered an option on
which it makes us valuable-for ourselves. For reasons I gave there, it is the second option
that I wish to develop. So the question I am asking now is: how does the capacity for having
final ends make us valuable by making us good-for ourselves? First we need to give content
to the notion of being good-for ourselves. By being good-for ourselves I mean that we are
good-for our lives. The proposal I am considering, then, is that the capacity for having final
ends makes us valuable by making us good for our lives. In fact, the proposal is weaker than
that. It is that the capacity to pursue final ends makes us capable of being good-for our lives.
In a clear sense the success of this explanation depends on its being the case that the pursuit
There are several competing accounts of ‘good-for’ in the literature. Though their accounts differ in
important respects, Richard Kraut () and Connie Rosati () both treat X’s being good-for S as a
relation of fit or suitability between X and S, something about which there are attitude independent facts of
the matter. There is agreement between them that: (i) good-for should not be understood, perspectivally, as
good from someone’s point of view; (ii) good-for should not be understood as good and occurs in the life of;
(iii) good-for need not be relative to particular agents, but can be relative to groups; (iv) X’s being good-for Y
depends on facts about the nature of X and facts about the nature of Y; (v) what is good-for human beings
does not depend on (though it may be affected by) what human beings want. Rosati gives a further analysis
of the relation of fit, so that ‘good-for’ is a second-order relational property of being productive of a set of
features which she enumerates. See Rosati (, pp. -). On the differences between Kraut and Rosati,
see Rosati (). Prominent subjectivist accounts of ‘good-for’ are given by Peter Railton (), for whom
X is good-for S iff X is such as to be desired by S were S fully informed and ideally rational; and by Wayne
Sumner (), for whom, roughly, X is good-for S iff S has a favourable attitude toward X, and that attitude
is ‘authentic’.

of final ends makes us capable of living a good life. That is, it must be shown how each of
the conditions on having a final end analysed in Section . is a constituent of a good life. I
am committed to treating the four conditions as necessary components of a good life, and
as the sufficient components contributed by subjects. Let me consider the conditions in
turn.
Is it plausible to think that a good life is a life in which a person pursues some project,
self-ideal, or commitment which she believes to be valuable (condition I)? I think it is. It
would be bad-for someone to pursue a project or commitment which she believed to be
disvaluable, or of no independent value. If there is a rational connection between pursuing
something and believing that it has some value, then pursuing an end which is believed to
be disvaluable, or of no independent value, will be irrational or incoherent. While certain
aspects of our lives may be marked by irrationality or incoherence without harm, it would
be harmful for our pursuit of final ends to be irrational, since final ends play a structuring
role in our long-range deliberations.
Is it plausible to think that a good life is a life in which a person is guided by a final
The qualification “sufficient components contributed by subjects” is meant to allow that fortune also
contributes to our lives going well, but that the contributions of fortune are irrelevant to our value.
Compare Harry Frankfurt. For Frankfurt, caring plays the central deliberative role that I envisage for
final ends, but Frankfurt maintains that we can appropriately care about something without believing that it
has value. In Frankfurt’s analogy, the perspective of the carer on the object of care is akin to the perspective
of a God who loves human beings without regard for their antecedent worth (, p. ). We can care, in
Frankfurt’s idiom, for no reason, or at least, for no reason independently of our caring. Frankfurt () cites
care of one’s children as paradigmatic here: one does not care about one’s children because one recognises that
they have value (p.  and passim). But is this a clear example of caring for no reason? Perhaps the reason is
simply that the children are one’s own. (I owe this point to Katja Vogt). Indeed, it is difficult to find a case
in which it can truly be said of someone that she cares for no reason. One might venture Scheffler’s (,
p. ) example of a Red Sox fan who cares how his team does against the Yankees (without thinking them
more worthy of support). But what would we make of the team supporter whose support was wholly without
evaluative thoughts and reasons? It seems to me that his support would itself be lacking something. It is
striking that fans tend to yoke their support to narratives that bring out the good-making features of the team,
or of its victory: that winning would give a key retiring player a chance at the championship that has always
eluded him; that this is a team trained up from grass-roots; that the opposition play a cynical kind of game;
and so on.
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end in her long-range deliberations and plans (condition II)? To have a final end is to be
a certain kind of valuer. But consider the difference between what I will call basic valuing
and final ends valuing. To be a basic valuer is to be guided by normative features of the
world in the formation of intentions to act, beliefs, emotions, and other attitudes. It
is consistent with basic valuing that our responses to normative features of the world be
relatively unsystematic; we respond to this and then that, but our responses need not sum
to anything. Final ends valuation involves basic valuation—it involves responding to this
and that normative feature of the world—but it involves having basic valuation summed,
cohered, or unified in specifiable ways. The responses of the valuer with final ends are
directed over time. Local responses are guided by longer-range objectives, and this gives
them a larger structure and point.
That a good life in this way involves deliberative unity, or cohesion, is an old thought.
I can do little more than provide initial motivation for it here. It may be helpful to note
that it is compatible with my view that a person has as a final end the self-ideal of being
spontaneous, or of engaging with the manifold offerings of the world as they present
themselves. And it is compatible with my view that final ends like these contribute to a
good life. What I deny is that the life of someone who pursues ends without a structure or
plan will be well-going. Should the reader find this too strong, I challenge her to substitute
a weaker account of the basis of human value that yields the requisite explanation. Raz
(, pp. -, f.n ) draws a distinction between something’s being good-for someone,
and something’s making someone good. He says: “It is, other things being equal, good for
me to have this ice cream now. It does not follow that it will make my life, let alone me,
better to have it”. In a similar way, I would urge that to engage with values in the manner of
a basic valuer may be good-for her, but it need not make her valuable. To make her valuable
See (Raz, , p. ).
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she would need to have, among other things, basic valuation summed, cohered and unified
in the manner of final ends valuing.
The third condition is related to the second, and the argument is the same. Not only
must more particular ends be guided by longer-term objectives, but a person must have
stable dispositions to engage with the end (and end-related activities) over time. Without
that, his engagement will be superficial, and may not count as engagement at all. And a life
without sustained engagement cannot be well-going.
The fourth condition involves appropriate emotional response to how one’s final ends
turn out. It seems right that appropriate emotional response will be part of what constitutes
a good life. A person with the appropriate emotional responses will find meaning and point
in what she does; she will pursue her projects with energy. Dissatisfaction in how her ends
turn out will lead her to adjust her plans, or to pursue them differently. It is plausible that
someone who neither finds satisfaction in her pursuit of final ends, nor dissatisfaction when
her ends encounter difficulties, will not pursue those ends in the right way. And a life
without the engaged pursuit of final ends will not be well-going.
Of course, it is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full account of a good life. My
interest in outlining these connections between the capacity to have final ends and the
nature of a good life is twofold. On the one hand, it helps to show what being good-for
ourselves amounts to; on the other hand, it shows how the capacity to have final ends makes
us good-for ourselves.
What, then, of the value of a good life? On some views, the existence of a good life
will be thought to be a better state of affairs (for the universe) than the existence of a bad
life; a good life will be thought to have value in itself, or simpliciter. But if we think that
something is valuable only if it is capable of being good-for something or someone, as I do,
we should say that a good life is valuable because it is good-for the person whose life it is.
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We are now in a position to appreciate a refinement to the account. It should be clear
from the foregoing that I am conceiving of a good life in normative terms. Some people
think we can undertake a value-free investigation into the well-going life for human beings.
I think this is implausible. I think that an account of a good life will be normative through
and through. So, on my view, someone who pursues ethically bad ends will not have
a good life. The refinement is that to be capable of having a good life—and so to be
valuable—human beings must be capable of pursuing valuable final ends. What is more,
they must be capable of pursuing valuable final ends that are appropriate to them, given
their aptitudes, interests, cultural background, genetic make-up, and so on. There are many
valuable things, but not all valuable things are valuable-for all people. Our choices among
values are crucial.
Finally, let me make a remark about capacities. It is plausible that a capacity is valuable
only if there is a live possibility that it will be exercised. A person who lives in conditions
of deprivation may not now be in a position to exercise her capacity to lead a good life.
But she will if conditions change, or she moves elsewhere. Matters are different when
someone’s capacity has no possibility of being exercised, for example, in cases of profound
disability, or irreversible coma. It is implausible to account for the value of these people, and
our duties towards them, by saying that they are capable of having final ends, and therewith,
of leading a good life. For if it makes sense to say that these people have the relevant
capacity—and it may not—it is unclear that the capacity is valuable. My account does
For a classic defense of this way of reading Aristotle, see M. F. Burnyeat ().
On this point, see Connie Rosati (), including her discussion of the sense in which what is good-for
us is both discovered and invented.
See Raz (, p. ).
It is plausible to think that it is precisely because people living in conditions of deprivation cannot exercise
their capacity for a good life that we are obliged to do what we can to change those conditions.

not provide guidance in these cases. They are difficult cases, and there may be normative
reasons not to treat them as more clear than they are. For present purposes I set such
cases aside as the topic for another paper.
. The Response to Human Value
My proposal that the value of human beings turns on our being capable of being good-for
ourselves has the air of a paradox. It can look as if we have an account of the value of each
person to him or herself, but not to others. So it can seem as if we need a further story
to take us from value in our own case to value in the case of others. This impression is
understandable, but it rests on a misunderstanding about the relationship between the basis
of human value, the explanation of human value, and the reasons for action.
One way to put the objection is in terms of the viability of the notion of good-for on
which it crucially relies. Donald Regan () has recently raised such a challenge for the
good-for theorist. It turns on the normative force of good-for. Good-for is normatively
inert, according to Regan, because the good-for someone makes no claims on anyone else.
In his example, if the good-for Abel is peculiarly Abel’s, then why should Cain care? We
think there is a deep connection between values and reasons, so if the good is relative to
Abel, it would seem to create only Abel-relative reasons. If Regan is right, the consequences
for my account of human value would be very bad indeed. We want to be able to say
that everyone has reason to treat human beings in certain ways and not in other ways. Put
otherwise, we want an account of human value to deliver agent-neutral reasons to respond
Compare Matthew Liao () who argues that we can give precise, biological criteria for “human moral
status”, where that includes anencephalic infants, people in persistent coma, and comparable cases.
Regan’s objection takes the form of a dilemma, but for present purposes I pass over the first horn. In my
view, it has been adequately rejected by Raz (, pp. -). See also Rosati (). Regan’s objection is a
version of G. E. Moore’s (, p. ) argument against egoism. On Moore’s argument, see Michael Smith
().
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to human beings. The immediate task is to meet Regan’s objection.
Joseph Raz (, pp. -) responds to the objection in the following way. Raz
allows that all good is good-for. That is, as I would put it, Raz allows that good and
good-for are mutually entailed: something is good iff it is good-for something or someone.
Still, there is a question of which, good or good-for, has explanatory priority. As we might
put the question: is X good because it is good-for something or someone? Or is X good-for
something or someone because it is good? Raz takes the second option: X is good-for
something or someone because it is good. Good has explanatory priority, and it is for this
reason that what is good, though it is necessarily good-for something or someone, can give
rise to reasons for everyone. From the explanatory priority of good over good-for, Raz rejects
Regan’s challenge. He adduces the following piece of linguistic data. We say: “It would
be good for you to read this novel. It’s really excellent”. (So ‘good’, or as here ‘excellence’,
has explanatory priority over ‘good-for’). Moreover, it is that very quality, being excellent,
which makes it good-for others too. It is good-for you for the same reason that it is good-for
me: it is an excellent book. (So though values are valuable-for something or someone, they
can give rise to reasons for everyone).
While Raz secures the conclusion we are after, he does so at a significant cost. Raz
makes an important concession to the Regan style view. Though he allows that all values are
value-for something or someone, he denies that good just is good-for. I would defend the
stronger claim. I would defend the claim that X is good because it is good-for something or
someone. That is to take explanatory priority in the reverse direction. When we explain
the value of something we do so by pointing to what it is good-for. A pencil is good
because it allows us to make marginalia, a gift is good because it allows us to show gratitude
Raz supposes this for the sake of argument here; he denies it elsewhere—for example in Raz ().
That good just is good-for is defended by, for example, Kraut ().
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for hospitality, a trip to the museum is good because it enlivens our studies, and so on.
Pencils, gifts, and museums are good because they make a positive difference to something
or someone: they are of use or of benefit to something or someone. What are we to make of
the linguistic data Raz adduces against this reading of explanatory priority? Raz says we say:
“It would be good for you to read this novel. It’s really excellent”. But metaphysical theses
cannot be read directly from claims about what we ordinarily say. What matters is not what
we say, but what makes what we say true. Is there a reading of the sentence compatible with
the explanatory priority of good-for over good?
On my view, as on Raz’s, the book is excellent—it has value. As with all valuable things,
we can say more about that in virtue of which it has value. What makes the book valuable is
that it is formally innovative, psychologically insightful and perceptive about the anti-social
emotions—about enmity, jealousy, and avarice. These are properties on which the value of
the book (at least in part) supervenes; they are the basis of its value. So we might imagine
the following conversation:
“It would be good for you to read this book. It’s really excellent”.
“Why? What’s good about it?”.
“Well, it is a novel but it makes use of letters, diary entries and the text of
lectures to bring together the world of many characters . . . . The characters
each represent one of the vices . . . ”
This is to give a further specification of what the value of the book consists in, we might say.
And yet, so far, we have said nothing about what makes those properties valuable properties.
They could be valuable because they just have value, or because they are valued by human
beings, or because they stand in some relation to a stone in the corner of the universe. On
the view I am proposing, what explains the value of these properties is that they are (capable
of being) good-for readers. (I leave the details of that story to one side here). So what makes

it true that it is an excellent book is that it has properties xyz. Properties xyz form the basis
of the value of the book. But what makes properties xyz valuable properties is that they
are capable of being good-for readers. This is to give an account of the truth-conditions of
Raz’s statement that is compatible with treating good-for as explanatorily fundamental.
Now it is from his argument for the explanatory priority of good over good-for that
Raz meets Regan’s objection. In rejecting Raz’s argument have I lost my recourse to his
conclusion? I have not. On my view, as on Raz’s view, the book has value. And I accept that
if something is good-for something or someone, it is good; good and good-for are mutually
entailed. What is more, I accept that it is the fact that the book has value (is excellent) that
makes it the case that (all things being equal) we should read it. That is, it is the fact that X
is good that gives rise to reasons in regard to it, and these are reasons for anyone. I have
given a further specification of what the value of the book consists in. It is good in virtue
of being formally innovative, psychologically perceptive, and so on. These are properties
the book has whether you read it, or whether I read it. What is important is that, from the
point of view of reasons for action, it is unimportant how the value of the book is explained:
whether it just has value, whether it is related to a stone in the corner of the universe, or
whether it is good-for readers. What we should respond to when we respond to books, as to
people, is their value. This is Raz’s conclusion, and I am perfectly eligible to draw it.
How does all this bear on the account of human value? Our starting point was that
human beings are valuable. We asked: what is valuable about human beings—what is the
basis of our value? On my view, human beings are valuable in virtue of our capacity for
having final ends. But we can ask a further question. We can ask: how does the capacity for
having final ends confer value on human beings—what makes the capacity value conferring?
On my view, the capacity confers value on us because it makes us capable of being good-for
ourselves. I hypothesise that all value is value-for, and that the best way to construe the

value of human beings is by taking us to bear a relation to ourselves—a relation of being
good-for ourselves. Now the worry was that in giving this explanation, the account lacks
normative force. To adapt Regan’s objection, the worry was that if Fitzgerald has value
because he is good-for himself, then no-one but Fitzgerald has reason to value him. We are
now in a position to see that the worry rests on a confusion about the status of the appeal
to good-for. To say that Fitzgerald is capable of being good-for something in virtue of his
capacity to have final ends is to explain how the capacity to have final ends makes Fitzgerald
valuable. But it remains the case that Fitzgerald is valuable. Moreover, it remains the case
that he is valuable in a specifiable way: as capable of having final ends. The solution to
Regan’s charge is that it is Fitzgerald’s value that gives rise to reasons to respond to him in
certain ways. More particularly, it is the fact that he is capable of having final ends that
makes it the case that we have reasons in regard to him. As we will see, it is the fact that he
is capable of having final ends that gives content to the reasons we have.
. The Responses We Should Have
Throughout this paper I have relied on a three-fold distinction regarding objects of value.
There is (i) the basis of value, there is (ii) the explanation of the value of the basis, and there
is (iii) the practical response to which the value gives rise. I have argued that the value of
human beings gives rise to reasons that are reasons for everyone. I have put this, in Regan’s
terms, by saying that the value of human beings has normative force. But a full account will
show, more particularly, the reasons we have. At least, it will show the basic forms of ethical
Frankfurt (, p. ) says we can care about something because we believe that the activity of caring
itself has value. Caring itself gives rise to reasons to care. So we can properly care about X because we believe
that caring about something is good for us (and we believe that we can care about X and not about Y). This is
to invoke the good of caring at the wrong theoretical juncture. That caring is good-for us does not give us
reason to care, nor does it give other people reason to respond to us as carers. Rather, it explains what is good
about caring, and it is the goodness of caring that gives us reasons to care.

consideration that are owed to human beings.
It is a common philosophical assumption that there is a deep connection between values
and reasons. This is a metaphysical assumption, but it has epistemological implications.
The value of something shows us the reasons we have (and vice versa). Moreover, to
the extent that the basis of the value tells us what the value consists in, it is the basis that
determines, more particularly, the reasons we have. If the basis of human value is that we
have the capacity for having final ends, then our response should be to human beings as
bearers of final ends. But to say that we should respond to human beings as bearers of final
ends takes only us so far. We need to know, further, the kind of response in question.
I maintain that we should respond to human beings as capable of having final ends
by, on the one hand, respecting their capacity, and on the other, by promoting their ends.
While I have not given a Kantian account of the value of human beings, this is a basically
Kantian point. Kant thinks we are to adopt principles of action which further the ends of
others. In the Metaphysics of Morals he introduces the framework in which we are to do so
with metaphors of attraction and repulsion. We are to imagine that our external relations
with others are governed by two forces:
I have put the point in a way that is neutral about the relative priority of values and reasons. The present
point depends only on there being a connection between them. But of course there are larger questions about
which has priority. If one thinks that value, and more particularly, value-for, plays an ineliminable theoretical
role in explaining the propensity of certain features to give rise to reasons for action, then one is committed
to the priority of values over reasons. In that case, one denies that the notion of a ‘reason’ is explanatorily
primitive. This is the position taken by Richard Kraut (, pp. -), in opposition to T. M. Scanlon
(, pp. -). In addition to the question about priority, there is a further question about ‘buckpassing’,
in the term introduced by Scanlon. For Scanlon, to be good is to have other properties that give us reasons.
Goodness is in this way a second-order property, and it is not in itself reason-giving. Understood this way, my
account is compatible with buckpassing. On my view, it is fine to say that what gives rise to reasons for action
are facts about something’s nature, for example, being such as to have final ends, so that goodness itself plays
no direct normative role. But I bypass this question here.
As Raz (, pp. -) makes the point, “the value of what has value, and the action it is a reason for,
are intrinsically connected”. See also Nozick (, p. ).
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The principle of mutual love admonishes [human beings] constantly to come
closer to one another; that of the respect they owe one another, to keep them-
selves at a distance from one another (:)
As Kant goes on to unpack the metaphors, mutual love requires us to adopt principles of
active benevolence towards others. Active benevolence expresses itself in a requirement
to “make others’ ends my own”. That means we are to help others realise their interests
and projects, insofar as we do not judge them to be bad for themselves or others. But the
requirement to respect others means that we are to make the ends of others our own without
forcing our ends on them. This calls for non-paternalism on our part.
I find it plausible that a basic form of ethical consideration that we owe to human
beings is (i) to respect human beings by not impeding their ability to have final ends, and
(ii) to further or promote their ends. There are remaining questions about precisely what
behaviours are compatible with (i) and (ii). For Kant, (i) involves the avoidance of contempt,
arrogance, and ridicule, where (ii) involves cultivating generosity and sympathetic feeling.
Clearly there is more to say. There are questions about whether these further behaviours
can be derived from the principle to not impede the ability of people to have final ends,
and to further their ends. There are also questions about the status of the principle. For
Kant and Kantians the principle is categorically binding. While I take the reasons we have
to respond to human beings to hold independently of anyone’s desires, since I take the
explanation of the reason-giving force of having final ends to turn on its being good-for
something or someone, I deny that the principle is categorically binding. It remains to
be made out how it compares with other principles or reasons. Likely, the stringency of
Onora O’Neill (, pp. -) develops this point about non-paternalism. On the tensions between
respect and love, but the need to practice them in concert, see Vogt (a).
An influential criticism of Kantian attempts to derive concrete principles from the Formula of Humanity
is made by Frankena (). O’Neill () defends Kant. Raz () denies that derivation is possible, because
he takes the basic principle of respect for human beings to take specific cultural forms.
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principles or reasons will depend on the character of the value in question—on the features
which make it valuable. But these are further matters.
. Conclusion
My aim in this paper has been to show how an assumed basis of human value generates an
explanation of the value of human beings, and basic forms of ethical response to human
beings. I hope to have shown that the resulting account is plausible and attractive. In
fact, I believe my account has distinct advantages over accounts which invoke notions of
absolute, or non-relational value—what I have called value in itself, or value simpliciter.
There are at least three motivations for giving an explanation in those terms. The first
stems from an argument from the nature of value, an argument I consider and reject
elsewhere. The second stems from the desirability of making the explanation of human
beings non-derivative on the value of something else. I have shown that to explain the value
of human beings in terms of our being good-for ourselves is to make the value of human
beings non-derivative in the relevant sense. The third motivation stems from the would-be
distinctiveness of the value of human beings. To explain the value of human beings by
appeal to the notion of value simpliciter makes the value of human beings metaphysically
distinctive: unlike the explanation of the value of anything else. But I believe the explanation
of the value of human beings is continuous with the explanation of the value of other kinds of
things: radios, works of art, and friendship. So on my view, there is nothing metaphysically
distinctive about the value of human beings. And yet, we should still think human beings
are distinctively valuable. The distinctiveness of human beings, and of what is owed to
human beings, is plausibly captured by the distinctiveness of the properties on which our
In ‘On the Non-Relational Value of Human Beings by Regress’.
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value supervenes, and by the distinctiveness of the responses which they demand. We are
distinctive in virtue of having final ends, and it is our having final ends that gives rise to
reasons to treat us in certain ways, and not others. If that is right, then none of these
motivations provide reason to prefer an account in terms of value in itself over an account
in terms of value-for something or someone.
It is noteworthy that whereas Raz () argues that the nature of the value of human beings is metaphys-
ically distinctive in being non-relational, non-relationality plays no role in generating reasons to respond to
human beings in his account. It is the basis of the value—for Raz, that human beings are basic valuers—that
does the work.
Many people have provided helpful feedback on this paper. I would like to thank Guy Fletcher, Ben
Bramble, Matthew Noah Smith, and Wolfgang Mann for helpful feedback on earlier drafts, and for probing
questions. I am very grateful to Brad Weslake for incisive editorial suggestions, and ongoing philosophical
exchange. My debt to Joseph Raz is large, and will be obvious. I owe great thanks to Katja Vogt with whom I
have worked out my views on human value in conversations spanning some years.
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